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Akhil Reed Amar-
Victims of government-sponsored lawlessness have come to dread the
word "federalism." Whether emblazoned on the simple banner of "Our
Federalism"' or invoked in some grander phrase,2 the word is now regu-
larly deployed to thwart full remedies for violations of constitutional
rights. Consider, for example, the Burger Court. Rallying under flags of
federalism, the Justices pushed back remedies for segregation in public
schools,3 denied relief to citizens threatened by racially discriminatory po-
lice brutality,4 cut back federal habeas corpus for state prisoners convicted
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This essay is dedicated to the memory of my teacher, colleague, and friend, Robert M. Cover.
1. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
2. One of the Supreme Court's favorite formulations trumpets "principles of equity, comity, and
federalism." See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362, 379 (1976).
3. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974) (invoking "local autonomy" and
citing federalism principles of San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973)).
4. See, e.g., Lyons, 461 U.S. at 112; Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 379-80; cf. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.
488, 499 (1974) (using "federalism" to deny relief to citizen threatened by racially discriminatory
administration of criminal justice).
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in tainted trials,5 and forced lower federal courts to dismiss a broad range
of suits challenging unconstitutional state conduct.'
So too, "sovereignty" has become an oppressive concept in our courts. A
state government that orders or allows its officials to violate citizens' fed-
eral constitutional rights can invoke "sovereign" immunity from all liabil-
ity-even if such immunity means that the state's wrongdoing will go par-
tially or wholly unremedied.7  When the national government invades
constitutionally protected zones, "sovereign" immunity is once again
wheeled out to defeat the remedial imperative.'
To be sure, our Constitution does embody structural principles of feder-
alism and sovereignty. Yet that same document also guarantees certain
fundamental individual rights against government. Is the Constitution
therefore divided against itself? Is the way in which it constitutes political
bodies at war with the legal rights that it constitutionalizes?
In this essay, I hope to offer a neo-Federalist answer-one that allows
us to see how the Constitution's political structure of federalism and sov-
ereignty is designed to protect, not defeat, its legal substance of individual
rights.' I seek to counter the Supreme Court's version of federalism and
5. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982).
6. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977);
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Samuels v.
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
The Court also invoked "federalism" to excuse crabbed definitions of individual constitutional
rights against states. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 44, 50; infra note 252. This essay, however,
focuses on the implications of federalism for remedies for admitted violations of constitutional rights.
7. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663-69 (1974); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1883).
8. See, e.g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 691 n.11 (1949).
9. I use the term "neo-Federalist" for three reasons. First, the term highlights the emphasis I
place in my attempts to explicate the Constitution on The Federalist and other writings of Federalists
like Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and James Wilson. My neo-Federalism, however, sharply
contrasts with the new federalism championed by the new Chief Justice. While purporting to follow
the original intent of the framers of the Constitution (the Federalists), William Rehnquist has worked
to implement a vision far more congenial to those who opposed the Constitution (the so-called Anti-
Federalists). See Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE
L.J. 1317 (1982). The irony of the Chief Justice's rhetoric is enriched by the fact that the first
"Federalists" were themselves arguably guilty of a similar rhetorical sleight of mind in 1787. While
purporting to follow pure "federal" principles (hence their self-description), Hamilton et al. worked
to implement a vision with strong "national" (in contradistinction to "federal") elements: They
scrapped a pure federal league (the Articles of Confederation) for a Constitution founded on the
sovereignty of a national People. See infra text accompanying notes 91-170.
Second, the neo-Federalist label flags the fact that I am reading Federalist writings at a distance of
two centuries and through a lens colored by intervening historical events (such as the Civil War,
Reconstruction, and the civil rights movement) and current schools of legal thought (such as legal
process and law and economics). Neo-Federalism attempts to offer a useable past-a set of Federalist
doctrines in harmony with post-Federalist developments and the realities of twentieth-century life and
law.
Finally, the neo-Federalist tag connects this essay to an earlier essay, Amar, A Neo-Federalist View
of Article 11: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U.L. REV. 205 (1985). Both
works are part of a larger project consisting of a series of neo-Federalist essays on the structure of the
Constitution.
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sovereignty with the framers' version-to replace "Our Federalism" with
their federalism, and government sovereignty with popular sovereignty.
Section I of this essay revives the Federalist ideas that true sovereignty
in our system lies only in the People of the United States, and that all
governments are thus necessarily limited. These ideas pervade the Consti-
tution and inform its structure of federalism. In the martial language of
the eighteenth century, each limited government, state and national, can
serve as a "sentinel" to "check" the other's "encroachments" on the con-
stitutional rights reserved by the sovereign People. 0 Guided by emerging
principles of agency law and organization theory, the Federalists con-
sciously designed a dual-agency governance structure in which each set of
government agents would have incentives to monitor and enforce the
other's compliance with the corporate charter established by the People of
America."'
Some of the terrain explored in Section I should be familiar ground to
students of constitutional law today. Indeed, it is precisely the familiarity
of that section's basic ideas that sharpens my neo-Federalist critique of
current legal ideas in subsequent sections of this essay. Although judges
and scholars often chant the mottoes of popular sovereignty and limited
government, they have developed specific legal doctrines and thought pat-
terns that misapply these basic ideas. In Sections II and III, I examine
two areas of misapplication, involving governmental immunities and con-
stitutional remedies.
In Section II, I argue that no government entity can enjoy plenary "sov-
ereign" immunity from a suit alleging a violation of constitutional right.
"We the People of the United States," through the Constitution, have del-
egated limited "sovereign" powers to various organs of government; but
whenever a government entity transgresses the limits of its delegation by
acting ultra vires, it ceases to act in the name of the sovereign, and surren-
ders any derivative "sovereign" immunity it might otherwise possess. Sim-
ply put, governments have neither "sovereignty" nor "immunity" to vio-
late the Constitution. Whenever they do act unconstitutionally, they must
in some way undo the violation by ensuring that victims are made whole.
In many cases, only governmental liability can provide this assurance. 2
10. See, e.g., THE FE.DERAISTi" No. 51, at 322-23 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) [hereinaf-
ter all citations to The Federalist are to this edition].
11. Contemporary organization theory's emphasis on both agent incentives within organizations
and competition among organizations meshes well with the Federalists' own interest in structuring
incentives to translate private interest into public welfare. See 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIER-
ARCHIES (1975); Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMIcA 386 (1937); Fama, Agency Problems
and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. Poi.. ECON. 288 (1980); Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
12. Where government liability is not necessary to guarantee victims full redress (because, for
example, other remedies against individual officers will fully compensate victims), the government
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In Section III, I argue that a healthy competition among limited gov-
ernments for the hearts of the American People can protect popular sover-
eignty and spur a race to the high ground of constitutional remedies. Each
government can act as a remedial cavalry of sorts, eager to win public
honor by riding to the rescue of citizens victimized by another govern-
ment's misconduct. This argument both invokes and inverts conventional
thinking about 42 U.S.C. section 1983, which provides a federal cause of
action-a legal "sword"" 3-to victims of unconstitutional state conduct. 4
We are quick to see the many ways in which the national government can
bid for its citizens' political affections by aiding those whose constitutional
rights have been, or are about to be, invaded by persons acting under color
of state law. Yet we often fail to note that federalism cuts both ways-that
states can gain political goodwill by arming their citizens with remedies
for constitutional wrongs threatened or perpetrated by federal officials.
Perhaps this failure stems from the fact that no state has ever adopted a
general "converse-1983"' cause of action expressly allowing suit against
any federal agent who acts unconstitutionally. Yet state "private law"
protections of liberty and property have historically furnished countless
occasions for vindicating complementary constitutional "public law" pro-
tections of liberty and property against the federal government. For exam-
ple, until the 1971 case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents,'6 the
only general damage remedy for a citizen victimized by federal violations
of the Fourth Amendment derived from state trespass law. Moreover, if a
single state were tomorrow to adopt a suitably worded converse-1983 stat-
ute-and the federal judiciary were to uphold the statute (as it should, I
shall argue)-then competitive pressures among states might well goad
other states to join the remedial campaign and enact like statutes. This
interstate dynamic bears some similarity to the "race to the top" posited
by many corporate law scholars.
17
may choose to immunize itself. See infra text accompanying note 262.
13. Cf Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1532 (1972) (arguing that courts should infer federal causes of action directly from Constitution).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
15. I use the term "converse-1983" to refer to any statute that would invert § 1983 by providing
a general state-law-created cause of action against persons acting unconstitutionally under color of
federal law. See infra text accompanying notes 343-60.
16. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
17. See, e.g., R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORA'rION (1978); Easterbrook & Fis-
chel, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 23 (1983); Romano, The State
Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. RiEv. 709 (1987); Romano, Law as a Product:
Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. E-oN. & ORG. 225 (1985); Winter, State Law,
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Properly understood, federalism and sovereignty need not stand as cruel
bars to full redress for unconstitutional conduct. Rather, they were origi-
nally understood to be, often have been, and can become once again, the
very tools to right government wrongs. If federalism and sovereignty seem
perverse today, it is only because our jurisprudence has perverted them,
clumsily attempting to hammer legal devices for abused citizens into doc-
trinal defenses for abusive governments.
I. THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE
A full constitutional account of sovereignty and federalism calls for two
complementary inquiries. One inquiry is rather formal: We must examine
the compact set of words that we call the Constitution. The other inquiry
is broader: We must come to terms with some of the great historical events
and symbols lying beyond and behind the words themselves-events and
symbols that constitute the shared historical legacy of twentieth century
Americans, and that have constituted us as the People that we are today.1 8
In particular, we must confront the momentous constitutional issues at the
heart of the American Revolution and the Civil War. Each of these epic
military and political struggles can be seen as part of a constitutional de-
bate about sovereignty and federalism.
In the Revolution and its wake, constitutional debate focused on
whether sovereignty resided in government or in the People, and on how
federalism should operate within Empire and Confederation. The Feder-
alist Constitution responded to this debate with its own distinct vision of
sovereignty and federalism. Yet that vision did not go unchallenged, and
ratification did not end constitutional debate. Instead, extreme states'
rights theorists, intellectual heirs of Anti-Federalist opponents of the Con-
stitution, waged an increasingly fierce debate with the keepers of the Fed-
eralist flame over constitutional first principles. That debate, culminating
in the Civil War, focused on whether sovereignty resided in the People of
each state or in the People of the United States as a whole, and on how
federalism should operate within Union. 9 The struggle ended with a re-
Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
18. Cf Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV.
L. REv. 4, 4 (1983) ("No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that
locate it and give it meaning. For every constitution there is an epic . . ").
19. Of course, in referring to the "Civil War" and not the "War Between the States," I am
implicitly affirming the correctness of the nationalist view that sovereignty resided in the People of the
United States as a whole. See infra text accompanying notes 91-170. If the People of each state were
sovereign, the War would be most appropriately viewed as an international dispute between sover-
eigns, and not an internal (civil) war (or, more precisely still, a rebellion). Thus, the dispute about the
dispute's label is microcosmic of one of the main constitutional issues underlying the dispute itself. See
generally J. RANDALL, CONSITUiIONA. PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 48-73 (rev. ed. 1963) ("The
Legal Nature of the Civil War"). But see A. STEPHENS, A CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW OF THE LATE
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affirmation and strengthening of the Federalist vision in the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments.
A. The Revolutionary Debate2"
Ideas mattered to our revolutionary forebears. Colonial leaders took up
arms in 1776 not simply because they found Parliament's actual policies
during the 1760's and 1770's intolerable in fact, but also because-as a
matter of principle-they could not accept the British idea that Parlia-
ment had legitimate authority to do anything it wanted to the colonies.
Even worse than what Parliament had done in the past was what Britons
claimed it could in theory lawfully do in the future.21 In the war of ideas
between Britain and America that preceded and inspired the military
struggle over independence-an intellectual war whose battle lines were
drawn over concepts of "imperium" and "empire"-a distinctly American
vision of sovereignty and federalism began to crystallize.
1. British Ideas
The conventional British position understood "sovereignty" as that in-
divisible, final, and unlimited power that necessarily had to exist some-
where in every political society. A single nation could not operate with
two sovereigns any more than a single person could operate with two
heads; some single supreme political will had to prevail, and the only lim-
itations on that sovereign will were those that the sovereign itself volunta-
rily chose to observe. To try to divide or limit sovereignty in any way was
to create the "political monster" or "hydra" of "imperium in im-
perio"-"the greatest of all political solecisms."22
But where did this sovereignty reside in Britain? In the crown, of
WAR BETWEEN THE STATES (Philadelphia 1868) (account of Vice President and chief constitutional
theoretician of so-called Confederate States of America).
20. The history of the revolutionary and Confederation periods presented below is necessarily
schematic and stylized. For a more nuanced and complete account, see B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOi.UTiION (1967), and G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AmERI-
CAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969), on whom I have relied heavily.
21. Also, many colonists feared that any failure to assert their rights could be deemed a construc-
tive waiver whose precedential force in a system governed by an unwritten constitution might enlarge
future governmental power by a sort of adverse possession. See 1 J. STORY, COMMENrARIES ON THE
CONsTrrurON OF THE UNrIED STATES § 170 n.2 (1833) (quoting Edmund Burke); J. TAYLOR,
CONSTRURG-nION CONST-RUED 54 (Richmond 1820); Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution:
Fundamental Law in American Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 875-79 (1978). The Boston Tea
Party, for example, was held in response to a nominal tax on tea that had recently been lowered by
the British, in what the outraged Bostonians viewed as a sly attempt to acclimate colonists to the
principle of Parliament's plenary power of taxation. J. BLUM, E. MORGAN, W. ROSE, A. SCHLES-
INGER, K. STAMPP & C. WOODWARD, THE NAriONAL EXPERIENCE 94 (1973).
22. See, e.g., THE FEtERALI.r No. 15, at 108 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 44, at 287 J. Madison); B.
BAI.YN, supra note 20, at 198-229; G. Wu.ms, EXPLAININ; AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 162-75
(1981); G. Woon, supra note 20, at 344-54.
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course, argued royal absolutists in the early seventeenth century.2 God
Almighty-the indivisible, unlimited sovereign of the universe-had
vested indivisible, unlimited temporal authority in the King, God's sover-
eign agent on earth.24 After the English Civil War of the 1640's and the
Glorious Revolution of 1688, however, few in England embraced royal
supremacy. According to the new understanding, ultimate political au-
thority derived not from the divine right of kings, but from the consent of
the governed. Legitimacy flowed up from the People, not down directly
from God. 25 Yet the unorganized polity at large could not effectively wield
sovereign power on a day-to-day basis in fashioning and administering
laws. At best, the People could assert their power in those rare meta-legal
moments, like the Glorious Revolution itself, when one monarch was
ousted and another consented to. In ordinary times, then, where did effec-
tive sovereignty lie?
By the eighteenth century, the answer in Britain seemed clear: Sover-
eignty resided in the King-in-Parliament, that indivisible entity consisting
of King, Lords, and Commons. Since all three "estates," or social orders,
of the realm-the one, the few, and the many-were "virtually repre-
sented," the King-in-Parliament became the virtual embodiment of the
abstract sovereignty of the People.26
For Britons, the beauty of the system lay in its perfect symmetry and
balance. Although the theoretical power of the King-in-Parliament was
necessarily boundless-as Samuel Johnson put it, "In sovereignty, there
are no gradations. . . . [T]here can be no limited Government" 2 -in
23. Robert Filmer was a leading exponent of this view. See B. BAILYN, supra note 20, at 199; G.
WooD, supra note 20, at 346. The work of the sixteenth century French jurist Jean Bodin is also of
interest here. See J. BODIN, THE Six BOOKES OF A COMMONWEALE (K. McRae ed. 1962).
24. Here we see the theological roots of both the absolutist definition of sovereignty, and its royal
location. Although medieval scholastics like Aquinas and Anselm had more modest views of secular
sovereignty than Bodin, Anselm's famous ontological proof of the existence of God and Aquinas'
emphasis on the necessary omnipotence of God anticipate Bodin.
25. Again, however, theological arguments-in this case based on Puritan notions of the equality
of all individuals before God-appear to have influenced sovereignty theory. See A. McLAUGHLIN,
THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONS'Ir-rTIONAISM 22 (1961). Thomas Hobbes appears in this
light as a transitional figure, reaching conclusions that resemble royal absolutism, but deriving those
conclusions from social contract and not divine right. See T. HOBBEs, LEVIATHAN (London 1651).
John Locke's work has a more modern cast: Beginning with contractarian premises similar to Hob-
bes', Locke repudiates monarchial absolutism and champions parliamentary supremacy and popular
sovereignty. See J. LoC:K., Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (London 1689).
26. Here too, theology may have helped shape sovereignty thinking: Consider the trinitarian doc-
trine of three-in-one indivisibility and the eucharistic notions of the wafer's actually or symbolically
embodying Christ.
27. S. JOHNSON, Taxation No Tyranny, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 401, 423 (D. Green ed. 1977)
(Yale Ed. of the Works of Samuel Johnson Vol. X). Sir William Blackstone's famous Commentaries
also featured a powerful exposition of parliamentary sovereignty. In every government, "there is and
must be . . .a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, in which the jura summi im-
peril, or the rights of sovereignty reside." I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *49. Since the "sover-
eign and uncontrollable authority in the making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, re-
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practice the balance of competing forces within the mixed system of gov-
ernment would preserve liberty. No law could be enacted without the ap-
proval of all three orders of society, and thus no one estate could tyrannize
the others. The excellence of the British Constitution lay in the way in
which it constituted the King-in-Parliament; by blending all three classi-
cal forms of government-monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy-the
British Constitution achieved an Aristotelian "mean of means" that would
avert the degeneration to which each pure "unmixed" form of government
was vulnerable.2
2. The American Response
Rather different ideas were brewing on the other side of the Atlantic.
During the 1760's and 1770's, many colonial leaders argued that various
parliamentary enactments were void because they violated higher princi-
ples of the British Constitution reflected in revered texts like Magna
Charta, and in fundamental unwritten and common law traditions. These
colonists came to define the British Constitution not merely as the struc-
ture and arrangement of governmental institutions, but also as a set of
substantive legal principles limiting the legitimate exercise of government
power.29 The British found such colonial notions curious at best. Since the
King-in-Parliament was itself the virtual embodiment of the British Con-
stitution and the British People, how could any principle, however vener-
able, supersede that body's sovereign will? Talk of "void" parliamentary
enactments was nonsense-or treason.30
a. The Corporate Analogy
The colonial experience during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
had prepared the ground for revolutionary ideas. In many colonies, writ-
ten "constitutions" prescribed substantive limits on the powers of the colo-
nial government.31 Several of these colonial "constitutions" had originally
pealing, reviving, and expounding of laws" resided in Parliament, id. at *160, that body could "do
everything that is not naturally impossible. . . . [W]hat the parliament doth, no authority upon earth
can undo." Id. at *161.
28. Without the competing tugs of aristocracy and democracy, kingship would easily slide into
monarchial tyranny; so too, if left unchecked, aristocracy would decay into oligarchy; and democracy
into mob rule. See B. BAI.YN, supra note 20, at 66-93, 175-229; G. WiLS, supra note 22, at
97-107; G. WooD, supra note 20, at 18-28, 197-206, 344-54.
29. See B. BAI.YN, supra note 20, at 175-98; Grey, supra note 21.
30. In the words of the 1766 Declaratory Act that grated on colonial ears, Parliament "hath, and
of right ought to have, full power and authority to make laws and statutes of sufficient force and
validity to bind the colonies and people of America ... in all cases whatsoever." An Act for the
Better Securing the Dependency of His Majesty's Dominions in America Upon the Crown and Par-
liament of Great Britain, 1766, 6 Geo. 3, ch. 12.
31. See Grey, supra note 21, at 866 n.99.
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been designed as corporate charters. The original Massachusetts Bay
Company Charter, for example, provided for a "governor," a "deputy
governor," eighteen "assistants," and regular "general court[s]" of
freemen of the company-corresponding to what we would today refer to
as a "private" corporation's president, vice-president, board of directors,
and shareholder meetings, respectively.32 The colonists generally came to
understand these corporate charters as "constitutions" in the modern
American sense-foundational political instruments constituting and lim-
iting governmental power. The people of Massachusetts saw their charter
not simply as prescribing the governance structure of a profit-seeking en-
tity, but as establishing the framework of colonial mixed government,
blending powers of the one (the "governor"), the few (the "assistants")
and the many (the "freemen")."3
Ordinary language eased this assimilation. Like Magna Charta itself,
the Massachusetts document was a "great charter"-it was a written
''compact" or "contract" among early inhabitants creating the "corporate"
entity of the colonial "body politic." Contemporary corporate law also em-
phasized the basic continuity between "municipal" and "private" corpora-
tions, entities that might today be seen as sharply distinct. 4 No general
incorporation laws existed then. Each corporation came into being only by
special act of the sovereign; each corporate charter-whether incorporat-
ing a profit-seeking joint venture, a charitable organization,3 5 a munici-
pality, or a colonial government-was a tailor-made and limited grant of
special sovereign privileges. As James Iredell wrote in 1793:
The word "corporations," in its largest sense, has a more extensive
meaning than people generally are aware of. Any body politic (sole
or aggregate) whether its power be restricted or transcendent, is in
this sense "a corporation." . . . In this extensive sense, not only each
State singly, but even the United States may without impropriety be
termed "corporations.""6
The analogy between corporate charters and political constitutions had
32. See A. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 25, at 38-65.
33. See B. BATLYN, supra note 20, at 190. In Connecticut, the original corporate charter issued by
the Crown in 1662 served as the state constitution throughout the Revolution and until 1818. See G.
WOOD, supra note 20, at 276-78. Rhode Island's colonial corporate charter lasted even longer-until
Dorr's Rebellion in the 1840's. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 1 (1849).
34. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTrORY OF AMERICAN LAW 166-69 (1973).
35. In addition to the established Anglican Church incorporated by law, many Puritan churches
had "self-incorporated"-formed themselves into bodies of worship-by a mutual compact among
individual Christians covenanting with each other and with God. This blending of covenant theology
and social contract theory could not help but influence political ideology in the city on the hill. See A.
McLAUGHI.IN, supra note 25, 13-85.
36. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 447 (1793) (opinion of Iredell, J.).
1433
The Yale Law Journal
profound implications. Not all of these implications were universally per-
ceived by colonial leaders, even as late as 1776. But slowly, subtly, the
corporate analogy seeped deep into the thought patterns of the men who
would eventually label themselves Federalists in 1787.
First, the analogy suggested that government power could be strictly
bounded by its "charter." Just as corporate officials lacked lawful author-
ity to go beyond the scope of their corporate charter, so conduct by gov-
ernment officials that transgressed substantive "constitutional" limitations
was null and void. Herein lay fertile seeds of limited government-of the
American conception of a constitution as a fence around, and not merely
the frame of, government.
37
Second, the fence could be maintained by judges following an emerging
body of agency law doctrine. Like corporate officers, government officials
were merely agents of principals who had prescribed limits on the agents'
power in the founding charter. Judges could enforce these limits by deny-
ing legal effect to the constitutionally unauthorized acts of government
agents. Thus were laid the foundations of judicial review. Note how
agency principles carry the bulk of the argument in the key passages of
The Federalist No. 78's classic defense of judicial review:
There is no position which depends on clearer principles than that
every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the com-
mission under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative act, there-
fore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny this would
be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the
servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are
superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of pow-
ers may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what
they forbid. . . . [Tihe Constitution ought to be preferred to the
statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.3"
Finally, the corporate analogy helped to revolutionize the concept of
"sovereignty" itself. Colonial governments undeniably fashioned and ap-
plied legal rules that directly regulated day-to-day life in the colonies. In
this sense, they seemed to wield sovereign power. Yet the very notion of
sovereignty as then understood in Britain suggested that sovereignty was
unlimited. How, then, could the power of colonial governments be legally
limited if the sovereign was by definition above the law? The ultimate
American answer, in part, lay in a radical redefinition of governmental
37. See A. McLAUGH.IN, supra note 25, at 38-65, 104-28.
38. THE FEDERAmsr No. 78, at 467 (A. Hamilton); see also R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE
SUPREME COURT- 14-16, 170-76 (1969) (noting agency law roots of judicial review); A. McLAUGH-
IN, supra note 25, at 104-28 (similar).
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"sovereignty." Just as a corporation could be delegated limited sovereign
privileges by the King-in-Parliament,39 so governments could be delegated
limited powers to govern. Within the limitations of their charters, govern-
ments could be sovereign, but that sovereignty could be bounded by the
terms of the delegation itself.
Yet Americans' redefinition of governmental sovereignty was only part
of the answer, for they continued to subscribe to the British view that the
source of delegated power-the true sovereign-must necessarily enjoy the
essential attributes of indivisible, final, and unlimited authority.40 Who,
then, was the ultimate unlimited sovereign whose limited delegations both
created and bounded government power? The American answer was at
once traditional and arresting: True sovereignty resided in the People
themselves. It was traditional, because one strand of Lockean thought had
long recognized the inalienable (i.e., non-delegable) right of the People to
alter or abolish their government through the exercise of the transcendent
right of revolution-a right that the British People had exercised in the
seventeenth century, and that Americans invoked in 1776."1 It was arrest-
ing, because eighteenth-century British theorists like William Blackstone
had blunted the possible radical implications of Locke by insisting that the
King-in-Parliament-the government-virtually embodied the sovereignty
of the People."2 In dramatic contrast, the American understanding drove
39. Or, it seems, by the King alone via the royal prerogative. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) at 448 (opinion of Iredell, J.); L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 166 n.30.
40. See, e.g., THE FEDERAi.Sr No. 15, at 108 (A. Hamilton); I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 34, 169, 172, 188, 287 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter M. Far-
rand) (remarks of Gouverneur Morris, Charles Pinckney, James Wilson, William Paterson, and Al-
exander Hamilton); 2 id. at 346-47 (remarks of William Johnson); I J. DAvis, THE RISE AND FALL
OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 99-100, 141-56 (1958). But see THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (J.
Madison) (suggesting divisibility of sovereignty); 4 J. MADISON, LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 61, 293-94, 390-95, 419-20 (Philadelphia 1865) (similar). See generally G.
WOOD, supra note 20 (discussing American ideas about sovereignty between 1776 and 1787).
41. Construed most broadly, such an inalienable right squared perfectly with the orthodox notion
that the sovereign, as the source of all law, was necessarily above the law, and could not be bound by
law absent ongoing consent. Locke himself, it seems, did not carry his principles to this apparently
logical conclusion. Although sovereignty originally resided with the People, Locke suggested that they
had to "give [it] up" to government so that day-to-day order could be maintained. The People could
only reclaim their surrendered sovereignty-by revolution-if government breached faith with the
People by "act[ing] contrary to their trust." J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§
221, 243 (T. Peardon ed. 1952). In sharp contrast, the Americans came to believe that the People
never parted with their ultimate sovereignty. Rather, they delegated certain sovereign powers to vari-
ous governmental agents, but could revoke those delegations, and reclaim those powers, at any time
and for any reason. See, e.g., THE FEDERAIST No. 84, at 512-13 (A. Hamilton); McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404 (1819); J. DAVIS, supra note 40, at 141.
The violent nature of revolution, it appears, induced Locke to limit strictly the legitimate occasions
for the exercise of the People's right to revolt. Americans domesticated and defused violent revolution
by channelling it into (relatively) peaceful conventions. See infra text accompanying notes 146-50. As
a result, Americans could expand the People's right to "revolt"-to alter or abolish their govern-
ment-into a right that could be invoked (by convention) on any occasion at the pleasure of the
People.
42. See G. WooD, supra note 20, at 344-54; supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
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an analytic wedge between the government and its People, relocating sov-
ereignty from the former to the latter. Government officials were "repre-
sentatives," "agents," "delegates," "deputies," and "servants" of the Peo-
ple-but they were not the People themselves, virtually or otherwise.
Therefore, government entities were sovereign only in a limited and deriv-
ative sense, exercising authority only within the boundaries set by the sov-
ereign People. By thus relocating true sovereignty in the People them-
selves-"that pure, original fountain of all legitimate
authority" 4"-Americans domesticated government power and decisively
repudiated British notions of "sovereign" governmental omnipotence.4
The relocation of sovereignty from governments to the People raised
three knotty and related questions. First, how could the People truly be
sovereign given their obvious inability to collectively govern day-to-day af-
fairs? Second, how could governments that lacked ultimate sovereignty le-
gitimately command obedience? Finally, was not the creation of "limited"
government a nonsensical attempt to divide necessarily indivisible sover-
eignty, thereby producing the solecism of imperium in imperio? Once
again, agency principles furnished Americans with the critical tools of
analysis. As sovereign, the People need not wield day-to-day power them-
selves, but could act through agents on whom they conferred limited pow-
ers. Within the sphere of these delegated powers, government agents could
legitimately compel obedience in the name of their sovereign principal, but
those agents lacked authority to go beyond the scope of their agency. So
long as the People at all times retained the ability to revoke or modify
their delegations, such agency relationships were in no sense a surrender
or division of ultimate sovereignty.45
This change in thinking did not occur overnight. Considerable noise,
literally and figuratively, punctuated the great constitutional debates be-
43. THE. FEDERA .lsr No. 22, at 152 (A. Hamilton); see also id. No. 49, at 313 (J. Madison)
("the people are the only legitimate fountain of power").
44. In the passionate words of James Wilson:
Even in almost every nation, which has been denominated free, the state has assumed a super-
cilious pre-eminence above the people who have formed it: Hence the haughty notions of state
independence, state sovereignty and state supremacy. . .. [Als described by Sir William
Blackstone and his followers. . . . the British is a despotic government. It is a Government
without a people. In that government, as so described, the sovereignty is possessed by the
Parliament: In the Parliament, therefore, the supreme and absolute authority is vested ....
The King and these three estates together form the great corporation or body politic of the
Kingdom. . . . What, then, or where, are the People? Nothing! No where! . . . From legal
contemplation they totally disappear!
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 461-62 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (emphasis altered); see also
J.Q. Adams, Oration on the 4th of July, 1831, quoted in 1 J. STORY, supra note 21, § 209 n.1 ("It is
not true, that there must reside in all governments an absolute, uncontrollable, irresistible, and des-
potic power; nor is such power in any manner essential to sovereignty. . . . The pretence of ...
[such power] existing in every government somewhere, is incompatible with the first principles of
natural right.").
45. See supra note 41.
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tween 1763 and 1789. Old words took on new meanings, as patriots
struggled to build an intellectual framework that would order their think-
ing, affirm their deepest values, and make sense of the ideological spin-
ning-the ideological revolution 6-around them. Some, like James Wil-
son who "[mlore boldly and fully than anyone else . ..developed the
argument that would eventually become the basis of all Federalist think-
ing" ,4 7 about sovereignty, evolved a careful and precise vocabulary in
which government only had "power" but never "sovereignty.""8 Others,
like Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Marshall, and James
Iredell, used different words to the same effect. When they spoke of gov-
ernment as sovereign they meant sovereign in a necessarily limited sense.
By definition, government's sovereignty was bounded; government was
sovereign within its sphere of delegated power, and powerless beyond."'
b. The State Constitution Experience
After declaring independence in 1776, each individual colony faced the
immediate challenge of forging a new constitutional regime to fill the legal
void created by separation from Britain. Unevenly and tentatively at first,
but with increasing confidence and clarity, Americans began to put ideas
of popular sovereignty into practice by giving concrete legal meaning and
institutional substance to the emerging theoretical distinction between the
People and their representatives. North Carolina's new constitution,
adopted in late 1776, began with a bold declaration of rights limiting the
power of state officials. The declaration's opening words are noteworthy
yet unsurprising: "[A]ll political power is vested in and derived from the
people only."5 A decade later, only a year before the North Carolina
Supreme Court definitively construed the document to provide for judicial
46. Cf G. WII.1-s, INVENTING AMERICA 51-53 (1979) (discussing etymological roots and eight-
eenth-century usage of word "revolution").
47. G. WooD, supra note 20, at 530.
48. See R. Ross, The Federalists and the Problem of Sovereignty (1984) (unpublished manuscript
on file with author).
49. See, e.g., THE FEDERAI.IST No. 32, at 198 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 43, at 279 (J. Madison);
id. No. 62, at 378 U. Madison); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401, 404-10,
429-30 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 435-50 (1793) (opinion
of Iredell, J.); Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF McCUL-
LoCH V. MARYIAND 155, 195 (G. Gunther ed. 1969). Given the Federalists' obvious redefinition of
the term, their language of governmental "sovereignty" seems wholly innocuous. A century later,
however, the Supreme Court began to inject lethal ammunition into this previously unloaded gun by
ignoring or misunderstanding the Federalists' redefinition. See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 207-08); cf. J. DAVIS, supra note 40, at 99, 142
(decrying "loose expressions" concerning government "sovereignty").
50. N.C. CONSI'. of 1776, in 5 F. THORPE, AMERICAN CHARTERS, CONSTITUTIONS AND OR-
GANIC: LAWS: 1492-1908, at 2787 (1909). Note how the assertion that political power continues to be
vested in, and not just derived from, the People goes beyond the Lockean formulation. See supra note
41.
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review of state legislation, James Iredell underscored his state's rejection
of the British parliamentary model:
It was, of course, to be considered how to impose restrictions on the
legislature . . . [to] guard against the abuse of unlimited power,
which was not to be trusted, without the most imminent danger, to
any man or body of men on earth. We had not only been sickened
and disgusted for years with the high and almost impious language
from Great Britain, of the omnipotent power of the British parlia-
ment, but had severely smarted under its effects. We . . . should
have been guilty of . . . the grossest folly, if in the same moment
when we spurned at the insolent despotism of Great Britain, we had
established a despotic power among ourselves.51
Iredell elaborated this theme in a later speech: "Our government is
founded on much nobler principles. The people are known with certainty
to have originated it themselves. Those in power are their servants and
agents; and the people, without their consent, may new-model their gov-
")52ernment whenever they think proper ....
In Massachusetts, the ratification process itself dramatized the new
American understanding of popular sovereignty. The proposed state con-
stitution of 1778 went down to defeat in a popular referendum in part
because of the symbolic point that it had been framed by the legisla-
ture-the government-and not by a specially elected constitutional con-
vention of the People themselves. 53 Two years later, a new draft constitu-
tion emerged from a special convention and won popular approval.
Equally dramatic was the constitution's language: "All power residing
originally in the people, and being derived from them, the several magis-
trates and officers of government, vested with authority, whether legisla-
tive, executive or judicial, are their . . . agents, and are at all times ac-
countable to them."
54
Similar dramas were played out in other states as the former colonists
framed new constitutions during the decade after the Declaration.55 The
51. R. BERGER, supra note 38, at 35 (quoting 1786 address by Iredell on formation of North
Carolina constitution).
52. 4 J. E.a.uyr, THE DEBArS OF THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FDERAL CoNsrrru-roN 9 (1888).
53. E. MORu;AN, THY BIWTH OF THE RE.PUBLC 89-90 (1977); see infra text accompanying notes
146-50.
54. MAss. CONs'r. of 1780, in 3 F. THORPE, supra note 50, at 1890; Cf. PA. CONST. of 1776,
Declaration of Rights art. IV, in CONVENTIONS OF PENNSYLVANIA 55 (Harrisburg 1825) ("That all
power being originally inherent in, and consequently derived from the people; therefore all officers of
government ... are their trustees and servants, and at all times accountable to them."); MD. CONST.
of 1776, Declaration of Rights art. II, in 3 F. THORPE, supra, at 1686 (similar).
55. The experience in New Hampshire is particularly noteworthy. See G. WOOD, supra note 20,
at 341-42. Consider also Madison's remarks regarding the key distinction between a state's People
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details vary from state to state, but it is enough to note here that various
local dress rehearsals (for so they appear in retrospect) set the stage for
the great act of popular sovereignty that was the framing and ratification
of the Federalist Constitution.
B. The Federalist Constitution
The constitutional Convention of 1787 drew delegates from twelve
states to Philadelphia to ponder anew the fate of the continent. Four main
tasks faced the men who met there: creating a strong but limited central
government, protecting individual rights against the states, dividing power
within the central government, and dividing power between local and cen-
tral officials. To perform each of these tasks, the Federalists leaned upon
their new understanding of the sovereignty of the People. Indeed, this sin-
gle idea informs every article of the Federalist Constitution, from the Pre-
amble to Article VII.5' It was thus no happenstance that the Federalists
chose to introduce their work with words that ringingly proclaimed the
primacy of that new understanding: "We the People of the United States
. . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America." James Wilson, who as a member of the Philadelphia Commit-
tee of Detail himself penned what became the Constitution's famous first
three words, later explained:
To the Constitution of the United States, the term SOVEREIGN, is
totally unknown. There is but one place where it could have been
used with propriety. But, even in that place it would not, perhaps,
have comported with the delicacy of those, who ordained and estab-
lished that Constitution. They might have announced themselves
"SOVEREIGN" people of the United Staes [sic]. .. .
1. Creating Central Authority
The Federalists' first job was to build a new central government that
would be strong yet bounded. Under the discarded British understanding,
the task seemed impossible by definition. If the national government were
sovereign, how could its powers be limited? If not, how could it enjoy any
and its government: "[The novelty of] American governments lies in the total exclusion of the people
in their collective capacity, from any share in [government]," in favor of exclusive reliance on "the
principle of representation." THE F-nDRAmIsT No. 63, at 387.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 126-70.
57. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 454 (1793) (opinion of Wilson, J.) (emphasis
omitted). Although his name has unfortunately faded from American constitutional folklore, Wilson's
role as a chief architect of the Constitution has long been recognized by historians. See, e.g., M.
FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSITUItION OF THE UNrrED STATES 197 (1913) ("Second to
Madison and almost on a par with him was James Wilson.").
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legitimate authority to enforce its will? The Federalists dissolved the di-
lemma by crafting the Constitution as a set of broad yet bounded delega-
tions of sovereign power from the sovereign People to various agents who
would constitute the new central government. The limitations on that new
government took the form of both express prohibitions-as in Article I,
section 9 and the later Bill of Rights-and finite delegations. By carefully
enumerating the powers granted, the framers made clear that the new
government would enjoy no other general "sovereign" powers. Under the
well-established rule of construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
the People retained all powers not expressly or impliedly delegated by
enumeration-powers they could either give to other government agents in
individual states, or withhold from all governments.58 This structural ca-
non of retained nondelegated powers was later made explicit by the text of
the Tenth Amendment.
2. Limiting State Governments
The Federalists also worked to forge a strong set of federally enforce-
able individual rights against states-in Madison's words, to correct "the
abuses committed within the individual states . . . by interested or mis-
guided majorities. ' 9 The "multiplicity," "mutability," and "injustice" of
extant state laws constituted a "dreadful class of evils" requiring a federal
"remedy." 60 Indeed, Madison wrote Thomas Jefferson that "the evils is-
suing from these sources contributed more to that uneasiness which pro-
duced the Convention, and prepared the Public mind for a general reform,
than those which accrued to our national character and interest from the
inadequacy of the Confederation to its immediate objects."61
58. See THE- FEDERAI.IST No. 41, at 262-63 U. Madison); id. No. 84, at 510-15 (A. Hamilton).
59. These abuses "were among the prominent causes of its [i.e., the Constitution's] adoption, and
particularly led to the provision contained in it which prohibits paper emissions and the violations of
contracts, and which gives an appellate supremacy to the judicial department of the U.S." 4 M.
Farrand, supra note 40, at 86-87 (letter from James Madison to unknown party). At the Convention,
Madison declared that the federal Constitution should "secure a good internal legislation & adminis-
tration to the particular States[.] In developing the evils which vitiate the political system of the U.S. it
is proper to take into view those which prevail within the States individually as well as those which
affect them collectively. ... 1 id. at 318; see also id. at 316 (remarks of J. Madison) (similar); 2
id. at 26, 110 (remarks of Gouverneur Morris and Madison) (similar); J. MADISON, Vices of the
Political System, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 361, 365-69 (G. Hunt ed. 1901)
(similar).
60. 1 M. Farrand, supra note 40, at 318-19 (remarks of J. Madison). Challenging William
Paterson's "New Jersey Plan" to prop up the existing Articles of Confederation instead of redesigning
government from the ground up, Madison argued that "[tihe rights of individuals are infringed by
many of the state laws-such as issuing paper money, and instituting a mode to discharge debts
differing from the form of the contract. Has the Jersey plan any checks to prevent the mischief? Does
it in any instance secure internal tranquility?" Id. at 327.
61. 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMFS MADISON, supra note 59, at 27 (letter to T. Jefferson); see also
1 M. Farrand, supra note 40, at 134 (remarks of Madison to Roger Sherman) (similar). For further
discussion of these and similar statements, see Amar, supra note 9, at 247 n.134 and sources cited
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Once again, the sovereignty of the People lay at the heart of the Feder-
alist solution. By ratifying the new Constitution, the People themselves
could impose limitations on powers previously exercised by state govern-
ments. To deny this would be to deny the right of the principal to modify
or revoke a power previously delegated to an agent, and to interfere with
the sovereign right of the People to "alter or abolish" their governments at
any time. But only direct ratification by the People in convention,6 2 as
proposed by the new Constitution, could securely limit state governments.
The Articles of Confederation had not attempted to impose "internal"
limitations on the power of each state government towards its own citi-
zens-that was one of the document's chief flaws, in Federalist
eyes6 3-but any effort to impose such restrictions might well have been
illusory. Having been ratified only by state legislatures, how could the
Articles have imposed any binding restrictions on those bodies in favor of
individual rights? What a majority in one state legislature had done by
ratification, a subsequent legislature could arguably undo by a similar
majority. Only a document emanating from a higher source than a state
legislature itself could undeniably bind that body."'
Although the Constitution's most sweeping assertions of federal power
on behalf of individual rights lay three-quarters of a century and a Civil
War away, the Federalists at Philadelphia succeeded in imposing signifi-
cant federal restrictions on state power. Federal courts would prevent
states from passing bills of attainder or ex post facto laws, coining money
or emitting bills of credit, denying the privileges and immunities of out-of-
staters, or impairing the obligation of contract; Congress would guarantee
citizens of each state a republican state government by refusing to seat
representatives from anti-republican regimes, and by helping to put down
attempted insurrections and coups; and the President would retain ulti-
mate command of state militias when they were called into national
service.
3. Dividing Power Horizontally: Bicameralism and Separation of
Powers
The third job confronting the framers was to allocate authority within
the new central government. Once again, the Federalists consciously broke
therein; Huntington, The Founding Fathers and the Division of Powers, in AREA AND POWER
191-92 (P. Maas ed. 1959).
62. See infra text accompanying notes 146-50.
63. See supra notes 59-61.
64. See THE Ft-nERAi.iST No. 22, at 152 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 43, at 279-80 (J. Madison);
Mc{ulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404 (1819); 2 M. Farrand, supra note 40, at 88
(remarks of George Mason).
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with British Blackstonian orthodoxy. Far from seeking to create an indi-
visible central organ to wield all national power, the Federalists labored to
divide power among distinct agencies. To them, "[t]he accumulation of all
powers ...in the same hands ...may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny. '"65
They viewed the Congress created under the Articles of Confederation
as dangerous precisely because it was a single body invested with all pow-
ers conferred by that instrument. The only thing saving such a wretched
system, they argued, was the skimpiness of the national powers delegated.
The unicameral assembly created by the Articles lacked power to regulate
commerce; to levy duties; to legislate directly upon, and directly tax, indi-
viduals; to nullify unjust internal state laws; to enact laws incidental to, or
implied by, express enumerations; to nationalize state militias; to directly
raise an army and navy; to appoint all military officers; to suppress inter-
nal insurrections, coups, and anti-republican governments; to directly exe-
cute its own enactments; to set up a general system of national courts; and
to insist on observance of the Articles and its own enactments thereunder
as supreme law overriding even state constitutions. Because the Federalists
proposed to add all of these grand powers, and more, to the central gov-
ernment, they needed to effect a radical redesign of its internal architec-
ture.66 The evil to be avoided was plain enough: an indivisible national
assembly that might view itself as the virtual embodiment of the People,
unlimited in its powers-in short, Blackstone's Parliament:
The representatives of the people, in a popular assembly, seem
sometimes to fancy that they are the people themselves, and betray
strong symptoms of impatience and disgust at the least sign of oppo-
sition from any other quarter ....
The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its
activity and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.
[I]t is against the enterprising ambition of this department
65. THE: FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (J. Madison); see also id. No. 48, at 311 (J. Madison) ("It
will be no alleviation that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and not by a single
one. One hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be as oppressive as one. . . .As little will
it avail us that they are chosen by ourselves. An elective despotism was not the government we fought
for .. ") (quoting T. JEFFERSON, No'rFs ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (London 1787)).
66. See THE FEDERA.-Sr No. 22, at 151-52 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 84, at 517-18 (A. Hamilton);
id. No. 38 (J. Madison); see also 2 M. Farrand, supra note 40, at 666-67 (Letter of Transmission
from Convention President George Washington accompanying proposed Constitution); I id. at 34,
256, 287, 339 (remarks of Pierce Butler, Edmund Randolph, Alexander Hamilton, and George
Mason).
67. THE FEDERAt.1ST No. 71, at 433 (A. Hamilton).
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that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all
their precautions.6"
The Federalists' strategy for avoiding legislative tyranny was twofold.
First, divide the legislature itself into two separate houses chosen in differ-
ent ways and holding different terms of office. Each house would have
strong institutional incentives to deny any grandiose claim made by the
other that it alone was the true embodiment of the People. 9 Second, dif-
fuse power further by creating independent national executive and judicial
branches. Under the Articles, central executive and judicial officers were
pitiful creatures of Congress, dependent on its pleasure for their place,
tenure, salary, and power. In sharp contrast, the Federalist Constitution
mandated the existence of a national executive and judiciary; rigidly fixed
the tenure of the President and federal judges (qualified only by the possi-
bility of removal upon impeachment and conviction for grave misconduct);
guaranteed those officers' salaries; and vested them with large portions of
power beyond legislative control."0 Although their methods of selection
and tenures of office varied, all national officials ultimately derived their
authority from the People. The President and federal judges were as
much agents of the People as the legislators were; each branch-each
agency-was equal and co-ordinate.71 And each agency would have incen-
tives to win the trust and affection of the principal (the People) by expos-
ing and resisting ultra vires acts of less faithful agencies. Lest manage-
ment come to act as if it owned the corporation, the shareholders of
America 2 created several sets of managers to keep an eye on each other as
they minded the national store.73 The classic formulation of the point is
Madison's The Federalist No. 51:
68. Id. No. 48, at 309 U. Madison).
69. See THE FtDI.RAI.S-r No. 51 (J. Madison); Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the
Constitution, 93 YAI.E L.J. 1013, 1025-31 (1984); cf. G. WILtS, supra note 22, at 117-25 (emphasiz-
ing importance of legislative bicameralism in Madisonian theory).
70. See Amar, supra note 9, at 231-33, 246-54.
71. See G. WooD, supra note 20, at 446-53, 547-62, 596-600; Ackerman, supra note 69, at
1025-31; Amar, supra note 9, at 231-33. Of course, Congress remained in many ways primus inter
pares. Schematically, Article I precedes Articles II and III. Structurally, Congress must exercise the
legislative power before the executive and judicial powers have a statute on which to act. Textually,
the "necessary and proper" clause vests Congress with significant control over powers vested "in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8,
para. 18 (emphasis added); see Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers
of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping
Clause, LAW & CONTEMP. PROM., Spring 1976, at 102. And historically, the Federalists expected
Congress to be the most powerful-and thus most dangerous-branch. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST
No. 51, at 322 U. Madison) ("In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily
predominates.").
72. See supra text accompanying note 36.
73. The relocation of sovereignty outside of government, combined with the application of agency
law principles, created virtually infinite possibilities for governmental organization by defusing the
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[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several
powers in the same department consists in giving to those who ad-
minister each department the necessary constitutional means and
personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. . . . Ambi-
tion must be made to counteract ambition ....
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect
of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of
human affairs, private as well as public. . . . [Tihe private interest
of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights."
The parallels between Madison's model of political competition and
Adam Smith's (then new) model of economic competition are both self-
conscious 75-witness Madison's reference to "private as well as public"
incentive systems-and powerful. Both models rely on overarching incen-
tive structures to harness individual self-interest (whether ambition or av-
arice) in a way that promotes some larger public good (whether "public
rights" or national wealth). Both models depend on competition to further
liberty and forestall undesirable concentrations of power (whether tyranny
or monopoly).
4. Dividing Power Vertically: Federalism
Finally, the Federalists faced the problem of allocating power vertically
between central and local officials-the problem of federalism. The issue
was notoriously difficult. In the mid-1770's, it had cracked open the Brit-
ish Empire. A decade later, and for different reasons, it was threatening to
dissolve the existing confederacy of states. Yet again, the emerging Feder-
alist principles of popular sovereignty and agency theory allowed a new
constitutional solution.
a. Federalism and the Empire
Until quite late in the revolutionary debate, the colonists had been will-
ing to concede, as a practical matter, parliamentary authority to regulate a
small but important set of matters of truly imperial scope, such as foreign
affairs and trade among different parts of the Empire. After all, someone
had to have power to make these trans-colonial decisions if the Empire
were to remain a viable entity, and Parliament seemed as good a choice as
objection that separate governmental entities would result in a theoretically unacceptable imperium in
imperio.
74. THii FEDERAtL.Tr No. 51, at 321-22 (J. Madison); accord 1 M. Farrand, supra note 40, at
421-22 (remarks of Madison).
75. Garry Wills makes a persuasive case for his thesis that Scottish enlightenment thought
powerfully influenced the thinking of Madison and Hamilton. G. WILtS, supra note 22; accord D.
ADAIR, FANI-: AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS (1974).
1444
Vol. 96: 1425, 1987
Of Sovereignty and Federalism
any. Yet the colonists categorically denied that an unrepresentative central
assembly sitting months away in England should also have plenary con-
trol over truly internal affairs of colonial government like everyday taxa-
tion and legislation. Such domestic affairs should be exclusively regulated
by local bodies. In short, the colonists were willing to refine and codify the
rough de facto allocation of decisionmaking responsibility that had pre-
vailed in the colonies before 1763.76
The British found the Americans' first proposals to constitutionalize
federalism-for so we should view them with hindsight-theoretically in-
coherent. Perhaps a working balance between central and local authority
had been achieved during the colonies' first century and a half, but local
autonomy was purely a matter of parliamentary grace, not constitutional
right." Either Parliament or each colonial assembly was sovereign. If the
former, Parliament enjoyed all power over all affairs, no matter how "in-
ternal." If the latter, then Parliament had no authority whatsoever, even
to regulate imperial affairs, and a raw state of nature existed between
Great Britain and America. The colonists' proposed constitutional division
of authority was a nonsensical imperium in imperio; like sovereignty, the
Empire was legally an all or nothing concept. Take it or leave it.78
Faced with this choice, the colonists left it.79 Yet there remained the
problem of weaving a new cloak of federalism to replace the imperial one
cast off.
76. See Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress (1774), reprinted in Docu-
MENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 82 (H. Commager 9th ed. 1973).
77. Hence the Declaratory Act accompanying parliamentary repeal of the Stamp Act. See supra
note 30. Note again the problem of adverse possession/abandonment-by-nonuser posed in a system
not governed by a written constitution. See supra note 21.
78. See B. BAI.YN, supra note 20, at 198-229; A. McLAUGHLIN, supra note 25, at 129-56;
McLaughlin, The Background of American Federalism, 12 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 215 (1918).
79. Consider the prescient words of Edmund Burke counselling against Parliament's pedantic
insistence on its theoretical omnipotence, given its willingness to continue to allow real local autonomy
in practice:
If, intemperately, unwisely, fatally, you sophisticate and poison the very source of government
by urging subtle deductions and consequences odious to those you govern from the unlimited
and illimitable nature of sovereignty, you will teach them by those means to call that sover-
eignty itself in question. When you drive him hard the boar will turn upon the hunters. If that
sovereignty and their freedom cannot be reconciled, which will they take? They will cast your
sovereignty in your face, nobody will be argued into slavery.
E. Burke, Speech on American Taxation, quoted in McLaughlin, supra note 78, at 231 n.25. That a
practical accommodation might have been worked out between Britain and America, but for the theo-
retical sticking point of sovereignty, once again demonstrates the intellectual and ideological --indeed
hyperlegal-dimensions of the dispute. See B. BAI.YN, supra note 20, at 198-229; A. MCLAUGHLIN,
supra note 25, at 129-56; McLaughlin, supra, at 230-31. For more discussion of the Revolution as a
legal dispute, see Black, The Constitution of Empire: The Case for the Colonists, 124 U. PENN. L.
REV. 1157 (1976); Greene, From the Perspective of Law: Context and Legitimacy in the Origins of
the American Revolution, 85 S. ArI.ANTIC Q. 56 (1986).
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b. Federalism and the Confederation
In relocating sovereignty from the government to the People, the revolu-
tionary generation initially seemed to have in mind the People of each
state, and not the People of the United States as a whole. The colonies
united to declare their independence, but their Declaration proclaimed
them to be "free and independent states" 80-independent even of each
other, save as they chose to concert their action.81 In short, they were
united states, not a unitary state; they were thirteen Peoples, not (yet) one
People. Thus the sovereignty of the People-a concept that the colonists
had wielded so skillfully as various newly-independent states adopted
their own internal constitutions-proved a blunt instrument when the rev-
olutionary generation turned to matters of inter-state governance. Their
first formal instrument-the Articles of Confederation-was therefore
strikingly traditional.
Under traditional jurisprudence, sovereign states could enter into trea-
ties with one another, and might even join together in a perpetual federa-
tion, or league, without losing their sovereign status.82 Such a federation
would in no sense be an internal government exercising sovereign coercive
powers over individuals; rather, it was an association of states, a "society
of societies,"'83 that could coordinate joint action by its "sovereign" mem-
bers. This sort of federation by mutual treaty was exactly what the Revo-
lutionaries had in mind when they created the Articles. The document
was not styled as a "constitution" (as were the new charters within each
state) but as a "confederacy," a "firm league of friendship" entered into
by "different states," each of which would "retain[] its sovereignty, free-
dom, and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is
not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Con-
gress assembled."'84 The central organ created was not so much a national
80. The Declaration of Independence para. 32 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
81. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 224 (1796); J. DAVIS, supra note 40, at 86, 118; 1
M. Farrand, supra note 40, at 324, 340 (remarks of Luther Martin); J. TAYLOR, NEW VIEWS OF
THE CONSIT'UT'ION OF THE UNITED STATES 2-3 (Washington City 1823); Fletcher, A Historical
Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Ju-
risdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1068 n.156
(1983); Van Tyne, Sovereignty in the American Revolution: An Historical Study, 12 Ah. HIST. REV.
529 (1906).
82. As the Swiss jurist Emmereich de Vattel put it: "The deliberations in common will offer no
violence to the sovereignty of each member." E. VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS bk. I, ch. I, § 10
(London 1760).
83. See C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIrr OF LAWS (D. Carruthers ed. 1977); Diamond, The Fed-
eralists' View of Federalism, in ESSAYS IN FEDERALISM 21 (1961); Diamond, The Federalist on
Federalism: "Neither A National Nor a Federal Constitution, But A Composition of Both," 86 YALE
L.J. 1273 (1977) [hereinafter The Federalist on Federalism].
84. Articles of Confederation, 1781, arts. I-III (emphasis added). Note also the description of a
side deal between two or more states within the league as a "Treaty." In contrast, the Federalist
Constitution refers to such an agreement as a "compact" in contradistinction to a state "Treaty, Alli-
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"legislature" (that word appears only in the document's reference to indi-
vidual state governments) as an international assembly of ambassadors.
The very word chosen to describe the central assembly, "Congress," sug-
gested its inter-sovereign character,85 and so did its organizational struc-
ture. Each state legislature would appoint a "delegat[ion]" of between two
and seven members, with each delegation to vote as a bloc casting one
vote, regardless of its size or its state's population; delegations were to be
paid by state governments which could alter salaries at will to keep dele-
gates in line; state governments expressly retained the right to "recall"
and replace their ambassadorial delegates "at any time"; and each dele-
gate was guaranteed a sort of diplomatic immunity from state arrest and
imprisonment. 86 Finally, to prevent delegates from developing unduly
strong attachments to the union, each was to be elected annually, was
forbidden to hold "any" 87 remunerative "office under the United States"
(there was no similar proscription against holding other state offices), and
was ineligible to serve in Congress for more than three out of any six
consecutive years.
Although the Congress enjoyed some important powers on paper, it had
no means of carrying them out or of compelling compliance. It could not
directly tax or legislate upon individuals; it had no explicit "legislative" or
"cgovernmental" power to make binding "law" enforceable as such in state
courts; it lacked authority to set up its own general courts; and it could
raise troops and money only by "requisitioning" contributions from each
state. On paper, such requisitions were "binding." In fact, they were mere
requests. As one contemporary writer put it, Congress "may declare every
thing, but do nothing."
88
By the time of the Philadelphia Convention, the Confederation was in
shambles. Various states refused to honor requisitions, flouted official
judgments in the very limited category of controversies committed to cen-
tral courts, enacted laws repudiating earlier treaties entered into by Con-
ance, or Confederation" with outside nations. The former is approvable by Congress; the latter, abso-
lutely prohibited. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10.
85. Consider, for example, the "Congress" of Vienna or Edmund Burke's famous statement that
Parliament was not "a congress of ambassadors." E. Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol, quoted
in G. WooD, supra note 20, at 175. By contrast, no state legislature in the 1770's and 1780's was
labeled a "Congress" by its state constitution. See infra note 134.
86. In an anonymous essay defending McCulloch v. Maryland, John Marshall wrote that "[tihe
confederation was, essentially, a league; and Congress was a corps of ambassadors, to be recalled at
the will of their masters." Marshall, supra note 49, at 199. In an earlier essay, Marshall described
members of Congress as "ministers plenipotentiary." Marshall, A Friend to the Union, in JOHN
MARSHALt.'s DEFENSE OF McCulloch v. Maryland, 78, 86 (G. Gunther ed. 1969); see also I M.
Farrand, supra note 40, at 256 (remarks of Edmund Randolph) (labelling Congress under Articles "a
mere diplomatic body").
87. Not "any other," suggesting that congressional delegates were state officers.
88. 1 J. STORY, supra note 21, § 246 (emphasis omitted) (quoting unidentified author).
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gress, waged unauthorized local wars against Indian tribes, conducted ne-
gotiations with foreign nations independently of Congress, and maintained
standing armies without congressional permission-all in clear contraven-
tion of the Articles.8" In short, the "United States" in 1787 was not much
more than the "United Nations" is in 1987: a mutual treaty conveniently
dishonored on all sides. Indeed, it was precisely the Articles' status as a
fallen treaty that Madison seized on to justify the Philadelphia Conven-
tion's bold declaration that its new Constitution would go into effect
among any nine states that chose to ratify it-notwithstanding the Arti-
cles' clear requirement that all amendments to it be unanimously adopted:
A compact between independent sovereigns, founded on ordinary acts
of legislative authority, can pretend to no higher validity than a
league or treaty between the parties. It is an established doctrine on
the subject of treaties that all the articles are mutually conditions of
each other; that a breach of any one article is a breach of the whole
treaty; and that a breach, committed by either of the parties, absolves
the others, and authorizes them, if they please, to pronounce the
compact violated and void. Should it unhappily be necessary to ap-
peal to these delicate truths for a justification for dispensing with the
consent of particular States to a dissolution of the federal pact, will
not the complaining parties find it a difficult task to answer the mul-
tiplied and important infractions with which they may be con-
fronted? The time has been when it was incumbent on us all to veil
the ideas which this paragraph exhibits. The scene is now changed,
and with it the part which the same motives dictate.90
c. Federalism and the Constitution
The Philadelphia delegates thus had the benefit of two previous efforts
to achieve a theoretically acceptable and practically workable federalism.
The imperial model had proved unacceptable because it centralized all
power, denying individual state governments any role as independent cen-
ters of authority. In the language of the time, it was a pure "consolida-
tion" that "melted down" all states into one monstrous "common mass."91
It was too "national." The Articles of Confederation, on the other hand,
had failed because there was insufficient gravitational pull from the center
89. See J. MADISON, supra note 59.
90. THE FEDERALImT No. 43, at 279-80 (J. Madison). For additional statements of Madison and
others to similar effect, see I M. Farrand, supra note 40, at 122-23, 314-17, 485; 2 id. at 93 (re-
marks of Madison); J. MADISON, supra note 59, at 365; 4 J. EI.LIOT, supra note 52, at 308 (remarks
of Charles Cotesworth Pinckney at South Carolina ratifying convention); id. at 230 (remarks of
James Iredell at North Carolina ratifying convention).
91. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819); G. WILLS, supra note 22, at
169-75; G. WooD, supra note 20, at 524-32 ("Consolidation or Confederation").
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to counter the centrifugal tendencies of each state. The system was too
"federal."92 What America needed, then, was some third model that bal-
anced centripetal and centrifugal political forces-a harmonious
Newtonian solar system in which individual states were preserved as dis-
tinct spheres, each with its own mass and pull, maintained in their proper
orbit by the gravitational force of a common central body. 3 It was exactly
such a system-"in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitu-
tion, but a composition of both"" 4-that the Federalists conceived in
Philadelphia.
Once again, the heart of the issue was sovereignty. The Articles had
crumbled because they had been erected on the uneven and shifting foun-
dation of the sovereignty of the People in each state. The imperial model
had failed because it asserted the omnipotent sovereignty of the central
assembly, Parliament. Yet to state the matter this way was to glimpse a
third and more promising alternative: Sovereignty must be vested in the
People of the United States as a whole. Such a system could shore up the
inherent instability of the Articles of Confederation. It could also avoid the
monumental centralism of the imperial model by relocating sovereignty
from the national assembly to the People of the nation. The People could
limit the delegated authority of the national government and stipulate that
certain powers be reserved for the government of each state.
Agency theory helped the Federalists conceptualize such a system in
legal terms. Consider, for example, Madison's The Federalist No. 46:
The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents
and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers, and
designed for different purposes. The adversaries of the Constitution
seem to have lost sight of the people altogether in their reasonings on
this subject; and to have viewed these different establishments not
only as mutual rivals and enemies, but as uncontrolled by any com-
mon superior in their efforts to usurp the authorities of each other.
92. The etymology of the word "federal" is noteworthy: Based on the Latin foedus (meaning
treaty or covenant), and its cognate fides (faith), a federal union is one relying on good faith and
voluntary compliance of member states, instead of direct governmental coercion of individuals. See The
Federalist on Federalism, supra note 83, at 1279-80. In this light, Article XIII of the Articles of
Confederation strongly confirms the document's purely federal nature: "we . . .solemnly plight and
engage the faith of our respective constituents." (emphasis added). Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at
204 (A. Hamilton) (distinguishing between "a mere treaty, dependent on the good faith of the par-
ties" and a "government, which is only another word for POLITICAL POWER AND
SUPREMACY"); I M. Farrand, supra note 40, at 34 (remarks of Gouverneur Morris) (similar).
93. For examples of exactly this sort of Newtonian imagery, see THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 73
(A. Hamilton); id. No. 15, at 111 (A. Hamilton); 1 M. Farrand, supra note 40, at 153, 165, 276
(remarks of John Dickenson, James Wilson, James Madison, and William Paterson). For a fascinat-
ing discussion of the effect of Enlightenment thought on the patriot generation, see G. WILLS, supra
note 22; G. Wn.s, supra note 46.
94. TH. F-DERAiSr No. 39, at 246 U. Madison).
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These gentlemen must here be reminded of their error. They must
be told that the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be
found, resides in the people alone . ...
As with separation of powers, federalism enabled the American People to
conquer government power by dividing it. Each government agency, state
and national, would have incentives to win the principal's affections by
monitoring and challenging the other's misdeeds.
It is tempting here simply to invoke the Constitution's famous first
seven words-"We the People of the United States"-and be done with it.
For at first blush, they seem to furnish irrebuttable proof that the sover-
eignty of one united People, instead of thirteen distinct Peoples, provided
the new foundation of the Federalist Constitution. The temptation is all
the greater because of the (quite literal) primacy of these words in the text
itself, their centrality in the minds of both pro- and anti-ratification lead-
ers in the various state conventions,96 and their prominence in the early
landmark opinions of the Supreme Court." Yet while the best reading of
the Constitution supports the unitary People thesis,98 we must resist the
temptation to place exclusive reliance on the Preamble's opening phrase.
Any argument based solely on these words proves too much. The Declara-
tion of Independence was made "in the Name, and by the Authority of the
good People [not Peoples] of these colonies," and the Articles of Confeder-
ation spoke of "the people [again singular] of the different states in the
95. Id. No. 46, at 294 (J. Madison). Note also the words of Wilson: "When the principle is once
settled that the people are the source of authority, the consequence is, that they. . . can distribute one
portion of power to the more contracted circle, called state governments; they can furnish another
portion of power to the government of the United States." 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 52, at 444 (re-
marks at Pennsylvania ratifying convention).
96. Compare 2 J. Et.yo'r, supra note 52, at 497-99 (remarks of James Wilson at Pennsylvania
ratifying convention) ("This . . .is not a government founded upon compact; it is founded upon the
power of the people. They express in their name and their authority, 'We, the people, do ordain and
establish,' &c. . . .[Tihe system itself tells you what it is; it is an ordinance and establishment of the
people.") with 2 id. at 134 (remarks of Anti-Federalist Samuel Nasson at Massachusetts ratifying
convention) (if Constitution's opening phrase "does not go to an annihilation of the state governments,
and to a perfect consolidation of the whole Union, I do not know what does") and 3 id. at 44
(remarks of Anti-Federalist Patrick Henry at Virginia ratifying convention) ("The fate ... of
America may depend on this. . . . Have they made a proposal of a compact between the states? If
they had, this would be a confederation. It is otherwise most clearly a consolidated government. The
question turns, sir, on that poor little thing-the expression, We, the people, instead of the states, of
America."); and A. MASON, THE S-riArs RIGH'Ts DEBA'rE 135 (2d ed. 1972) (quoting remarks of
Anti-Federalist Robert Whitehill at Pennsylvania ratifying convention) (" 'We the people of the
United States,' is a sentence that evidently shows the old foundation of the union is destroyed, the
principle of confederation excluded, and a new and unwieldy system of consolidated empire is set up,
upon the ruins of the present compact between the states."); see also G. WooD, supra note 20, at
524-32 ("Consolidation or Confederation").
97. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403-05 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.);
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 324 (1816) (Story, J.); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 454, 463 (1793) (opinion of Wilson, J.); id. at 471 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
98. See infra text accompanying notes 126-70.
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union." 9 Yet, as we have seen, neither of these documents, taken as a
whole, is best understood as proclaiming that Americans were one sover-
eign People.100 Nor is the question of which People were sovereign a
purely pedantic one whose nuances we need not ponder. On this question
hinges nothing less than a proper understanding of the most momentous
issues in the subsequent history of American federalism-issues framed by
the great antebellum debate between states' rightists and nationalists.
C. The Civil War Debate
The ratification of the Federalist Constitution both reflected and rein-
forced the emerging American consensus that the People were sovereign
and that governments were therefore necessarily limited.01 On this point,
men who agreed on little else-Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamil-
ton,102 Spencer Roane and John Marshall, 03 John C. Calhoun and Jo-
seph Story 04-spoke with one voice. Yet if, to quote Jefferson's first in-
99. The Declaration of Independence para. 32 (US. 1776) (emphasis added); Articles of Confed-
eration, 1781, art. IV (emphasis added).
100. Indeed, as late as 1787, Marylanders still called their state "the nation." G. WOOD, supra
note 20, at 356. See generally J. DAVIS, supra note 40, at 82-120 (presenting states' rights interpre-
tation of Declaration and Articles).
101. This consensus existed, of course, among a very limited set of prominent white male property
owners. Yet the idea of popular sovereignty could serve as a benchmark to measure the obvious defi-
ciencies in America's system of political participation, and as a pole star to guide democratic progress.
See infra text accompanying notes 164-70.
102. Compare T. JEFFERSON, Notes on The State of Virginia, in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEF-
FERSON 23, 170, 176 (M. Peterson ed. 1975) ("[To render a form of government unalterable by
ordinary acts of assembly, the people must . . . [choose] special conventions to form and fix their
government . . . [and] to bind up the several branches of government by certain laws, which when
they transgress their acts shall become nullities. ... ) with THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 152 (A.
Hamilton) ("The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF
THE PEOPLE. The streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure, original
fountain of all legitimate authority.").
103. Compare Roane, Hampden, in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARY-
i.AND 106, 142-43 (G. Gunther ed. 1969) ("The old confederation, I admit, was adopted by the
legislatures of the several states: but the validity of that adoption may well be questioned. That adop-
tion took place, in the infancy of our republic, and when we had not emancipated ourselves from the
opinion, which still prevails in Europe, that the sovereignty of states abides in their kings, or govern-
ments. That is, in this country, and at this day, an outrageous heresy. None but the people of a state,
in exclusion of its government, are competent to make or reform a government of whatever nature.
The governments are their deputies, for limited and defined objects.") with Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 175 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) ("That the people have an original right to estab-
lish, for their future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own
happiness, is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been erected. . . . This original and
supreme will organizes the government, and assigns to different departments their respective powers
. . . [and may] establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments.").
104. Compare J. CA.HOUN, Letter to General Hamilton on the Subject of State Interposition, in
6 WORKS OF JOHN C. CA.HOUN 144, 151 (New York 1855) ("sovereignty resides elsewhere-in the
people, not in the government") with 3 J. STORY, supra note 21, § 1609 ("No man in a republican
government can doubt, that the will of the people is, and ought to be, supreme. . . . The constitution
is the will, the deliberate will, of the people.").
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augural address, Americans were "all republicans . ..all federalists" ' 5
on the issue of the sovereignty of the People, the two parties had very
different "Peoples" in mind. 06
To states' rightists (the Anti-Federalists and Republicans of the early
antebellum period, the Confederates of the 1860's), the People of each
state were sovereign. Each People had their own unique set of government
agents (state government) and a set of agents in common with the Peoples
of other states (the federal government). 0 7 The Constitution was a purely
federal compact among thirteen sovereign principals to coordinate certain
joint activities by employing a common agency. To these states' rightists,
the Constitution marked no sharp break with the sovereignty structure of
the Articles of Confederation.'0" At most the Constitution simply made
clear that sovereignty did not reside in state legislatures, as the Articles
could have been (mis)interpreted as implying, but in state Peoples.'0 9
To nationalists (the Federalists of the early antebellum era, the Union-
ists of the 1860's), the People of the United States as a whole were sover-
eign. The People had a unique set of national agents representing the
whole (the federal government) and various sets of local agents represent-
ing parts of the whole (state governments)." 0 The Constitution was not
an inter-sovereign compact or treaty, but a supreme statute deriving from
the supreme sovereign legislature-the People of the nation."' These na-
tionalists either argued that the Constitution sharply broke with the pre-
existing structure of sovereignty," 2 or claimed that ever since the Declara-
tion of Independence, Americans had been one People notwithstanding a
purely formal reading of the text of the Articles of Confederation.1
3
105. T. JEFFERSON, First Inaugural Address, in T. JEFFERSON, supra note 102, at 292.
106. The work of my colleague Jeff Powell contains excellent insights into this debate. See gener-
ally Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985) [herein-
after Powell, Original Intent]; Powell, Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution: A Belated
Review, 94 YALE L.J. 1285 (1985) [hereinafter Story's Commentaries].
107. See, e.g., Amphictyon, in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MICCULLOCH V. AIARYLAND 52,
56 (G. Gunther ed. 1969); J. CALHOUN, supra note 104, at 151-52.
108. See, e.g., J. CALHOUN, supra note 104, at 158; J. DAVIS, supra note 40, at 154-56.
109. See, e.g., Roane, supra note 103.
110. The language of "whole" and "parts" is, of course, a hallmark of Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405, 435-46 (1819); see also Washing-
ton, Farewell Address, in 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 213, 215-17 (J. Richard-
son ed. 1898) (similar); A. LINCOLN, Message to Congress in Special Session, in 4 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421, 435 (R. Basler ed. 1953) (similar).
111. See Original Intent, supra note 106, at 904-05, 915-17, 922-24; Story's Commentaries,
supra note 106, at 1302-06.
112. This, I believe, was John Marshall's view. See infra text accompanying note 155.
113. Professor Powell sees Justice Story's Commentaries as the classic exposition of this view.
Story's Commentaries, supra note 106, at 1303-04. Shades of it may also be found in Chief Justice
Jay's opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 470-71 (1793).
James Madison attempted to straddle the states' rightist-nationalist debate by suggesting that ulti-
mate sovereignty had somehow been divided between the People of each state and the People of
America as a whole. See supra note 40. On this point, the father of the Constitution was uncharacter-
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Nationalists and states' rightists could offer complementary-indeed,
virtually identical-accounts of how the sovereignty of the People enabled
the Constitution to empower yet limit federal officers, to impose restric-
tions on state governments, and to separate and divide power within the
federal government. On such questions, it did not much matter which
People were sovereign, but only that "the People" were and that govern-
ments were not. On issues of federalism, however, divergent understand-
ings of sovereignty pointed the two parties in opposite directions.
On the level of day-to-day government, the two parties' visions yielded
conflicting implications for the scope of federal legislative and judicial
power. Consider first the scope of Congress' legislative powers under Arti-
cle I-the first question of McCulloch v. Maryland."4 If the Constitution
was in fact a compact among thirteen sovereign Peoples, then arguably
Article I should be strictly construed, in accordance with the traditional
rule that treaties generally be interpreted narrowly. Indeed, this was ex-
actly Jefferson's interpretive strategy in arguing against the constitutional-
ity of the first national bank."' If, however, the Constitution was not a
treaty among different Peoples but a grant of power by one People to a
special set of national agents, then Hamilton's rejoinder to Jefferson
gained weight:
This restrictive interpretation of [Article I] is also contrary to this
sound maxim of construction; namely, that the powers contained in a
constitution of government, especially those which concern the gen-
eral administration of the affairs of a country, its finances, trade,
defense, etc., ought to be construed liberally in advancement of the
public good. 16
Consider next the scope of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
over state courts-the issue in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee." 7 States' right-
ists found it hard to believe that the sovereign People of Virginia had
delegated the last word on the meaning of the federal compact (at least as
it applied to Virginia) to a federal judiciary beyond their exclusive con-
trol."1 8 Nationalists, however, found it equally implausible that the sover-
eign People of America had intended to forbid agents of "the whole" to
istically without followers. Almost every other major figure thought that ultimate sovereignty was
indivisible and therefore had to reside solely in either a state or a continental People.
114. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
115. See T. JEFFERSON, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank, in 5 THE WRIT-
tNCS OF THoMAS JEFFERSON 284 (P. Ford ed. 1895); Original Intent, supra note 106, at 888, 931.
116. A. HAMnI:rON, Opinion as to the Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States, in 3
WORKS OF A.EXANDER HANII:rON 455 (H. Lodge ed. 1885); see Original Intent, supra note 106,
at 913-17.
117. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
118. See, e.g., Roane, supra note 103, at 148-51.
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review judicial decisions about the meaning of the Constitution rendered
by agents of a local "part. "319
Of course, as a logical matter, the question whether the People of the
state or of the Union were sovereign did not necessarily dictate the alloca-
tion of power between state and federal government. Even if the Constitu-
tion was an inter-sovereign compact, it obviously contemplated an excep-
tionally tight federation whose nature and purposes might warrant
deviation from the general rule that treaties be narrowly construed. 20
Similarly, there was nothing in the logic of sovereignty that would have
prevented the People of Virginia from giving federal judicial agents the
last word (vis-a-vis state agents) on constitutional meaning. Conversely,
even under the nationalist premise of unitary sovereignty, the existence of
local agents with general legislative and judicial jurisdiction might argue
against an overly broad reading of the powers of central authorities. Nev-
ertheless, the states' rights vision did at least support a rebuttable inter-
pretive presumption favoring state legislatures over Congress, and state
courts over the federal judiciary.
When we move from the allocation of power between state and federal
agents to the allocation of power between federal agents and the People of
a state themselves, in convention assembled,'21 an even starker contrast
emerges. If the People of South Carolina were sovereign, they necessarily
retained the inalienable right to judge for themselves whether the federal
compact had been breached.' 22 And if, in convention, the People of South
Carolina determined that a material and substantial breach had occurred
(regardless of what federal judges or Peoples in other states thought), was
it not their sovereign right to withdraw-to secede-from the compact?' 23
And did not this greater power of legitimate secession subsume the lesser
of nonacquiescence in-nullification of-any particular action of federal
agents deemed unconstitutional by the popular convention? If, on the
119. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 49, at 200-14; D. WEBSTER, The Constitution Is Not a
Compact Between Sovereign States, in 3 WORKS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 448, 479-86 (Boston 1851).
120. See Marshall, supra note 49, at 169-71.
121. See infra text accompanying notes 146-50.
122. See J. CALHOUN, Address on the Relation Which the States and General Government Bear
to Each Other, in 6 J. CALHOUN, supra note 104, at 59, 75 (Fort Hill address).
123. See generally J. DAVIS, supra note 40 (using sovereignty theory to justify Confederate seces-
sion); A. SrEPHENS, supra note 19 (same). Lincoln brilliantly described the "sophism" of secession as
follows:
The sophism itself is, that any state of the Union may, consistently with the national Constitu-
tion, . . . withdraw from the Union, without the consent of the Union, or of any other state.
The little disguise that the supposed right is to be exercised only for just cause, themselves to
be sole judge of its justice, is too thin to merit any notice. . . .This sophism derives
much-perhaps the whole-of its currency, from the [false] assumption that there is some
omnipotent, and sacred supremacy pertaining to. .. [the People of] each State of our Federal
Union.
A. LINCOLN, supra note 110, at 433.
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other hand, the People of America collectively were sovereign, then, in the
words of the states' rightist John C. Calhoun, "there is an end of the
argument. The claimed right for a State [People] of defending her re-
served powers against the General Government, would be an
absurdity."12
Thus the great constitutional issues of the antebellum
era-congressional power and interposition, McCulloch and Martin, nul-
lification and secession-all turned to some degree on which People were
sovereign. And the first seven words of the Constitution only frame, but
do not (without more) answer, the all-important question. Indeed, the
Constitution's consistent use of the phrase "the United States" as a plural
noun only serves to cast further doubt on the self-evident correctness of
the conventional reading of the Preamble's opening phrase.125 However, a
closer look at the rest of the Constitution reveals several other provisions
that can help the Preamble's overworked opening words bear the argu-
mentative load.
1. The Unitary People
At the outset, let us look at the Preamble's final seven words. What is
being ordained and established is a "Constitution for the United States of
America." Not a "league," however "firm," not a "confederacy" or a
"(con)federation," not a "compact" among states, but a constitution cre-
ated by a single People for internal government, styled after earlier state
prototypes. 26 In this light, Chief Justice Marshall's immortal words in
McCulloch take on added meaning: "[I]t is a constitution we are
expounding.1
12 7
We should also note the ways in which the Preamble subtly but sugges-
tively altered the purposive language of the Articles. Under the earlier
instrument, "the said states" had leagued together "for their common de-
fense, the security of their Liberties, and their mutual and general wel-
fare.""28 The Federalist Preamble speaks instead of providing for "the
common defense," promoting "the general Welfare" (significantly, the
word "mutual" is dropped), and securing "the Blessings of Liberty." And
124. J. CALHOUN, supra note 104, at 146.
125. U.S. CON.ST. art. I, § 9, para. 8; id. art. II, § 1, para. 7; id. art. III, § 2, para. 1; id. art. III,
§ 3, para. 1; see I M. FARRAND, supra note 40, at 416 (remarks of James Wilson). We should also
note that artful repetition of the words "the United States" enabled the framers to avoid any explicit
textual description of the central government as "federal" or "national." See id. at 335.
126. See U.S. CONS-r. art. VI, para. 3 (distinguishing "this Constitution" from old "Confedera-
tion"); J. MADISON, supra note 59, at 365 (distinguishing "a league of sovereign powers" and a
"political constitution by virtue of which they are become one sovereign power").
127. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
128. Articles of Confederation, 1781, art. III.
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it adds references to "establish[ing] Justice" and "insur[ing] domestic
Tranquility"-internal matters of government that had lain beyond the
limited inter-sovereign scope of the Articles. Truly, the Constitution could
hardly be more straightforward in articulating its (literally) primary pur-
pose: the formation of a "more perfect Union."'29 Finally, we must not
neglect the silence roaring between the lines of the Preamble: Nowhere is
there any reference to the "sovereignty" of the People of "each state" that
had been the express animating principle of the Articles. 3
In fact, the word "sovereignty" never appears in the Constitution,
3
3
not even in the Tenth Amendment, the Federalist Constitution's counter-
part of the Confederation's Article II.132 Ironically, that Amendment, to-
day typically seen as a pure states' rights provision, contains language that
more strongly supports the unitary People thesis than does the Preamble's
seemingly more nationalistic opening phrase. For it is exactly the juxtapo-
sition of the Amendment's plural reference to "the states, respectively"
and its singular reference to "the People" (and not "their respective Peo-
plefs]")-a juxtaposition the Preamble lacks' 33 -that underscores the
unity of the American People and strongly confirms that the Preamble
means exactly what it seems to mean at first glance.
Between the Preamble and the Tenth Amendment lie various provi-
sions that strengthen the unitary People thesis. The first six articles ex-
129. See infra note 152. Whatever union had existed in America under the Confederation had
been imperfect, because each state People had retained its status as a distinct sovereign entity and
thus, for example, its right to secede. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 453 (1793)
(opinion of Wilson, J.) ("people of the United States form a NATION"); 2 M. Farrand, supra note
40, at 666-67 (Letter of Transmission from Convention President George Washington accompanying
proposed Constitution) ("It is obviously impracticable in the federal government of these States, to
secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and yet provide for the interest and safety of all
.... In all our deliberations on this subject we kept steadily in our view, that which appears to us
the greatest interest of every true American, the consolidation of our Union, in which is involved our
prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence."); Washington, supra note 110, at 217
("To the efficacy and permanency of your union a government for the whole is indispensable. No
alliances, however strict, between the parts can be an adequate substitute. . . Sensible of this mo-
mentous truth, you have improved upon your first essay by the adoption of [the] Constitution ...
which at any time exists till changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people ....").
Leading Anti-Federalists well understood the import of the Preamble's reference to "perfect union."
See, e.g., Yates, Brutus, in THE ANTrIFEDERALISTS 345 (C. Kenyon ed. 1985) (Constitution creates
"union of the people of the United States considered as one body").
130. Cf CON. OF T'HE CONFEDERATF S'rA'FS OF AmFRICA preamble (1861) ("We, the people
of the Confederate States, each State acting in its sovereign and independent character. ) (em-
phasis added).
131. Cf Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 454 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (quoted supra text
accompanying note 57).
132. Compare U.S. CoNs'r. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple.") with Articles of Confederation, 1781, art. II ("Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom and
independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly
delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.").
133. For other, less illuminating, constitutional references to "the people," see U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 2; id. amends. I, IV, IX.
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plicitly establish a national "government" with "legislative,"'' "execu-
tive" and "judicial" powers-all words carefully omitted from the Articles
of Confederation's description of its general assembly. The national legis-
lature's pronouncements are expressly described as "laws" enforceable
even in state courts. And the provision authorizing the legislature to pass
all laws "necessary and proper" to implement its enumerated powers pur-
posely reverses the international law spin of the language of the Articles,
which explicitly required a narrow interpretation of federal power.135
Moreover, the national government can directly carry out its "laws" by
reliance on its own, rather than state, executive and judicial officers. In-
deed, even when state courts sit as original tribunals in cases arising
under the Constitution or national laws, the Constitution requires that
some national court sit in appellate review. 6 The first house of the na-
tional legislature is directly elected by individuals who are to be propor-
tionately represented, in sharp contrast to the Confederation's one state,
one vote rule; and Congress can directly legislate upon, and tax, these
individuals.1 37 The Constitution defines treason as levying war against, or
giving aid or comfort to, enemies of the United States, not any individual
state. "'38 Taken together, all of these provisions tend to suggest that the
Federalist Constitution was simply a continental version-deriving from
134. As with their self-description as "Federalists," see supra note 9, supporters of the Constitu-
tion rhetorically de-emphasized their break with the Articles of Confederation by continuing to use
the word "Congress." Cf 2 M. Farrand, supra note 40, at 135, 152 (first description of Constitution's
new bicameral legislature as "Congress" appearing in Committee of Detail drafts, two months after
opening of Convention). This rhetorical continuity masked dramatic differences between "Congress"
under the Articles and "Congress" under the Constitution. The latter was a true "legislature" and
was indeed described as such in the Constitution itself. The framers thus developed vocabularies that
would have been oxymoronic twenty years earlier-e.g., "limited sovereignty" and "legislative Con-
gress." Unsurprisingly, later states' rightists placed heavy reliance on the Constitution's use of the
word "Congress." See, e.g., J. TAYI.OR, supra note 81, at 5-6.
135. Compare U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, para. 18 with Articles of Confederation, 1781, art. II. See
generally THE FEDERAI.Tsr No. 33, at 201-04 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 44, at 283-86 (J. Madison).
Even the Tenth Amendment purposely omits the word "expressly," which had been the centerpiece of
Article II of the Articles. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819); 1 AN-
NAlS OF CoN;. 790 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
136. See Amar, supra note 9, 229-59.
137. Here we see the obvious influence of revolutionary ideology that taxation or legislation with-
out representation is tyranny. Under the Articles, only state governments were represented, and thus
only they-and not individuals-could be "requisition[ed]". The Federalists mandated individual rep-
resentation precisely because they proposed to allow the national government to tax and legislate
directly upon individuals. See U.S. CON.Tr. art. I, § 2, para. 3 (linking representation and direct
taxation by prescribing same formula to compute both).
138. The language of the treason clause reflects careful consideration. The Convention explicitly
rejected earlier drafts defining treason as "adhering to the enemies of the United States, or any of
them," precisely to make clear that a citizen's paramount allegiance was owed to the sovereign People
of the United States, and not to the People of any state, in the event of conflict between the two. 2 M.
Farrand, supra note 40, at 345-49 (emphasis added); see 3 id. at 223 (remarks of Luther Martin
before Maryland legislature).
1457
The Yale Law Journal
one continental People-of earlier state constitutions (deriving from state
Peoples) under the league.
The supremacy clause clinches the case. Consider what would happen
if the People of South Carolina, having adopted the Federalist Constitu-
tion, reconvened at some later time to amend their state constitution. In
convention, they adopt an amendment inconsistent with the federal Con-
stitution. In a subsequent lawsuit, which law would a state judge be
obliged to follow? If the People of South Carolina were sovereign, the
answer would plainly be the state constitution as amended. The sovereign
People's right to alter or abolish their government at any time is an ina-
lienable attribute of sovereignty, and the sovereign's judicial agents (state
judges) are bound to enforce the sovereign's will even if that will violates
an earlier treaty (here, the federal compact) under international law. 9
Yet the supremacy clause explicitly compels even state judges to disregard
the attempted amendment-a rule plainly inconsistent with the sover-
eignty of the People of each state.140 It is worthy of special note that when
the supremacy clause was first introduced at Philadelphia by the strident
Anti-Federalist Luther Martin, it pointedly failed to specify the
supremacy of the federal Constitution over its state counterparts. 1" Seen
through the lens of sovereignty theory, Martin's outrage at the Conven-
tion's subsequent modification of the clause is understandable, for the
modification decisively repudiated his view that the new Constitution
should remain a compact among thirteen sovereign Peoples. 4 A more
subtle alteration of Martin's language further undercut his purely confed-
erate design: Whereas Martin's proposal spoke of federal statutes as "the
supreme law of the respective States,"'4 3 the Convention proclaimed the
Constitution to be "the supreme law of the land."'44 Once again the im-
plication was continental: one Constitution, one land, one People.
4 5
139. 2 M. Farrand, supra note 40, at 93 (remarks of Madison). This is indeed the federal rule.
See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
140. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and theJudges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONsT. art. VI, para. 2 (emphasis added); cf. 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 52, at 187 (remarks of
Governor Johnston at North Carolina ratifying convention) ("The Constitution must be the supreme
law of the land; otherwise, it would be in the power of any one state to counteract the other states,
and withdraw itself from the Union."); 3 id. at 55 (remarks of Patrick Henry at Virginia ratifying
convention) ("Suppose the people of Virginia should wish to alter their government; can a majority of
them do it? No; because they are connected with other men, or, in other words, consolidated with
other states.").
141. 2 M. Farrand, supra note 40, at 28-29.
142. See R. BERGER, supra note 38, at 75, 240; 3 M. Farrand, supra note 40, at 287 (Luther
Martin's Reply to Landholder); Fletcher, supra note 81, at 1065.
143. 2 M. Farrand, supra note 40, at 28 (emphasis added) (Martin proposal).
144. Id. at 603 (emphasis added) (Committee of Style revision).
145. See THE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 38 (J. Jay) ("Providence has been pleased to give this one
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But if earlier state constitutions and the Articles had established the
sovereignty of the People of "each state," how, apart from sheer ipse dixit,
did the Constitution derive the sovereignty of one American People? How
did thirteen separate sovereign Peoples magically "consolidate" into one
common People? The answer lies in the seventh and final Article: "The
Ratification of the Conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the
Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the
Same."
The word "conventions" is used here as an eighteenth century term of
art, denoting a special assembly of the People themselves, convened for the
special purpose of expressing direct popular sovereignty. 146 Each state's
ratifying convention was superior to its ordinary legislature, for the con-
vention was in theory the virtual embodiment of the People of that
state. 147 It was thus a meta-legal body that could legitimately alter the
state's constitution.1 4  Since the Federalist Constitution would give na-
tional officers powers that had previously been vested exclusively in vari-
ous state agents, or reserved by the People of each state, under various
state constitutions, its adoption would require a pro tanto repeal of those
constitutions. Such a modification obviously required the assent of the
People themselves.149 By ratifying the Federalist Constitution, the People
connected country to one united people-a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the
same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very
similar in their manners and customs. . . . [This] band of brethren, united to each other by the
strongest ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties.").
146. See G. WooD, supra note 20, at 306-89; Ackerman, supra note 69, at 1058-70.
147. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819) ("[T]he people acted upon
[the Constitution] in the only manner in which they can act safely, effectively, and wisely, on such a
subject, by assembling in Convention.").
Why was it sensible for Americans to transubstantiate a convention into the virtual embodiment of
the People? After all, as with an ordinary legislative assembly, a convention assembly may improve
the ultimate quality of public deliberation, see, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 342 (J. Madison),
but only by excluding most citizens, thereby raising fiduciary/agency problems. An answer based on
organization theory/incentive analysis might focus on how a ratification convention is structured dif-
ferently from an ordinary legislature in ways that enhance monitoring and improve public accounta-
bility. First, the People select convention delegates in a special election. Second, delegates are generally
convened to consider a single issue (ratification). Third and related, the basic choice set is binary (yes-
no), reducing agenda manipulation problems and decreasing the monitoring problems that exist in an
ordinary legislature with virtually infinite possibilities of side deals and vote trading. Fourth, conven-
tions immediately disband and disperse among the People, reducing the problem of legislators en-
trenching themselves and developing their own institutional perspectives. Finally, a convention en-
hances a sense of public-spiritedness and individual moral responsibility among both voters and
delegates. Calling a "convention" signals to all concerned that the polity is entering a high-stakes
moment when basic ground rules will be hammered out. Interestingly, criminal juries (deciding the
single issue of individual guilt or innocence) possess many more convention attributes than do ordi-
nary legislatures. Cf Note, Choosing Representatives by Lottery Voting, 93 YALE L.J. 1283 (1984)
(comparing legislatures and juries). For further thoughts on the nature of conventions, see B. Acker-
man, Discovering the Constitution (1986) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
148. Note how Americans legalized and channelled the more lawless-sounding right of revolution.
See G. Woon, supra note 20, at 342, 613-15; Ackerman, supra note 69, at 1020-24, 1058-62.
149. See 2 M. Farrand, supra note 40, at 92-93 (remarks of Madison).
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of each state would exercise their primal power to "alter or abolish" their
form of government by withdrawing powers previously delegated to one
set of agents and redelegating those powers to a different set.' 50
Ratifications by state conventions, however, would have far more tran-
scendent consequences. It was by these very acts that previously separate
state Peoples agreed to "consolidate" themselves into a single continental
People. Before ratification, the People of each state were indeed sover-
eign-and for that very reason could not be bound by the new Constitu-
tion if they chose not to ratify, no matter what any of the other sovereign
Peoples chose to do.' Thus, although Article VII required only nine
states to ratify, it confirmed the pre-existing sovereignty of the People of
each state by proclaiming that the Constitution would go into effect only
between the nine or more states ratifying.'52 The ratifications themselves
thus formed the basic social compact by which formerly distinct sovereign
Peoples, each acting in convention, agreed to reconstitute themselves into
one common sovereignty. The Gettysburg Address notwithstanding, it was
in 1788, and not 1776, that "a new nation" was legally "brought forth
upon this continent."' 53
This reading of Article VII synthesizes the antithetical views of extreme
states' rightists like Roane and Calhoun, who argued that Americans
never became one People, and ardent nationalists like Story and Lincoln,
who suggested that Americans had always been one People after Indepen-
dence."" This synthesis is precisely the middle position staked out in vari-
150. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 404; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 463-64 (1793)
(opinion of Iredell, J.); G. WOOD, supra note 20, at 532-36.
151. See 1 M. Farrand, supra note 40, at 179 (remarks of William Paterson) ("Let [large states]
unite if they please, but let them remember that they have no authority to compel the others to
unite."); id. at 123, 483, 541, 593 (similar remarks of James Wilson, Elbridge Gerry, and
Gouverneur Morris); see also 2 id. at 92-93, 475 (overwhelming Convention rejection of proposals to
bind any state People to new Constitution absent their consent).
152. The Preamble's reference toforming a more perfect union also seems to recognize the sepa-
rateness of state Peoples in 1787. Cf An Act for rendering the Union of the two Kingdoms more
intire and compleat, 1707, 6 Anne, ch. 6 (formal union of Scotland and England); 1 M. Farrand,
supra note 40, at 198, 493 (remarks of Benjamin Franklin and Rufus King) (discussing success of
union between England and Scotland); id. at 462 (remarks of Nathaniel Gorham discussing success of
unions of previously separate colonies to form Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Jersey).
153. A. LINCO.N, The Gettysburg Address, in 7 THE CoI.x~rrED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LIN-
COLN, supra note 110, at 23 (emphasis added). For a more elaborate exposition of Lincoln's view that
one nation emerged immediately and unproblematically from the Declaration of Independence, see his
Special Session Message to Congress, fittingly delivered on July 4, 1861:
The original [states] passed into the Union even before they cast off their British colonial
dependence . . . . [Tihe object [of the Declaration of Independence] plainly was not to declare
their independence of one another, or of the Union . . . . The Union is older than any of the
States; and, in fact, it created them as States.
A. LINCOI.N, supra note 110, at 433-34.
154. Story's argument that the practice of Revolutionary government confirmed the sovereignty of
one American People rested heavily on the facts that the continental Congress under the Articles had
always wielded large portions of "sovereign" power over international affairs of the highest import,
and that the People generally considered members of Congress to be their direct agents and not just
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ous nineteenth century writings of Chief Justice Marshall.'55 Perhaps
more important, the nation-creating implications of Article VII ratifica-
tion were evident to Americans during the ratification period itself. Thus
The Federalist No. 33 likened state ratification of the Constitution in con-
vention to a social compact among individuals to form one body politic:
If individuals enter into [i.e., form through social compact] a state of
society, the laws of that society must be the supreme regulator of
their conduct. If a number of [pre-existing] political societies enter
into a larger political society, the laws which the latter may enact,
pursuant to the powers intrusted to it by its constitution, must neces-
sarily be supreme over those societies and the individuals of whom
they are composed. It would otherwise be a mere treaty, dependent
on the good faith of the parties, and not a government. . . ."
By July 4, 1788, ten state conventions had already ratified the Federalist
Constitution-enough to put the new document into effect under Article
VII. "'Tis done," wrote Dr. Benjamin Rush on the twelfth anniversary
of the Declaration to which he had been a signatory. "We have become a
nation."' '
delegates of their state governments. Yet those points cast doubt only on the notion that Revolution-
era continental government rested on the sovereignty of state governments; they do not affirmatively
establish the sovereignty of the People of America in contradistinction to the People of each state.
Even in the work of the great Justice, it seems that the garbled nature of the sovereignty debate
created analytic confusion and a conflation of two distinct dichotomies: government versus People and
state versus national.
155. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 187 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.)
("[R]eference has been made to the political situation of [the] States, anterior to [the Constitution's]
formation. It has been said, that they were sovereign, were completely independent, and were con-
nected with each other only by a league. This is true. But, when these allied sovereigns converted
their league into a government, when they converted their Congress of Ambassadors, deputed to delib-
erate on their common concerns, and to recommend measures of general utility, into a Legislature,
empowered to enact laws on the most interesting subjects, the whole character in which the States
appear, underwent a change .... "); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 389, 413-14
(1821) (Marshall, C.J.); Marshall, supra note 49, at 195-200; see also D. WEBSTER, supra note
119, at 454-55, 472-77 (similar).
156. THE. FEDERAI.Ir No. 33, at 204 (A. Hamilton) (emphasis added); accord J. MADISON,
supra note 59, at 365 (defining "constitution" as "instrument by which [separate states] are become
one sovereign power" (emphasis added)); see 2 M. Farrand, supra note 40, at 666 (Letter of Trans-
mission from Convention President George Washington accompanying proposed Constitution) ("Indi-
viduals entering into society, must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest.") (emphasis added);
I J. EI.tOyT, supra note 52, at 334 (ratification instrument of Rhode Island) (referring to "social
compact," and not inter-sovereign "federal" compact or compact between pre-existing People and its
rulers); id. at 322, 326 (ratification instruments of Massachusetts and New Hampshire) (similar); 3
id. at 657 (Declaration of Rights and Amendments of Virginia ratifying convention) (similar). See
generally J. LocKu, supra note 41, § 14 (distinguishing between league and pact "to enter into one
community and make one body politic"); A. McLAUGHLIN, supra note 25, at 66-85 (similar); G.
WOOD, supra note 20, at 259-305 (discussing social compact ideas).
157. C. BOWEN, MIRAcLE A71 PHI.ADEt.PHIA 310 (1986). The leading Anti-Federalist pamphlets
shared this understanding of Article VII ratification. See Lee, Letters of a Federal Farmer, in PAM-
PHI.ETS ON THE CONS~rrITUTION OF THE UNrIED STATES 277, 311 (P. Ford ed. 1888) ("[W]hen the
people [of each state] shall adopt the proposed constitution it will be their last and supreme act; it will
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This understanding of Article VII is reinforced by comparing it with
Article V, which provides that ratification by conventions of three-fourths
of the states suffices to amend the Constitution in a way that will bind
even nonratifying states. Even as late as July, 1788, the People of New
York, as a distinct sovereign entity, were legally free to vote down the new
Constitution and refuse to comply with it.5'8  However, New Yorkers
knew that if they ratified the document in convention, they would lose
their freedom to disregard any subsequent constitutional proposal agreed
to by enough other conventions. Nowhere was the Constitution's break
with the Articles of Confederation-and indeed, all other multiple-
sovereign, federal regimes'59-more dramatic.1 60 Simply put, Article VII
recognized the pre-existing sovereign right of any non-ratifying state to
secede from its sister states;' 8 Article V prospectively abolished that sov-
ereign right for each state People who joined the Union, thereby melting
themselves into the larger common sovereignty of the People of
America. 8 2 E Pluribus Unum.' 8
be adopted not by the people of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, &c., but by the people of the United
States . . . ." (emphasis added)); The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Con-
vention of the State of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents, in THE AN'nFEDERALIS's 46 (C. Kenyon
ed. 1985) [hereinafter Pennsylvania Minority] (Preamble worded in "style of a compact between
individuals entering a state of society, and not that of a confederation of States"); Agrippa, in id. at
150 (similar); Yates, supra note 129, at 345 ("this constitution, if it is ratified, will not be a compact
entered into by states, in their corporate capacities, but an agreement of the People of the United
States, as one great body politic"); see also 3 J. Eu.uor, supra note 52, at 22, 44 (remarks of Anti-
Federalist Patrick Henry) ("If the states be not the agents of this compact, it must be one great,
consolidated, national government, of the people of all the states.. .. Here is a resolution as radical
as that which separated us from Great Britain.").
158. Indeed, North Carolina and Rhode Island did not ratify the new Constitution until months
after it had gone into operation in the other states under Washington's presidency.
159. The point made here about Article VII is in some ways the mirror image of the point made
earlier about Article VI. The People of the United States may amend their Constitution in a way that
violates the state constitution of South Carolina, but the People of South Carolina may not amend
their state constitution in a way that violates the Constitution of the United States. Both of these
conclusions logically follow from the same premise: Only the People of the United States as a whole
are sovereign. Conversely, both articles are logically inconsistent with the states' rights theory of popu-
lar sovereignty. See 2 M. Farrand, supra note 40, at 557-58 (remarks of Elbridge Gerry and Alexan-
der Hamilton).
160. Cf 1 M. Farrand, supra note 40, at 250 (remarks of William Paterson) (discussing amend-
ment provisions of Articles of Confederation) ("This is the nature of all treaties. What is unanimously
done, must be unanimously undone.").
161. See, e.g., THE FEDERAS1T No. 43, at 280 (J. Madison) ("no political relation can subsist
between assenting [i.e., ratifying] and dissenting States"). Strictly speaking, it is perhaps more accu-
rate to view the ratifying states as seceding from the Confederation by abrogating the Articles. In any
event, a recurrent theme of The Federalist and the earlier Philadelphia Convention is that govern-
ment under the Articles is at an end, and that the two alternatives are therefore "reunion" under the
Federalist Constitution, id. (emphasis added), or dissolution (i.e,, secession) and recombination of
individual states into two or more competing nations/confederacies. See THE FEDERALiS'r No. 1, at
37 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 8, at 71 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 15, at 112 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 23, at
157 (A. Hamilton); 1 M. Farrand, supra note 40. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 5 (J. Jay)
(discussing evils that would result "should the people of America divide themselves into three or four
nations"); id. Nos. 6-8 (A. Hamilton) (similar).
162. Admittedly, the text of Article V does not address secession in so many words-nothing in
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2. Confederate Vestiges, Union Responses
The sovereignty of the People of the United States marked a sharp
break with the logic of the Articles. Yet the break was not a completely
clean one. In several crucial respects, the Federalist Constitution seemed
to fall short of perfecting the sovereignty of the People of America. To
begin with, many persons, slaves being the most obvious example, found
themselves excluded from "the People" by a definitional fiat that seriously
eroded the moral force of the Federalist vision of popular sovereignty.
16 4
the Constitution does. Nevertheless, the plain import of that Article and the rest of the document is
flatly inconsistent with the states' rights theory of popular sovereignty that underlies the claimed right
of secession. It is a great mistake to assume that the secession question was some purely abstract
hypothetical that the pragmatic Federalists left open for future resolution. The spectre of imminent
secession haunted their every thought. See supra note 161. Indeed, we do well to remember, as Jeffer-
son Davis so vigorously insisted, that the Constitution itself was born in an act of secession. See 1 J.
DAvis, supra note 40, at 99-103. Davis, however, drew the wrong conclusion from this premise: He
presumed continuity between the Constitution and the Articles regarding the ongoing permissibility of
secession in the very same breath in which he established a discontinuity between them created by
secession itself. One of the Federalists' paramount goals was to constitute their new system in a way
that would give no color to later state claims of a right to secede. See, e.g., 1 M. Farrand, supra note
40, at 467 (remarks of Hamilton) ("This was the critical moment for forming . . . [a national] gov-
ernment. . . . It is a miracle that we are here . . . . It would be madness to trust to future mira-
cles."); 2 id. at 92-93 (remarks of Madison) (The "true difference between a league or treaty, and a
Constitution" is that "in the case of treaties . . . a breach of any one article by any of the parties,
frees the other parties from their engagements. In the case of a union of people under one Constitu-
tion, the nature of the pact has always been understood to exclude such an interpretation."); cf. THE
FEDERAI.IST No. 22, at 152 (A. Hamilton) (similar); id. No. 11, at 91 (A. Hamilton) (speaking of
"strict and indissoluble" union); 2 J. Ei.tOr, supra note 52, at 463 (remarks of James Wilson at
Pennsylvania ratifying convention) ("bonds of our union ought therefore to be indissolubly strong"). It
should also be noted that no state convention attempted to reserve the right of secession. See 11 THE
PAPERS OF JAM'S MADISON 189 (R. Rutkind & C. Hobson eds. 1977) (letter from James Madison
to Alexander Hamilton) ("Constitution requires an adoption in toto, andfor ever"); A. McLAUGH-
LIN, A CON.TrITIrONAi. Htsr-ORY OF THE UNITED STATS 214-19 (1935). Madison's, Hamilton's,
and Jay's brilliant discussions of the threats to internal liberty and tranquility that would arise from
disunion-the need for standing armies, the strengthening of executive power, the dangers of Euro-
pean intrigue and intervention in American affairs-powerfully confirm and justify the impermissibil-
ity of unilateral secession under "the more perfect union" formed under the Federalist Constitution.
See THE FEDERAI.IST No. 5 (J. Jay); id. Nos. 6-8 (A. Hamilton); I M. Farrand, supra note 40, at
464-65 (remarks of Madison). The strongest historical evidence against secession, however, was not
what the Federalists said but what they did not say. To my knowledge, no major proponent of the
Constitution sought to win over states' rightists by conceding that states could unilaterally nullify or
secede in the event of perceived national abuses. The Federalists' silence is especially impressive be-
cause such a concession might have dramatically improved the document's ratification prospects in
several states. Instead, the Federalists sought to blunt Anti-Federalist concern about federal abuses by
emphasizing bicameralism, separation of powers (especially judicial review), refinements in principles
of representation, future amendments under Article V, and various federalism checks short of interpo-
sition, nullification, and secession. See generally infra Section III.
163. "Out of many, one." Thus, the most important thing that the Constitution constitutes is
neither the national government, nor even the supreme law, but one sovereign national People, who
may alter their government or supreme law at will. To turn the words of the arch states' rightist
Spencer Roane against him, "The people only are supreme. The Constitution is subordinate to
them. . . . '[Tihe authority of constitutions over government, and of the people over constitutions, are
truths which should be ever kept in mind.'" Roane, supra note 103, at 130-31 (quoting Virginia
Report of 1799).
164. Indians, women, and the poor also faced barriers to equal political participation.
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Indeed, the Constitution itself provided no clear definition of national citi-
zenship. Yet if the People of America were sovereign, then one's Ameri-
can citizenship was all-important, and should never have been treated as
simply derivative of one's state citizenship under state constitutions, or
subject to virtually limitless manipulation by ordinary legislation."6 5 Addi-
tionally, the suggestion of Article V that no state could lose its equal rep-
resentation in the Senate without its own consent appeared to crimp the
sovereign power of the People of the nation to alter their government by
constitutional amendment. Harking back to the pure federalism of the Ar-
ticles' requirement of unanimous amendment, the Senate clause of Article
V seemed to deny the sovereign right of the People of America to impose
their changed will on a tiny but recalcitrant localized minority.
It is remarkable that the Reconstruction Amendments can be seen as
perfecting the Federalist Constitution by trimming off its confederate ves-
tiges. For our purposes, the most significant constitutional development of
this era was not the general federal guarantee of individual rights against
states embedded in the due process and equal protection clauses, provi-
sions that dominate current constitutional scholarship. While of course
momentous, these clauses can be seen as simply expanding the substantive
scope of the Federalist Constitution's Article I, section 10 catalogue of
federally enforceable individual rights against states. Of far greater signif-
icance here are the Thirteenth Amendment's abolition of slavery; the
Fourteenth's constitutional definition of national birthright citizenship and
its prohibition against exclusion by definitional fiat; the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments' specific protections of equality of franchise; and
the process of ratification itself, which, as Professor Ackerman has pointed
out, swept aside the formal limitations of Article V in order to vindicate
the American People's sovereign right to alter their government.16
165. Even if not strictly compelled by the logic of sovereignty, surely a popular-that is, a consti-
tutional-rule defining who counted as part of the polity was called for (just as Parliament would
never dream of delegating the power to set the qualifications of its members to some other body).
Instead, however, the Constitution could be read as allowing the vital issue of national citizenship to
be decided by state law except in cases of naturalization. The complex legal issues concerning the
source of antebellum citizenship were never fully resolved. See J. KE.TNER, THE DEVFLOPM FNT OF
AMERICAN CrrIZENSHIP 1608-1870, at 248-351 (1978).
166. Thus, I share Professor Ackerman's view that popular amendment cannot be cabined by the
formal niceties of Article V. See Ackerman, supra note 69, at 1056-69 (arguing that Constitution can
be and has been amended by modes of popular referenda transcending purely "formal" reading of
Article V); B. Ackerman, supra note 147 (similar). My argument is simply the structural complement
of Professor Ackerman's basic textual one; he points to the textual references to "Conventions" in
Article V, whereas I am offering here a structural account of the sovereignty of the American people
that undergirds the textual reference to "Conventions."
The constitutional amendments of the Progressive era carry on the Reconstruction tradition, both in
extending participation to a group of persons previously excluded from politics by definitional fiat, see
U.S. CoNs'r. amend. XIX (women's suffrage), and in further eroding the Senate clause of Article V,
see id. amend. XVII (direct election of senators).
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3. The Role oI the States
Relocating sovereignty in the People of the United States in the late
1780's did not obliterate all state lines; it only established that any power
exercised by state Peoples and state governments was ultimately subject to
the absolute control of the American People.16 Nothing prevented that
sovereign from adopting a constitution that allowed state structures to con-
tinue to exist and wield delegated power." 8 Such was the design of the
Federalist Constitution. For example, Article V itself generally looked to
states, rather than individuals, as the unit of measure for tallying ratifica-
tions of constitutional amendments. 69 Indeed, states were woven into the
167. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's slogan that ours is "an indestructible union, composed
of indestructible states," Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869), "We the People of the
United States" may choose to destroy states by constitutional amendment. Of course, there are excel-
lent reasons why we should choose not to. See infra Section III.
More realistically, Americans might desire to amend the Constitution to require periodic redistrict-
ing of state boundaries to ensure that the Senate's equally represented states have equal size, or to
modify equal representation itself. Not only would these amendments be constitutional, despite the
special limitations of Article V's Senate clause, but such amendments could come into being even
without satisfying the Article's general mechanism of tallying ratification according to a one state, one
vote rule. To contest this is to deny the sovereign right of the People to alter their government at any
time for any reason, and to attempt to bind the source of all law-the sovereign People-with a law
of its own creation. See supra text accompanying notes 22-45. Of course, the obvious objection to my
argument is that it ignores the clear mandate of Article V to the contrary. Only two brief responses
can be sketched here. First, as Professor Ackerman has persuasively argued, a sensitive reading of
Article V's reference to "Conventions" suggests that the framers themselves recognized the futility and
foolishness of any hard and fast mode of channelling future acts of true popular sovereignty. See
Ackerman, supra note 69, at 1058-62; B. Ackerman, supra note 147. Second and more fundamental,
the People of 1787 were incapable of binding a future convention of the People, even if they had tried.
Indeed, the modes by which various state ratifying conventions exercised popular sovereignty in
1787-1788 seemed to violate the formal provisions for constitutional amendment prescribed by pre-
existing state constitutions. See A Republican Federalist, in THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note 129,
at 112, 121-22 (Massachusetts); Pennsylvania Minority, supra note 157, at 32-33 (Pennsylvania).
See generally Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress To Control the Future, 13 HAS-
TINGS CON.r. L.Q. 185 (1986) (discussing legitimacy problems raised whenever body tries to bind
itself). Nor does this understanding of the inalienable right of (a deliberate majority of) the People to
change their government render Article V a nullity. It continues to have legal force as the rule of
recognition for ordinary constitutional amendment, and moral force as a promise made by the sover-
eign-even though such a promise cannot be legally enforced by the sovereign's judicial agents against
the sovereign absent its ongoing consent. See infra text accompanying notes 185-88. Thus, disregard
of Article V in, say, 1790 would have been a plain breach of faith with those who voted for the
Constitution in reliance on the mechanisms of that Article. Any breach of faith argument, however,
seems limited to the founding generation itself, and loses much of its force when applied to Recon-
struction (when the limitations of Article V were first transcended, see B. Ackerman, supra note 147)
or to the twentieth century: None of the original voters were/are around to call "foul" persuasively.
168. For example, the People of America could in 1788 choose to deviate from proportionate
representation in selecting their Senate, just as the People of Maryland did in 1776. See MD. CONST
of 1776 arts. XIV-XV, in 3 F. THORPE, supra note 50, at 1693-94 (giving unequal sized counties
equal weight in selecting state Senators); infra note 169.
169. For an important qualification, see supra notes 166-67; cf. T. JEFFERSON, A Draft Consti-
tution for Virginia, in THE PORTAB.E THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 102, at 242 n.1 ("It is
proposed that this bill, after correction by the Convention, shall be referred by them to the people to
be assembled in their respective counties and that the suffrages of two thirds of the counties shall be
requisite to establish it."); J. CAI.HOUN, supra note 104, at 146 (if People of America are sovereign,
states would "bear to the Union the same relation that counties do the states"); 6 CONG. DEa. 269
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very fabric of the new national government's political departments."' Fi-
nally, and most importantly for our purposes, the Federalist Constitution
preserved the independent lawmaking authority of state governments. The
language of the Tenth Amendment simply distilled the underlying struc-
tural logic of the original Constitution: Wherever authorized by its own
state constitution, a state government can enact any law not inconsistent
with the federal Constitution and constitutional federal laws.
Thus, state governments would continue to enjoy power to make law,
power derived from the sovereign People. To what extent did that deriva-
tive "sovereignty" also imply a "sovereign" immunity from legal liability?
To that question we now turn.
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE FEDERALIST CONSTITUTION
The sovereignty of "We the People of the United States" is admittedly
an abstraction-an idea. But abstractions often have legal consequences.
And the single idea of popular sovereignty generates a powerful set of
legal implications covering a vast range of constitutional issues from lim-
ited government and judicial review to federalism and separation of pow-
ers to nullification and constitutional amendment. In one vital area of con-
temporary jurisprudence, however, the Supreme Court has fashioned
doctrine wholly antithetical to the Constitution's organizing principle of
popular sovereignty. By allowing both federal and state governments to
invoke "sovereign immunity" from liability for constitutional violations,
the Court has misinterpreted the Federalist Constitution's text, warped its
unifying structure, and betrayed the intellectual history of the American
Revolution that gave it birth. In effect, the Court has transformed "sover-
eignty" into the very tool of government supremacy that our Revolution-
ary forebears wielded pen and sword to destroy.'
(1830) (remarks of Sen. Edward Livingston) (similar).
170. See Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Compo-
sition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Coixm. L. Rvv. 543 (1954). The point is
strongest with respect to the Senate, which preserved two central features of the Congress under the
Articles: election by state legislatures and equal representation of each state. Yet even here, these
similarities should not blind us to the many ways in which the Federalists constituted the Senate as an
entity more nationalistic than the old Congress. The Federalists replaced bloc voting by states with
per capita voting by Senators; increased sixfold the term of office (and thus enhanced the likelihood of
Senators' developing national sentiments and attachments); abolished recall by state legislature; elimi-
nated all limitations on reelection; required salaries to be paid by the national government; and gave
the Senate, as well as the House, powers to discipline and even expel its members and compel their
attendance (powers lacking under the Articles, given Congress's status as a mere diplomatic assembly).
See 4 J. Eia.uOr, supra note 52, at 60 (remarks of William Davie at North Carolina ratification
convention); The Federalist on Federalism, supra note 83, at 1281-82.
171.
Was, then, the American Revolution effected, was the American Confederacy formed, was the
precious blood of thousands spilt, and the hard-earned substance of millions lavished, not that
the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety, but that the governments of the
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Although the issue of sovereign immunity for constitutional wrongs im-
plicates both state and federal governments-both are limited under the
Constitution-the issue first arose under the Federalist Constitution in
Chisholm v. Georgia, a case concerned only with state immunity. 172 A
detailed review of Chisholm-the first major constitutional case decided by
the Supreme Court-will illuminate the text of the Eleventh Amendment,
which overruled the case, as well as general structural principles of state
and federal sovereign immunity.
A. Chisholm v. Georgia
In 1792, the executor of a South Carolina merchant brought an as-
sumpsit action in the Supreme Court against the state of Georgia for
breach of a war supplies contract. Georgia declined to argue the case at
bar and instead filed a written objection asserting the state's "sovereign"
immunity from suit. 173 Five Justices heard the case and delivered individ-
ual seriatim opinions. Perhaps because Georgia's tactics created an awk-
ward procedural posture requiring the state to present sovereign immu-
nity as a jurisdictional bar rather than a defense on the merits of
assumpsit, all five Justices tended to collapse the two distinct questions
posed by the case. First, the jurisdictional issue proper: Did the Court
have original jurisdiction to entertain the case? Second, the rule of deci-
sion question: Did an action in assumpsit lie in federal court for a state's
breach of a contract it had made with a citizen? Four Justices answered
yes to both questions; Justice Iredell dissented.
The jurisdictional issue called for close examination of Article III and
the Judiciary Act of 1789. The former vests the federal judiciary with
jurisdiction over nine separate but overlapping categories of cases. The
first three are defined by subject matter; all federal question and admi-
ralty cases, for example, are cognizable in federal court regardless of the
identity of the parties to the suit. The last six categories are defined by
party status. Federal diversity jurisdiction over controversies "between cit-
individual States, that particular municipal establishments, might enjoy a certain extent of
power and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty? We have heard of
the impious doctrine in the old world, that the people were made for kings, not kings for the
people. Is the same doctrine to be revived in the new, in another shape-that the solid happi-
ness of the people is to be sacrificed to the views of political institutions of a different form? It
is too early for politicians to presume on our forgetting that the public good, the real welfare of
the great body of the people, is the supreme object to be pursued; and that no form of govern-
ment whatever has any other value than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object
.... [Als far as the sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the
people, the voice of every good citizen must be, Let the former be sacrificed to the latter.
TH- FE-DERA.,rr No. 45, at 289 (J. Madison).
172. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
173. C. JACoa., THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 48 (1972).
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izens of different states" is today probably the best known example, but
three other diverse party categories are of special importance in framing
the issue of state sovereign immunity: "Controversies between two or
more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State; [and be-
tween] . . . a State . . . and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."1 4 Even
in the absence of a federal question or admiralty issue, any of these di-
verse party configurations suffices to confer federal jurisdiction. Indeed, in
these three state diversity categories, Article III provides for original juris-
diction in the Supreme Court itself, a grant confirmed by the language of
section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.1
As a civil suit brought by a citizen of one state against another state,
Chisholm seemed to fall squarely within the language of both Article III
and the Judiciary Act. Georgia apparently argued that these texts should
be read to confer jurisdiction only where a state brought suit against an
out-of-state citizen, but not vice versa." 6 Yet as the four majority Justices
noted, the text of Article III on its face applies symmetrically to both
party alignments.' The implication of symmetry is even stronger in the
language of section 13,17 given that other portions of the Judiciary Act
are expressly asymmetric.'7 9
In response to the contention that Georgia's sovereign status required
an extremely narrow reading of the jurisdictional provisions of Constitu-
tion and statute-an early version of a strict construction, states' rights,
clear statement doctrine-the majority Justices offered two related argu-
ments. First, American states were not "sovereign" in the same way Eu-
ropean governments claimed to be:
174. U.S. CoNs'. art. III, § 2, para. 1.
175. Section 13 provides:
[Tihe Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil nature,
where a state is a party, except between a state and its own citizens; and except also between a
state and citizens of other states, or aliens, in which latter case it shall have original but not
exclusive jurisdiction.
1 Stat. 73, 80 (1789).
176. Professor Maeva Marcus has kindly furnished me with a copy of a Dec. 14, 1792 resolution
of the House of Representatives of Georgia, which apparently served as the text of Georgia's remon-
strance before the Supreme Court. See General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Feb. 6, 1793.
177. See, e.g., Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 466 (opinion of Wilson, J.) ("Causes, and not parties to
causes, are weighed by justice, in her equal scales: On the former solely, her attention is fixed: To the
latter, she is, as she is painted, blind.") (emphasis deleted).
178. See supra note 175.
179. In implementing the Article III grant of jurisdiction over "controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party," section 9 of the Act provided for district court jurisdiction only when the
United States was party plaintiff. Section 13 itself distinguished between suits brought against "am-
bassadors, or other public ministers" and suits brought by them.
It is unlikely that Congress overlooked the issue of a state defendant's amenability to suit at the
behest of an out-of-state citizen plaintiff, for the issue had been hotly debated only months earlier
during the ratification process. See Fletcher, supra note 81, at 1047-52; Gibbons, The Eleventh
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 CoLum. L. REv. 1889, 1902-14
(1983).
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In Europe the sovereignty is generally ascribed to the Prince; here it
rests with the people; there, the sovereign actually administers the
Government; here, never in a single instance; our Governors are the
agents of the people ....
[Federal jurisdiction] enforces this great and glorious principle,
that the people are the sovereign of this country, and consequently
that fellow citizens and joint sovereigns cannot be degraded by ap-
pearing with each other in their own Courts to have their controver-
sies determined.180
Second, in adopting the Constitution, the sovereign American People
had imposed important limitations on the "sovereign" powers of state of-
ficers, limitations that necessarily implied that states could be sued in fed-
eral court. Article III conferred federal jurisdiction in controversies "be-
tween two or more States." Obviously, one of these states had to be a
defendant; the provision was meaningless otherwise.18' Similarly, effective
vindication of various individual constitutional rights against states might
require a compulsive suit against the state itself in federal court under the
Article III grant of federal question jurisdiction. 82 These provisions, the
majority Justices noted, argued conclusively against any general theory of
a state's "sovereign" immunity from suit in federal court.
Up to this point, the majority's logic was impeccable. Yet upon reach-
ing this analytic juncture, the majority leaped to a conclusion that simply
did not follow from its premises, committing what in our post-Erie1
83
world seems an obvious category mistake. Having established the Court's
power to entertain the case (and the suability of Georgia in a jurisdic-
tional sense), the majority proceeded to opine that a cause of action in
assumpsit would properly lie (and that the state was properly suable in
this substantive sense) notwithstanding any immunity from assumpsit lia-
bility under state law.8 Under the common law of Georgia and, appar-
ently, every other state, no cause of action lay for a breach of contract by
the state itself. At common law, such contracts, though perhaps morally
binding, were not legally enforceable.'
8 5
180. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 472, 479 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
181. See id. at 421-22 (oral argument of Edmund Randolph); id. at 450-51 (opinion of Blair, J.);
id. at 466-67 (opinion of Cushing, J.); id. at 473 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
182. See id. at 422 (oral argument of Randolph); id. at 465 (opinion of Wilson, J.); id. at 468
(opinion of Cushing, J.).
183. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (federal jurisdiction does not necessarily include
power to disregard state substantive law as rule of decision in federal court).
184. Chief Justice Jay's opinion on this point, however, is murky. Despite broad language in
earlier passages, his final paragraph seems to leave open the possibility of recognizing future substan-
tive defenses raised by the state defendant. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 479.
185. As Alexander Hamilton wrote: "The contracts between a nation and individuals are only
binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive [i.e., legal] force.
They confer no right of action independent of the sovereign will." THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 488
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What, then, justified the majority's disregard of Georgia's immunity
from liability under her own law? After all, the Tenth Amendment
plainly reserves to states the power to fashion any law, common or statu-
tory, not inconsistent with the higher laws of the federal Constitution,
congressional statutes, or state constitutions. Indeed, section 34 of the Ju-
diciary Act-the so-called Rules of Decision Act-expressly charges fed-
eral courts to follow "the laws of the several states" as residuary "rules of
decision" in trials at common law. 86
We must be clear about what the Court did not say. The majority Jus-
tices did not claim that Georgia's common law rule of state immunity
violated any higher law, constitutional or statutory. In particular, they did
not claim that such a common law rule might violate the Constitution's
contracts clause.187 Plaintiff never raised the contracts clause or any other
violation of federal right. Jurisdiction rested exclusively on diverse party
status. Indeed, had the Court viewed Chisholm as a contracts clause case
as well as a diverse party suit, a serious question might have arisen about
its appropriateness for the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
whose general federal question jurisdiction was only appellate."8 ,
The majority's only arguments for recognizing an assumpsit cause of
action against Georgia were arguments sounding in what would today be
labelled "general common law." In this respect, Chisholm anticipated
Swift v. Tyson,"89 which allowed federal courts sitting in diversity cases to
disregard state common law as defined by state courts, and instead fashion
their own judge-made law. At oral argument in Chisholm, plaintiff ar-
(emphasis added).
186. The Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92. As an assumpsit action in federal court,
Chisholm fell squarely within the terms of section 34, yet none of the five Justices mentioned that
section.
187. Although Chisholm does contain several references to the clause, see 2 U.S. at 422 (oral
argument of Randolph); id. at 465 (opinion of Wilson, J.); id. at 469 (opinion of Cushing, J.), these
were simply illustrative of future cases that might come before the Court.
188. This question was eventually resolved in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
In light of subsequent cases like Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87 (1810) (applying con-
tracts clause to state contracts), the absence of the contracts clause from the analysis and oral argu-
ment in Chisholm seems curious. One possible explanation is that the clause was not intended to have
any retroactive effect on contracts with states made before ratification. To give state creditors a legally
enforceable claim when they had only bargained for a moral obligation might have been viewed as
unjust enrichment. Indeed, such a dramatic change in legal rules in the middle of the contract seems
wholly antithetical to the spirit of the contracts clause itself. See Chisholm 2 U.S. at 479 (opinion of
Jay, C.J.) ("I am far from being prepared to say that an individual may sue a State on bills of credit
issued before the Constitution was established, and which were issued and received on the faith of the
State, and at a time when no ideas or expectations of judicial interposition were entertained or con-
templated."). Alternatively, perhaps the clause was designed only to prevent the impairment of a pre-
existing legal obligation, but not to create a legal obligation where none had previously existed, as
with state contracts. Under this logic, Fletcher itself is suspect. This thesis might also explain why
Hamilton nowhere mentions the contracts clause to qualify his sweeping claim that state contracts
never legally bind the state.
189. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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gued that assumpsit liability followed automatically from the state's ca-
pacity, as a juridical entity, to make a promise. The continental jurist
Vattel was the only authority cited for this bold proposition. 90 Similarly,
Justice Wilson simply invoked "general principles of right and equality"
and "general jurisprudence" in support of his claim that "a State, for the
breach of a contract, may be liable for damages. '191
Indeed, the state-citizen diversity case of Chisholm foreshadowed the
citizen-citizen diversity suit of Swift in an even more precise way:
Whereas Swift established a jurisprudence of general commercial law,
Chisholm rested in part upon principles of general corporate law. Accord-
ing to Justice Cushing, "[A]II states whatever are corporations or bodies
politic. The only question is, what are their powers?. . . I think assump-
sit will lie, if any suit; provided a state is capable of contracting."' 92 A
similar general corporate law motif can be heard in Chief Justice Jay's
language:
[T]he obvious dictates of justice, and the purposes of society . . .
[demand that] in certain cases one citizen may sue forty thousand;
for where a corporation is sued, all the members of it are actually
sued, though not personally, sued. . .. Will it be said, that the fifty
odd thousand citizens in Delaware being associated under a State
Government, stand in a rank so superior to the forty odd thousand of
Philadelphia, associated under their charter, that although it may
become the latter to meet an individual on an equal footing in a
Court of Justice, yet that such a procedure would not comport with
the dignity of the former?11
3
Although Justice Iredell dissented, his opinion accepted many of the
majority's premises. He wholeheartedly agreed with the majority view
that ultimate sovereignty lay in the People; that by adopting the Constitu-
tion, the People had imposed important limitations on states; and that
states were therefore sovereign only in a limited and derivative sense.' 4
190. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 428.
191. Id. at 456, 458, 465.
192. Id. at 468-69.
193. Id. at 472 (emphasis altered).
194.
Every state in the Union in every instance where its sovereignty has not been delegated to the
United States, I consider to be as completely sovereign, as the United States are in respect to
the powers surrendered. The United States are sovereign as to all the powers of Government
actually surrendered.
Id. at 435 (emphasis omitted). Further, he wrote, states possess "as to every thing simply relating to
themselves, the fullest powers of sovereignty, and yet in some other defined particulars [are] subject to
a superior power composed out of themselves for the common welfare of the whole." Id. at 447. Both
state and central governments derive "authority from the same pure and sacred source[:] . . . The
voluntary and deliberate choice of the people." Id. at 448.
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Indeed, Iredell even acknowledged that for some purposes, states might
usefully be treated as corporations.' 95 On all these basic points, then, the
Chisholm Court was unanimous.
Yet for Iredell these premises did not lead to the majority result of a
general federal corporate law of state assumpsit liability. If the majority
anticipated Swift v. Tyson's doctrine of a general federal common law,
Iredell presaged Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins' repudiation of that doc-
trine.'96 The liability of the state in assumpsit, he argued, should be deter-
mined not by general federal common law, but by antecedent state law.1
97
And under a state common law rule of unquestioned constitutionality, no
assumpsit lay against Georgia. For Iredell, Georgia's "sovereign" immu-
nity was therefore exactly coextensive with her derivative "sovereign"
lawmaking capacity: A state could use its lawmaking power to adopt rules
immunizing itself from liability, as long as such immunity frustrated no
higher-law restrictions on the state's limited sovereignty.
Thus, Iredell carefully limited his discussion to pure diverse party cases
against states, in which jurisdiction did not rest upon a substantive federal
cause of action based on a congressional statute or the self-executing pro-
visions of the Constitution. The particular question before the Court was
for Iredell a narrow one: "[W]ill an action of assumpsit lie against a
State? This particular question [must be] . . . abstracted from the general
one, viz. Whether, a State can in any instance be sued?"' 98 Although no
assumpsit suit lay against Georgia on principles of "general jurispru-
dence," Iredell conceded that a different result might obtain in a federal
question case "relat[ing] to the execution of the . . . authorities of the
general Government (which it must be admitted are full and discretion-
ary, within the restrictions of the Constitution itself)." In such cases, state
"sovereignty has . . . been . . . delegated to the United States ...
195. Id. at 447 (quoted supra text accompanying note 36). For further illustrations of the Feder-
alists' self-conscious analogy between state governments and corporations, see 1 M. Farrand, supra
note 40, at 331-32 (remarks of Rufus King); id. at 323, 328 (remarks of Hamilton); id. at 357, 471
(remarks of Madison); id. at 552 (remarks of Gouverneur Morris); Gibbons, supra note 179, at
1896-98.
196. See supra note 183.
197. Since he read the relevant congressional statutes to incorporate state law, Iredell did not
reach the question of congressional power to displace state law rules of decision in diversity-type
controversies. On this count, the Erie Court went further when it suggested that the diversity and
necessary and proper clauses standing alone did not empower Congress to enact a general federal
statutory rule of decision or to authorize a general federal common law.
Iredell also diverged from Erie in his emphasis on state law at the time of the ratification of the
Constitution and adoption of the Judiciary Act instead of at the time of the lawsuit. This freezing of
state law more closely resembles the static conformity methodology of the federal Process Acts of 1789
and 1792, see C. WRI;Hr, THE. LAW OF FEDERAL COURIS § 61 (4th ed. 1983), than the dynamic
conformity methodology required by Erie and the Rules of Decision Act. On this point, as elsewhere,
the Chisholm Court's failure to focus on the latter act both reflected and generated dubious analysis.
198. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 430.
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wherein the separate sovereignties of the States are blended in one com-
mon mass of supremacy.'
199
In closing, Iredell did write that he was inclined to believe that full
vindication of congressionally-created and constitutional rights would
never require "a compulsive suit against a State for the recovery of
money." However, he took special pains to make clear that his musings on
this "delicate topic" were pure dicta subject to reconsideration should the
issue squarely arise in a subsequent case.200
B. The Eleventh Amendment
The Court's decision in Chisholm provoked a chorus of calls around the
country for a constitutional amendment. The text eventually agreed
upon-"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or sub-
jects of any Foreign State"-was undeniably designed to repudiate the
majority analysis in Chisholm and overrule its holding. From that simple
starting point, the Supreme Court has arrived at the following interpreta-
tion of the case and the Amendment: The defect of Chisholm was its fail-
ure to recognize absolute state sovereign immunity from citizen suits in all
circumstances, and this defect was corrected by enshrining such immunity
in the Constitution. No individual can sue her own or any other state in
federal court unless the defendant's constitutional immunity is in some
special way waived or abrogated.2"' Sovereign immunity ousts all federal
jurisdiction, whether in law, equity, or admiralty; whether the suit is
based on state law, congressional statute, or the Constitution itself; and
whether or not state liability would most fully remedy a constitutional
wrong perpetrated by the state itself. The state thus enjoys "sovereign"
immunity even when it has violated a limitation on that sovereignty im-
posed by the ultimate sovereign, the American People.
All of this is, in a word, nonsense. There exists another reading of the
199. Id. at 432, 435.
200. Id. at 449-50.
201. The Court has conceded that Congress has power under the Civil War Amendments to
abrogate states' immunity, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), and that a state may waive
its immunity, see Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883), but has manipulated clear statement doc-
trines to choke off both abrogation and waiver, see Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234
(1985); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The Court's
claim that this hostility is justified by its general rule against inferring "the surrender of constitutional
rights," Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 n.1, is doublespeak. Current Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
typically protects a classic unconstitutional right-the right of the state to violate plaintiffs' constitu-
tional rights and get off scot-free. As for the Court's self-proclaimed concern with avoiding construc-
tive waivers of constitutional rights, consider Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (expanding
category of waiver of constitutional rights by criminal defendants).
1473
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 96: 1425, 1987
Eleventh Amendment that does far more justice to constitutional text, his-
tory, and structure. More important, this neo-Federalist reading does far
more justice to the People of the United States, to those revolutionaries
who dedicated their lives to bequeath us limited governments, and to those
today who claim their distinctive legacy of the rule of law under constitu-
tional government. Under this reading, the defect of Chisholm was its dis-
placement of the prevailing state common law of government immunity
with a "general" common law of state assumpsit liability in a case
presenting no question of substantive federal law. The Amendment's
cure for Chisholm's case of Swift's disease, however, was not the Erie pre-
scription that federal courts follow state law in diverse party cases, but the
simple elimination of two categories of diverse party jurisdiction: those
involving noncitizen or foreign plaintiffs and state defendants.20 2 This ju-
202. This way of conceptualizing Chisholm and the Eleventh Amendment raises two interesting
questions. First, why did the framers of the Amendment opt for jurisdictional repeal instead of an
Erie-style rule of decision amendment? Second, if the evil of Chisholm was simply its creation of a
federal common law, why didn't the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional repeal include ordinary
diversity cases as well, where federal courts predictably might also attempt to apply (and in fact later
did apply) a general federal common law? Each question admits of a variety of answers, only a few of
which may be tentatively sketched here.
In answer to the first question, I would stress that: (1) Following Georgia's lead in Chisholm itself,
states' rights advocates tended to frame the sovereign immunity issue in jurisdictional (and not rule of
decision) terms, a conceptualization that tended to lead to a jurisdictional solution. (2) A clear rule of
decision amendment strictly binding federal courts might well have been more difficult to draft than a
jurisdictional repeal that could simply track the language of Article III. After all, the language of the
Rules of Decision Act itself seems crystalline, yet all of the Justices in Chisholm had ignored it. (3)
States' rights advocates, distrustful of the ways in which federal courts might continue to manipulate
rules of decision once seized of jurisdiction, may well have preferred a clear repeal of federal jurisdic-
tion. (4) Federalists committed to a strong national judiciary may also have preferred jurisdictional
repeal as setting a less dangerous precedent than an amendment directing federal courts on how to
decide cases on the merits. Cf United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871) (suggesting
constitutional limits on congressional power to dictate how Article III courts decide cases).
In answer to the second question, I would note that: (1) Shortly after the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment, proposals to repeal diversity jurisdiction were in fact made. See infra note 233. (2)
Symbolically and ideologically, states' rightists found the prospect of a federal common law in diver-
sity cases less offensive than federal common law liability of the state itself (3) Politically, the highly
charged issue of repayment of state Revolutionary War debts directly implicated the citizen-state di-
versity clauses but not the ordinary citizen-citizen diversity clause. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821) (Amendment animated by specific concern over war debt, rather than gen-
eral theory of state sovereignty); Gibbons, supra note 179, at 1926-41. (4) Doctrinally, a federal
common law in at least some citizen-citizen diversity cases was probably seen as less offensive to
states' rightists than an analogous common law in citizen-state diversity cases like Chisholm. In
Chisholm-type cases, the law of virtually every state was identical in immunizing the state from suit
absent its consent. A federal common law rule of liability would therefore displace the policy of all the
states. In the quintessential citizen-citizen diversity case, however, state law would predictably differ:
Northern state laws would be pro-creditor; Southern laws, pro-debtor. In a typical diversity suit be-
tween a Northern creditor and a Southern debtor, a "neutral" federal common law rule "splitting the
difference" between divergent state laws (each biased by parochialism) would be comparatively less
threatening to states' rights, since not even a state law rule of decision would satisfy "sovereign"
demands of all interested states. Blind federal court deference to the law of one state would necessarily
be at the expense of the "states' rights" of the other state. Put another way, the justification for federal
jurisdiction-and even a federal common law in some situations-was much stronger in citizen-citizen
diversity cases where predictable state court parochialism at the choice of law stage might have exac-
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risdictional repeal, however, was not designed as a barrier cutting across
the other jurisdictional grants of Article III. The party alignments speci-
fied by the Eleventh Amendment would no longer provide an independent
basis for jurisdiction (as they had in Chisholm), but the existence of such
an alignment would not oust jurisdiction that was independently
grounded-for example, in federal question or admiralty cases.203
1. The Inadequacy of Current Doctrine
If the Eleventh Amendment was meant to enshrine the general immu-
nity of state "sovereigns" from private suits in federal courts, it was abys-
mally drafted. Not only does the text nowhere mention "state sovereign
immunity," but the limitations in the text itself are inexplicable if we
assume (as does the Court) that the Amendment's purpose was to secure
general immunity.
The last fourteen words of the Amendment plainly restrict its scope to
suits in which noncitizens are plaintiffs. Yet if, as the Court has held, the
Amendment's framers meant to bar federal jurisdiction over federal ques-
tion suits brought by noncitizens, 0 4 why did the framers not also oust
federal jurisdiction in analogous federal question suits brought by citizens,
where the possibilities of state court prejudice were far smaller? It is hard
to believe that the framers with one hand invoked federal power to protect
out-of-staters with the diversity and privilege and immunity clauses while
with the other hand seeking to discriminate against them with the Elev-
enth Amendment.21 5 The Amendment's limitation to cases "in law and
equity" is also curious if the Amendment is read to embody a general
principle of sovereign immunity. The three basic categories of cases famil-
iar to the framers were law, equity, and admiralty.20 8 If the states were to
be immune in law and equity, why not in admiralty as well?
erbated relations among states. See Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 401-02 (1964). State court comity and reciprocity were far more likely
in Chisholm-type cases where fewer conflicts among state laws would exist.
203. Professor Willie Fletcher and Judge John Gibbons have both recently published important
articles that offer readings of the Eleventh Amendment similar to the one put forth here. See Fletcher,
supra note 81; Gibbons, supra note 179; see also Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 258-90 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (following Fletcher-Gibbons approach to Eleventh Amendment). Although Professor
Fletcher, Judge Gibbons, and I all reach similar conclusions about the Amendment's meaning, we do
so by way of somewhat different paths. While Professor Fletcher stresses the importance of federal
court jurisdiction over cases involving federal statutes, and Judge Gibbons emphasizes the need for
such jurisdiction in treaty cases, my main emphasis is on the third prong of "federal question" juris-
diction: cases arising under the Constitution itself. I also seek to locate the Eleventh Amendment in a
more general structural framework of Federalist sovereignty theory, implicating federal as well as
state sovereign immunity.
204. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1883).
205. See infra text accompanying note 236.
206. See 3 J. SroRv, supra note 21, § 1683 ("[A] suit in the admiralty is not, correctly speaking,
a suit in law, or in equity; but is often spoken of in contradistinction to both."); Amar, supra note 9,
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The Supreme Court has resolved the tension between comprehensive
sovereign immunity and the textual restrictions of the Eleventh Amend-
ment by finding immunity in cases where the Amendment by its own
terms does not apply. In Hans v. Louisiana,"" the Court held that fed-
eral jurisdiction was ousted where a citizen had sued his own state. Hans
was a case arising under the federal Constitution-this time, the plaintiff
had claimed that his state was violating the contracts clause-so federal
jurisdiction was rooted in the "arising under" clause of Article III; never-
theless, the Court extended the sovereign immunity bar of the Eleventh
Amendment to block the suit. Similarly, in Ex parte New York,208 plain-
tiffs' federal suit in admiralty was supported by an explicit grant of Arti-
cle III jurisdiction-the "admiralty and maritime" clause-but jurisdic-
tion was ousted by the Supreme Court's extension of the Eleventh
Amendment bar.
A coherent vision of blanket state sovereign immunity virtually compels
the results in Hans and Ex parte New York; if noncitizen suits are barred
in law and equity, there is simply no good reason not to extend sovereign
immunity to citizen and admiralty suits. The problem, of course, is that
the results in Hans and Ex parte New York contradict the unambiguous
limitations of the Eleventh Amendment's text-a contradiction that sug-
gests the clear error of the Supreme Court's first interpretive premise that
the Amendment is in fact concerned with sovereign immunity. If coher-
ence of general sovereign immunity doctrine is achieved only by mangling
the Amendment's text, the obvious lesson should be that the Amendment
was not designed to embody any such doctrine.
Worse yet, Hans and Ex parte New York succeed in patching holes in
the Court's sovereign immunity theory only by tearing constitutional
fabric in other spots. Even in some areas where Congress may constitu-
tionally regulate state behavior, the Supreme Court denies it the power to
provide for full enforcement of its regulations in federal court. By reading
the Eleventh Amendment's "state sovereign immunity" restrictions on fed-
eral judicial power to go far beyond the Tenth's "residuary state sover-
at 253.
207. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Strictly speaking, it appears that the Hans Court rested its decision not
on the Eleventh Amendment itself, but on general principles of state sovereign immunity tacitly limit-
ing Article III. Subsequent opinions of the Court, however, have cited Hans as an Eleventh Amend-
ment case, see, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985), once again demon-
strating the Court's tendency to equate the Amendment with the very different principle of sovereign
immunity. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984) (Amend-
ment's "greater significance lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immu-
nity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III"); Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921)
("That a State may not be sued without its consent is a fundamental rule of jurisprudence . . . of
which the Amendment is but an exemplification.").
208. 256 U.S. 490 (1921).
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eignty" restrictions on federal legislative power, the Court has created a
curious category of cases in which Congress may pass laws operating di-
rectly on states that can be enforced (if at all)20 9 only in state courts.21
The result is an inexplicable throwback to the jurisdictional regime of the
Articles of Confederation, which the Federalists viewed as "extremely de-
fective" and violative of obvious first principles of government.2" "If there
209. The obligation of state courts to entertain all federal claims that federal courts are barred
from hearing by the Court's sovereign immunity doctrine rests largely on the slender dicta of General
Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 226-27 (1908). Cf Employees v. Department of Pub. Health &
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 293-98 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in result) ("The issue. . . is merely
the susceptability of the States to suit before federal tribunals."); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 240 n.2
(structure of federalism determines which court will hear complaints against state, not whether they
will be heard).
210. See, e.g., Atascadero, 473 U.S. 234; Employees, 411 U.S. 279.
211. See Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 818-19 (1824) (Marshall,
C.J.). It might be argued that Congress had no power under the original Constitution to legislate
directly on states qua states. This argument, however, has properly been rejected by the Supreme
Court. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); see also THE
FEOERAm.tST No. 36, at 220-21 (A. Hamilton) (federal government may continue to levy requisitions
on state governments); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 343 (1816) ("It is a
mistake [to think] that the constitution was not designed to operate upon states, in their corporate
capacities." (emphasis added)); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 464 (1793) (opinion of
Wilson, J.) (similar). In any event, the basic point is simply that if and when Congress may constitu-
tionally pass laws directly binding states, federal courts may not be barred from deciding all cases
arising under these laws.
The Court has recently hinted in a footnote that state courts may be obliged to entertain suits that
the Eleventh Amendment withholds from federal courts, and that these state court dispositions of
federal questions can be reviewed on appeal by the Supreme Court. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 n.2.
This concession is inadequate and incoherent. It is inadequate because it still denies Congress power
to use federal trial courts to enforce its own laws. The Court's position is exactly the one staked out
by the extreme Anti-Federalist opponents of the Constitution, like Luther Martin, who argued that
the national judiciary should only be allowed to exercise appellate review over state trial courts. Be-
cause the Federalists knew that state trial courts could not always be trusted to enforce federal rights,
and that federal appellate review would not always suffice to protect these rights against state court
hostility or indifference, they insisted-successfully-upon empowering Congress to establish federal
trial courts that could entertain all federal cases. Atascadero's approach simply ignores the great
Madisonian compromise at the base of Article III. See Amar, supra note 9, at 212-14, 233. The
Court's concession is incoherent because it, in effect, forces state courts to hear certain suits-if there
is no compulsion, the Court's point is meaningless-and then uses the state "consent" thus extorted to
support federal appellate jurisdiction.
Just as the Federalists designed the federal judicial power to be coextensive with the legislative,
they designed the original jurisdiction of lower federal courts to be potentially coextensive with the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. Atascadero thus knocks out two of the basic pillars of Article
III, both prominently featured in each of the three great Marshall Court opinions on federal jurisdic-
tion: Osborn, 22 U.S. at 818-21; Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 384-99 (1821); Mar-
tin, 14 U.S. at 329-36.
Elsewhere in the same footnote, the Court serves up the following misstatements: "our Eleventh
Amendment doctrine is necessary to support the view of the federal system held by the Framers of the
Constitution"-nothing could be further from the truth, see infra text accompanying notes 235-36;
"the Framers believed that the States played a vital role in our system and that strong state govern-
ments were essential to serve as a 'counterpoise' to the power of the Federal Government"-a state-
ment that is profoundly true but equally irrelevant in a suit brought by a citizen claiming that a state
has violated federal law; and "[t]he Constitution never would have been ratified if the States and their
courts were to be stripped of their sovereign authority except as expressly provided by the Constitution
itself" (emphasis added)-a statement flatly contradicted by Madison in THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at
283-86 (noting framer's self-conscious choice to avoid word "expressly" in Constitution's "necessary
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are such things as political axioms, the propriety of the judicial power of a
government being coextensive with its legislative may be ranked among
the number."2 2 The Federalist Constitution's provision that the federal
judicial power under Article III would extend to all cases arising under
laws passed under Article I could not have more plainly repudiated the
Confederation's jurisdictional scheme.2"3 And federal question suits
brought against states themselves are exactly the sort of cases in which
state courts are most likely to lack the commitment and political indepen-
dence to enforce federal rights unflinchingly.21
The Federalist Constitution also guaranteed that federal jurisdiction
would extend to all cases arising under the Constitution itself. Federal
judges insulated from parochial politics were to play a special role in safe-
guarding various constitutionally guaranteed individual rights against
state governments. 21 5 The Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment juris-
prudence mocks these solemn promises: Federal jurisdiction is barred even
when citizens seek relief against states that have violated constitutional
rights.
The Court itself has recognized the problems of following general sov-
ereign immunity to its logical conclusion, and has therefore tried to limit
that immunity through various doctrinal gymnastics and legal fictions.
The most famous, the fiction of Ex parte Young,2"" allows citizens to sue
for injunctive relief against a state violating the federal Constitution or
and proper" clause because of problems created by inclusion of word in Articles of Confederation,
1781, art. II), and the first Congress, see 1 ANNAlS OF CONG. 790 U. Gales ed. 1789) (objecting to
attempt to insert "expressly" into Tenth Amendment), and Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819) (making same point about Tenth Amendment).
To top it all off, the Court cites-of all things-Martin v. Hunter's Lessee to support its vision of
federalism. This citation does a disservice to the memory of Joseph Story, whose vision of federal
jurisdiction simply could not be more distant. See Amar, supra note 9, at 210-15. Compare Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976) (citing Martin in support of proposition that state judges and
federal judges are fungible) with Martin, 14 U.S. at 344-47 (explicitly denying such fungibility). The
Atascadero footnote is emblematic of the Burger Court's sloppy use of history and misunderstanding
(or deliberate perversion) of the Federalist tradition.
212. THE FEDERAI.Isr No. 80, at 476 (A. Hamilton); see also Amar, supra note 9, at 250-52
(discussing axiom of coextensive jurisdiction); Fletcher, supra note 81, at 1074 (same).
213. It is, of course, possible to read the Eleventh Amendment as radically inconsistent with the
provisions of the original Constitution-after all, the Amendment did modify the Philadelphia docu-
ment. Nevertheless there are compelling reasons not to read the Amendment as a gross rupture of
constitutional first principles. See infra text accompanying note 236.
214. As a logical matter, the gap between federal legislative and judicial power was created not by
Hans itself but by reading the Amendment as a jurisdictional bar ousting federal question jurisdiction
whenever there exists a certain party configuration. The roots of this mistake lie in a case, decided a
few years before Hans, that raised a similar contracts clause issue, Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711
(1883). The Jumel suit, however, was brought by a non-Louisianian, and thus the Court held that
federal question jurisdiction was ousted by the literal words of the Eleventh Amendment. As a practi-
cal matter, Hans is the more important case since it dramatically enlarges the jurisdictional hole
created by Jumel; most federal question claims against states are claims against one's own state.
215. See Amar, supra note 9, at 222-29, 246-50; supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
216. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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federal statutes by pretending to sue a state official. The Young fiction
covers suits against officers in their official capacities-suits that can com-
pel officers to pay money out of the state treasury, rather than their own
pockets.117 The fiction that such suits are merely brought against individ-
uals, and not the state, is transparent. The "state" itself, after all, is an
artificial juridical person and can act only through state officials. If these
women and men are enjoined in their official capacities then, as a practi-
cal matter, the state is itself enjoined. Indeed, in cases like Young involv-
ing violations of constitutional rights, the cause of action itself typically
requires the plaintiff to prove that defendant is a state actor wielding state
power.218
If the fiction of Ex parte Young were fully extended to all citizen suits
based on the constitutional wrongs of states, perhaps little harm would
result from the Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. "Sov-
ereign" immunity would dissolve into a technical matter of writing one
word instead of another in the caption of the complaint. Immunity would
simply be a matter of pleading, of politeness.21 ' In Edelman v. Jordan,22 °
however, the Court cabined the Young fiction to suits for prospective re-
lief. Federal courts may enjoin state officials in their official capacity to
pay money out of the state treasury for future obligations, but may not
order them to charge the public fisc to iake whole victims of past consti-
tutional wrongdoing. Perversely, a state government that spends money to
avoid violating the Constitution ends up financially worse off than one
that cynically flouts higher law until ordered into prospective compliance.
The obvious lack of principle underlying the Edelman distinction
merely reflects a much deeper paradox in the Court's attempt "to promote
the supremacy of federal law [and yet] accommodate[] ...the constitu-
tional immunity of the States. ' 221 The Edelman Court "declined to ex-
tend the fiction of Young to encompass retroactive relief, for to do so
would effectively eliminate the constitutional immunity of the States. "222
But the Court has created its own false dilemma here by wrongly concep-
tualizing the "constitutional immunity of the States" as in tension
with-indeed, as the logical negation of-the "supremacy of federal law."
The result would be comic were it not so tragic: The Court heroically
217. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
218. Young itself, for example, involved no individual private law tort by the defendant; the sole
basis for the suit was the claim that defendant, as a state official, was about to execute an unconstitu-
tional state law that offended the due process clause's restrictions on state action.
219. Cf Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 460 (1793) (opinion of Wilson, J.) (King's
immunity from suit in Britain "is only in the form, not in the thing").
220. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
221. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984).
222. Id.
1479
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 96: 1425, 1987
struggles to promote both higher-law limitations on states and the states'
"immunity" to violate those limitations. It is no wonder the Court's Elev-
enth Amendment case law is incoherent; in law, as in logic, anything can
be derived from a contradiction.22 All we are left with is an ad hoc mish-
mash of Young and Edelman, of full remedy and state sovereignty, of
supremacy and immunity, of law and lawlessness. 224 The icon of the fed-
eral courthouse open to remedy all constitutional wrongs gives way to a
burlesque image of a doctrinal obstacle course on the courthouse steps.225
In the end, the Supreme Court's vision of state sovereign immunity
warps the very notion of government under law. The Court's invocation
of state "sovereign" immunity in cases where the state plainly is not sov-
ereign-because it has acted ultra vires-resurrects the British theory of
governmental supremacy that was anathema to the framers. It puts gov-
ernments above, not under, the law. It makes government officers masters,
not servants, of the People. James Madison put it bluntly: "[Als far as the
223. Further examples of incoherent doctrine: (1) The Eleventh Amendment is a subject matter
bar that-unlike all others-may be waived (despite the fact that the Amendment nowhere suggests
that "consent" can cure a jurisdictional defect) and-unlike other waivable bars (like personal juris-
diction, venue, and service of process)-may be raised at any time in the lawsuit. (2) When a state
violates the Constitution or ordinary congressional legislation, it is immune from damages, but when it
violates a court order it is not. Not only does this improperly give each state one free bite at constitu-
tional rights, it seems to turn the Eleventh Amendment's special restriction on judicial power on its
head. (3) The absence of a damage remedy encourages more intrusive and coercive injunctive relief,
which, ironically, may be enforced by damages for noncompliance. (4) When Congress legislates
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment it can unilaterally lift state sovereign immunity, yet
section I of that same Amendment apparently does not cure the jurisdictional defect, despite its self-
executing nature. (5) Federal courts apparently cannot order specific performance of a state contract
whose breach violates the contracts clause, but they can order specific performance of analogous obli-
gations created by other federal law.
224. In Pennhurst, 465 U.S. 89, the Supreme Court further limited Young by declining to apply
its fiction to a citizen suit seeking purely prospective relief on the basis of a state law claim pendent to
the jurisdiction-conferring federal claim. Although Pennhurst might seem a dramatic extension of the
Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar, the case in fact can be read as returning to the core meaning
of the Amendment: Where no higher law applies, where no federal question exists, federal courts
should not have jurisdiction over private citizen suits against states. Although federal question juris-
diction did exist in Pennhurst, and therefore the Amendment by its terms did not strictly apply, the
principles underlying it should perhaps inform the discretionary assertion of pendent jurisdiction over
state-law claims. Cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976) (statutory limitation on federal jurisdic-
tion should inform exercise of pendent jurisdiction).
But to reconceptualize Pennhurst in this way is to see yet again the flaw of Edelman. If the
rationale for declining jurisdiction in Pennhurst is the absence of any federal right requiring vindica-
tion, the simple converse is that where such a federal right is asserted, jurisdiction should always be
upheld-whether the relief sought is retrospective or prospective. The very same reasons that justified
Young applied equally in Edelman: the need to provide full vindication of federal rights against states,
vindication that will sometimes require retrospective damages. Perhaps unwittingly, Pennhurst's anal-
ysis invites us to reorient the Eleventh Amendment's axis from the prospective-retrospective line of
Edelman to the state law-federal law distinction involved in both Pennhurst and Chisholm.
225. See Fletcher, supra note 81, at 1044 (calling case law "jerry-built" and "complicated" by
"use of fictions"); Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause: Damages Against States
in Their Own Courts for Constitutional Violations, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 189, 195, 197, 210-12 (1981)
(noting that "curious rules" of Eleventh Amendment and "elaborate structure of fiction and artifice"
force plaintiff to "negotiate ...through judicial avoidance doctrines").
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sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the peo-
ple, the voice of every good citizen must be, Let the former be sacrificed to
the latter."22
2. The Advantages of Neo-Federalism
The neo-Federalist reading of the Eleventh Amendment suffers from
none of the crippling ailments of the Court's approach. To begin with, it
makes perfect sense of all the words of the Amendment itself. The
Amendment was limited to cases in "law and equity" precisely because its
framers intended to leave plenary federal jurisdiction over "all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" undisturbed. It is quite implausible
to assume-as the Court must-that the Amendment's omission of admi-
ralty was a mere drafting oversight. In 1793, admiralty was universally
considered to be one of the most important categories of federal jurisdic-
tion.227 Similarly, the Amendment was restricted to suits brought by
noncitizen and foreign plaintiffs precisely because only the presence of
these private plaintiffs would give rise to independent diverse party juris-
diction where a state was party defendant. The text does not speak sweep-
ingly of state "sovereign immunity," but instead tracks the technical "judi-
cial power shall extend" language of the Article III jurisdictional grants,
precisely because it was simply designed to restrict two of those grants.
The Amendment's legislative history supports this parsing of the text.
Professor Charles Warren uncovered an alternative amendment that he
believed was introduced in the House of Representatives immediately af-
ter Chisholm came down, but never seriously considered.228 Although
other scholars have expressed doubt about whether the proposal was in
fact ever officially introduced,229 its undisputed existence confirms what
should be obvious anyway: If the Eleventh Amendment's framers had in-
tended a broad sovereign immunity principle applicable even in federal
question cases, they knew the words:
[T]hat no State shall be liable to be made a party defendant in any
of the Judicial Courts established or to be established under the au-
thority of the United States, at the suit of any person or persons,
citizens or foreigners, or of any body politic or corporate whether
within or without the United States.230
226. THE FEDERAIST No. 45, at 289 (J. Madison); cf T. JEFFERSON, supra note 102, at 164
("[aln elective despotism was not the government we fought for").
227. See Amar, supra note 9, at 253-54.
228. 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED SrATES HISrORY 101 (1922).
229. Gibbons, supra note 179, at 1926 n.186.
230. 1 C. WARREN, supra note 228, at 101.
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By contrast, it would have been difficult to come up with wording that
expressed better than does the Amendment's final text a simple desire to
effect a partial repeal of two technical diverse party grants.
Even the Court has long argued that the Amendment was designed to
parallel Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm.2 31 Yet as noted above, Ire-
dell carefully limited his rationale to diverse party cases; he expressly
avoided a judgment (although he did venture admittedly tentative opin-
ions) on the questions of state sovereign immunity in federal question or
admiralty cases-questions not posed by Chisholm itself. The Court thus
reads the Amendment to go far beyond Iredell's dissent in Chisholm,
whereas the neo-Federalist reading follows Iredell by carefully limiting
the scope of the Amendment to diverse party cases.232
A specific language change made by the drafters offers further evidence
of their narrow intent. The original draft language of the Amendment
provided that the judicial power "shall not extend" to noncitizen and for-
eign plaintiff suits against states in law and equity. That language, how-
ever, might have been interpreted to mean that the federal judicial power
could never extend to cases presenting these party alignments, even when
such cases were independently grounded in, say, a federal question. Per-
haps because of this ambiguity, the original text failed to pass, and was
subsequently modified by replacing the phrase "the judicial power shall
not extend" with the language "the judicial power shall not be construed
to extend." This modification softened the Amendment to conform to the
framers' intent that the judicial power should not be construed to extend
to the enumerated diverse party suits as such, but would extend to these
diverse configurations whenever jurisdiction was independently based on
another affirmative jurisdictional grant.233
231. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12-19 (1890).
232. Interestingly, the "Constitution" of the Confederate States of America, which generally
tracks the language of the Federalist Constitution, modified the language of Article III by adding the
following italicized phrases: "The judicial power shall extend to . . . controversies . . . between a
State and citizens of another State, where the State is plaintiff; . . . and between a State . . . and
foreign states, citizens, or subjects; but no State shall be sued by a citizen or subject of any foreign
state." CONSTI. OF rHE CONFEDERATE STATFS OF AMERICA art. III, § 2 (1861) (emphasis added).
Thus, the Confederates chose language that simply limited two party-defined jurisdictional categories
without in any way establishing the general "sovereign immunity" of states, or ousting federal ques-
tion and admiralty jurisdiction-exactly the same result as the Eleventh Amendment of the Federalist
Constitution, properly read.
233. Senator Henry Clay proposed a constitutional amendment in 1807 in language that carefully
tracked the Eleventh Amendment's: "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to controversies between citizens of different States . . . nor between a State or the citizens
thereof, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects." 16 ANNAtS OF CONG. 76 (1807). The intent of this
amendment was clear: The judicial power should no longer extend to the listed cases ipso facto, but it
could where other sections of Article III so provided. See id. at 216 (remarks of James Elliot). Under
Clay's amendment, mere diversity of citizenship was obviously not intended to oust independently
granted (federal question or admiralty) jurisdiction. So tco with the Eleventh Amendment.
Some scholars have conjectured that the words "shall not be construed" were inserted into the
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The "shall not be construed" clause of the Eleventh Amendment thus
harmonizes with the identical language in the Ninth Amendment: "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Here, the enumera-
tion of rights does not automatically deny, repeal, or abrogate other natu-
ral rights. Those rights may continue to be judicially enforced in the ab-
sence of contrary superior positive law-congressional or constitutional.
Similarly, in the Eleventh Amendment, the judicial power does not auto-
matically extend to enumerated suits, but suits may lie if provided for by
positive law-congressional or constitutional.234
Finally, the neo-Federalist reading preserves various basic structural
principles of the original Constitution repudiated by the Court's doc-
trine-the coextensiveness of judicial and legislative power; the coexten-
siveness of original and appellate jurisdiction; the critical importance of
plenary federal jurisdiction in admiralty and federal question cases; the
structural superiority of the federal judiciary to state judiciaries; the spe-
cial role of federal judges in protecting individual rights against states; and
the need for suits against states themselves to enforce these rights. I have
Eleventh Amendment to correct what the Amendment's framers regarded as the Supreme Court's
misconstruction of the original diverse party grants in Chisholm. The language of Clay's amendment,
however, belies this hypothesis. In 1807, it was clear that Article III did extend federal jurisdiction to
cases between individuals with diverse citizenship. Clay evidently inserted the "shall not be construed"
clause to make clear that his amendment was simply repealing an earlier affirmative jurisdictional
grant, not creating a new jurisdictional bar. The same clause was designed to serve the same purpose
in the Eleventh Amendment.
The "misconstruction" thesis also seems at odds with the abundant evidence suggesting that, on the
jurisdictional issue proper, Chisholm was firmly grounded. See supra text accompanying notes
173-83.
234. It thus turns out that a proper reading of the Eleventh Amendment can help to inform
interpretation of the Ninth, which has itself been the subject of much confusion. (The neo-Federalist
reading thus clarifies important connections, currently obscured by Supreme Court doctrine, among
the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Amendments.) Under the interpretation offered here, the "natural"
or pre-existing rights "retained" by the People and declared by the judges would be "subconstitu-
tional" in that they could be trumped by legislative enactment. The Ninth Amendment authorizes
federal judges to engage in the making of a species of what Professor Monaghan has labelled "consti-
tutional common law"; judicial derivation of natural law is both approved and democratically cabined.
Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1975). This reading of the Ninth Amendment is buttressed by recent work on the history of
natural law in America. According to Professor Robert Cover, Americans in the 18th and 19th centu-
ries generally viewed judicially derived natural law as interstitial law that could be overridden by
legislative enactment. R. COVER, JUStICE ACx:usED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 34
(1975).
This interpretation of the Ninth Amendment may help to resolve two seemingly unconnected
problems currently bedevilling constitutional scholars. First, what is the constitutional source of con-
stitutional common law? Professor Monaghan's efforts to answer this question seem uncharacteristi-
cally weak. See Monaghan, supra, at 8, 13, 23, 34-38; see also Schrock & Welsh, Reconsidering the
Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1117, 1118-45 (1978) (criticizing Monaghan on
this point). Second, how can the Ninth Amendment be taken seriously yet limited? Interestingly, in
Dean Ely's exhaustive Sherlock Holmesian proof-by-elimination concerning the meaning of the Ninth
Amendment, the one possibility he overlooks is constitutional common law. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUt 34-41 (1980).
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discussed the first five of these principles at length elsewhere. 35 I shall
therefore simply note here that if the Supreme Court's interpretation is
correct, it is amazing that the Amendment was supported by so many
Federalists-without whose support the Amendment could not have suc-
ceeded-willing to dismantle so much of what they had worked so hard so
recently to erect.2" 6 The sixth and final structural principle-the remedial
imperative of government liability-requires additional elaboration and
furnishes perhaps the strongest reason of all for rejecting the Court's
Eleventh Amendment doctrine.
C. The Remedial Imperative of Government Liability
To say that the Eleventh Amendment embodies no general principle of
state sovereign immunity is only to begin constitutional inquiry. Even in
the absence of a specific textual niche for sovereign immunity, we must
examine the structure of the Constitution to see whether such immunity is
implicit in our constitutional order. For example, there is no obvious
source of national sovereign immunity analogous to the Eleventh Amend-
ment, yet countless suits against the federal government have been barred
by general sovereign immunity principles of mysterious origin. Indeed,
much of the case law of federal sovereign immunity has been directly as-
similated, with little explicit analysis or justification, to state sovereign im-
munity cases-an assimilation that once again suggests that the real work-
horse in sovereign immunity doctrine is not the text of the Eleventh
Amendment. Assuming that no Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
exists, the question becomes, does the rest of the Constitution imply gov-
ernmental immunity?
237
In Monaco v. Mississippi the Court wrote:
Manifestly, we cannot . . . assume that the letter of the Eleventh
235. See Amar, supra note 9. In that essay, I attempted to establish that the Federalists viewed
the first three jurisdictional categories of Article III-which include the admiralty and federal ques-
tion grants-as far more important than the last six diverse party categories. While the Court reads
the Eleventh Amendment to cut deeply into the first three "critical" categories, the neo-Federalist
reading reinforces the two-tiered approach to Article III by viewing the Amendment as merely trim-
ming off portions of "second tier" categories that were much less important from the outset.
236. "The roster of those favoring the amendment includes the names of ardent nationalists, as
well as states' rights men." C. JACOBS, supra note 173, at 71. "That there was no design, on the part
of its framers, to effect a revolution in federal-state relations seems clear." Id. at 92.
237. Put another way, do strong reasons exist to try to cram sovereign immunity into the Eleventh
Amendment despite the obviously uncomfortable fit? Cf H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PRO-
c-ss: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 806-07 (tent. ed. 1958) (Court
has abandoned words of Eleventh Amendment and treated it "as if it were a precedent to the opposite
of Chisholm v. Georgia"). Unfortunately, the Court has misread the anti-Chisholm precedent of the
Eleventh Amendment by going far beyond the "holding" of Iredell's dissent. See supra text accompa-
nying note 231. In effect, the Court has read the Eleventh Amendment as if it were a precedent to the
opposite of the rest of the Constitution. See infra text accompanying notes 240-60.
1484
Vol. 96: 1425, 1987
Of Sovereignty and Federalism
Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against non-
consenting States. Behind the words of the constitutional provisions
are postulates which limit and control. . . .There is . . .the postu-
late that States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sover-
eignty, shall be immune from suits, without their consent, save
where there has been "a surrender of this immunity in the plan of
the convention.
238
But contrary to Monaco and the rest of the Court's sovereign immunity
case law,239 the Constitution draws its life from postulates that limit and
control lawless governments, not postulates that limit and control citizens
in their efforts to vindicate constitutional rights, nor postulates that limit
and control federal courts in their efforts to provide that vindication. The
real postulates "behind the words of the constitutional provisions" are
these: (1) Ultimate sovereignty resides in the People of the United States,
not in governments. Governments-state and national-enjoy only limited
and delegated sovereign power. When these governments violate the com-
mands of the highest Sovereign embodied in the Constitution, they are no
longer acting in their derivative sovereign capacity, and thus have no "sov-
ereign" immunity. (2) The legal rights against governments enshrined in
the Constitution strongly imply corresponding governmental obligations to
ensure full redress whenever those rights are violated. (3) Full and ade-
quate remedies for constitutional wrongs committed by governments will
often call for governmental liability. In these cases, there necessarily has
been-to reclaim the words Monaco borrowed from Hamilton-"a sur-
render of immunity in the plan of the convention [i.e., the Constitution]."
The first postulate simply distills the theory of popular sovereignty ani-
mating the Federalist Constitution. 240 The second is equally straightfor-
ward. Few propositions of law are as basic today-and were as basic and
238. 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934) (footnote omitted) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A.
Hamilton)).
239. Despite the plain words of Article III, Monaco held that no federal jurisdiction existed over
a suit brought by a foreign nation against an unconsenting state. Id. at 320-32. Unless state courts are
forced to hear such cases-a compulsion that seems at least equally, if not more, offensive to state
"sovereignty"-needless international confrontations might arise embroiling citizens in all the other
states of the union. It was exactly to avoid such international incidents that the Federalists gave
national tribunals the power to entertain "Controversies ... between a State ... and foreign
States." U.S. CONS'I'. art. III, § 2; see Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 424 (1793) (oral
argument of Randolph); id. at 451 (opinion of Blair, J.); id. at 467 (opinion of Cushing, J.); id. at
473 (opinion of Jay, C.J.). Nothing in the Eleventh Amendment in any way alters this jurisdictional
grant, as Chief Justice Marshall forcefully noted in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406
(1821). The parochialism of Monaco is staggering; nowhere else has the Court applied state sovereign
immunity principles outside the context of a private citizen's suit against a state. See South Dakota v.
North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904) (upholding jurisdiction when state plaintiff sues unconsenting
state defendant on virtually identical cause of action to that ousted in Monaco); United States v.
Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892) (upholding jurisdiction where U.S. is plaintiff).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 56-170.
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universally embraced two hundred years ago-as the ancient legal maxim,
ubi jus, ibi remedium: Where there is a right, there should be a remedy.
The proposition that every person should have a judicial remedy for every
legal injury done him was a common provision in the bills of rights of
state constitutions;24 was invoked by The Federalist No. 43 in a passage
whose very casualness indicated its uncontroversial quality;242 and was the
cornerstone of analysis in one of the most important and inspiring
passages of Marbury v. Madison:
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford
that protection ...
. .."[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a
legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit, or action at law,
whenever that right is invaded". . . . "[E]very right, when with-
held, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress."
The government of the United States has been emphatically
termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease
to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for
the violation of a vested legal right.
2 43
The third step of analysis focuses on how the very existence of sover-
eign immunity will often drive a wedge between legal right and effective
remedy. Granted, not all may have recognized this fact at the time of the
adoption of the federal Constitution. Iredell in Chisholm closed his opin-
ion with the self-described dictum that "every word in the Constitution
may have its full effect without involving [the] consequence" of allowing
"a compulsive suit against a state for the recovery of money."244 Similarly,
John Marshall's opinion in Cohens v. Virginia seemed to imply that full
vindication of constitutional rights against states might not require affirm-
ative suits against the state; individual rights, Marshall hinted, might be
fully protected by affirmative suits against individual officers in their pri-
vate capacity, and by the ability of citizens to invoke constitutional rights
defensively in suits brought by states.24"
Even if these arguments were colorable in the eighteenth and early
241. See Gibbons, supra note 179, at 1898 n.44 (citing constitutions of Delaware, Maryland, and
Massachusetts); see also 3 J. Et.Lor, supra note 52, at 658 (Declaration of Rights and Amendments
of Virginia ratifying convention).
242. "But a right implies a remedy . THE. FEDERAI.1ST No. 43, at 274 (J. Madison).
243. 5 U.S. (I Cranch.) 137, 162-63 (1803) (quoting 3 W. BLACRSrONE, supra note 27, at *23,
*109).
244. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 449-50 (1793).
245. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 402-03 (1821).
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nineteenth centuries,"" they fail today. To begin with, in the eyes of Ire-
dell and Marshall any possible government immunity was offset by strict
liability on the part of individual government officers. For example, in
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, Marshall noted that the defendant
Ohio officer would have been personally liable to the plaintiff bank even
had he acted in compliance with a state law that he reasonably but incor-
rectly believed to be fully constitutional.24" Today, most individual govern-
ment officers enjoy either qualified or absolute immunity from personal
liability. As Professor Engdahl has noted, courts since the mid-nineteenth
century have opened up a wide remedial gap by creating expansive official
immunities without correspondingly relaxing government immunity.
248
Even abolition of the current structure of individual immunity would
often only narrow twentieth century gaps between right and remedy.249
Individual officers will frequently be (at least partially) judgment-proof.
Pervasive and systematic illegality will not always be traceable to specific
individuals who can be called to account. The state entity itself will often
246. They did not represent the dominant view of the Federalists. See infra text accompanying
notes 253-55. Yet even if I am wrong on that count, the error is not fatal to my structural argument
here. Rather, we would be left with the following puzzle: The framers of the Constitution believed (1)
that there should be full remedies for violations of constitutional rights, and (2) that such remedies
would never require government liability. If (I) and (2) are inconsistent today because of changed
circumstances, the question becomes, which should yield? The issue here is admittedly devilish, but a
sensitive reading of the Constitution suggests that (2) should yield because full remedies were woven
into the fabric of the document in a way that government immunity was not. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 256-60. The Constitution is better read as in effect imposing the risk of changed circum-
stance on lawless governments and not constitutional rights-holders.
To take a similar example, the framers believed both that Congress should have power to legislate
upon all truly interstate commerce, and that such legislation would never seriously intrude on state
legislatures, since most commerce was purely intrastate. Because of changed circumstances, these pro-
positions are inconsistent today. Transportation and communications technologies have vastly in-
creased the proportion of truly interstate commerce. Once again, the issue is tricky, but a sensitive
reading of the Constitution suggests that the prerogatives of state legislatures should yield, because the
coterminous nature of congressional power and interstate commerce was built into the Constitution
itself. If interstate commerce expands, so does congressional power under the commerce clause. The
Constitution imposes the risk that changed technological circumstances might expand the national
economy upon state legislatures.
247. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 839 (1824) ("The appellants
expressly waive the extravagant proposition, that a void act can afford protection to the person who
executes it, and admit the liability of the defendants to the plaintiffs. ... ); see also Little v. Bar-
reme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804) (obedience to presidential orders does not immunize naval
officer from liability for unlawful seizure); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1. Cranch) 170 (1803)
(office does not create immunity from accountability for illegal acts).
248. Engdahl, Positive Immunity and Accountability for Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L.
RF-v. 1 (1972); accord P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. W.CHSLER, HART AND WECHS-
LER'S TH. FEDERAL. COURTS AND THE FEDERAL. SYSTEM 1410-23 (2d ed. 1973); Dellinger, supra
note 13, at 1553-59; Gibbons, supra note 179, at 1943 n.295; see also Declaration and Resolves of
the First Continental Congress, supra note 76, at 84 (objecting to parliamentary attempt to immunize
errant government officials from private damage suits).
249. Cf. P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVRNMErNI 55-121 (1983) (strict individual liability without in-
demnification may create perverse incentives and compound already excessive risk aversion of govern-
ment officials).
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be the source and the unjustly enriched beneficiary of illegal conduct by
individual officials. Furthermore, general principles of modern tort theory
and enterprise liability suggest that the governmental entity will often be
in a far better position than any individual officer to restructure official
conduct in a way that avoids future violation of rights. Thus, many of the
same reasons that support entity liability for private corporations argue
persuasively for similar entity liability for governments 1°-a point sharp-
ened by the Federalists' conception of governments as limited corpora-
tions, and by their use of agency principles and incentive analysis as link-
ing concepts in a more general system of political economy structuring the
law of both governmental and profit-seeking organizations.25
Additionally, many legal rights today are affirmative rights against the
government itself. If the Constitution obliges a state to provide minimal
education to its children,252 this affirmative right cannot be fully protected
by the ability of a citizen to raise her claim defensively in a state-initiated
proceeding. Likewise, this right cannot be adequately protected by the
possibility of suit against a private person, since the obligation is that of
the state qua state.
Furthermore, Iredell's and Marshall's musings notwithstanding, the
dominant view of the Federalists was that full vindication of constitutional
rights would sometimes require direct suit against government. Even in
the absence of today's more expansive vision of affirmative rights, the
framers recognized that affirmative relief would often be essential to pro-
tect negative rights25 -especially where the government violation could
not be prevented ex ante, and where the government would enjoy the
fruits of its past violations. In the words of Attorney General Edmund
Randolph, who had earlier played a vital role in the Philadelphia Con-
vention and the Virginia ratification debates:
The common law has established a principle, that no prohibitory act
shall be without its vindicatory quality . . . . In our solicitude for a
250. See generally id.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 31-49, 72-75. Judge Gibbons has noted that no state
constitution explicitly provided for sovereign immunity, and that, on the contrary, the charters of
several states expressly provided that the state could be sued, in conformity with the general rule that
corporations were suable. See Gibbons, supra note 179, at 1896-98.
252. The Supreme Court has expressed doubt about the existence of this right to minimal educa-
tion and invoked principles of "federalism" in support of its view. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973). Nevertheless, I use an education hypothetical because I believe
Rodriguez was as misguided as the Burger Court's Eleventh Amendment cases analyzed above, rais-
ing a serious question whether the Court's general misuse of "federalism" and "state sovereignty" to
constrict constitutional remedies is paralleled by a general misuse of these principles to constrict con-
stitutional rights. The question lies beyond the scope of this essay, but I hope to present the reasons
behind my admittedly conclusory statement here about Rodriguez in a subsequent essay on the Civil
War Amendments and the meaning of freedom.
253. For a modern explication of this vision, see Dellinger, supra note 13.
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remedy, we meet with no difficulty, where the conduct of a state can
be animadverted on through the medium of an individual. . . . But
this redress goes only half way; as some of the preceeding unconsti-
tutional actions must pass without censure, unless states can be made
defendants. What is to be done, if, in consequence of a bill of attain-
der, or an ex post facto law, the estate of a citizen shall be confis-
cated, and deposited in the treasury of a state? What, if a state
should adulterate or coin money below the congressional standard,
emit bills of credit, or enact unconstitutional tenders, for the purpose
of extinguishing its own debts? What, if a state should impair her
own contracts? These evils, and others which might be enumerated
like them, cannot be corrected, without a suit against the State.254
Chief Justice Marshall's own opinion for the Court in Marbury also
cut strongly against a broad view of sovereign immunity. Following the
logic of ubi jus, ibi remedium, he expressly declared the appropriateness
of mandamus-affirmative judicial relief against an executive officer in
his official capacity-to fully protect a vested legal right. Marshall
quickly dismissed the notion that a defendant government official could
enjoy any British-style "sovereign immunity" from a suit charging a viola-
tion of vested rights. 55 At one level, then, Marbury's logic could be de-
scribed as follows: If the only full and adequate remedy for ultra vires
action by government requires a pro tanto abrogation of sovereign immu-
nity, so be it.
It therefore seems evident that at least in some cases, blanket govern-
ment immunity from liability conflicts with the Constitution's structural
principle of full remedies for violations of legal rights against government.
What, then, can possibly justify the invocation of sovereign immunity in
those cases? Surely not the text of the Constitution, for we have already
seen that governmental claims to sovereign immunity have no textual ba-
sis.258 Nor can it be persuasively argued that the structural principle of
full remedies is somehow necessarily qualified or limited by an equally
254. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 422 (1793) (oral argument) (emphasis added).
Note how Randolph's first sentence invokes the remedial imperative. Moments earlier, he had argued
that the Constitution imposed legal limits on the powers of government. Id. at 421-22; cf. id. at 423
(Constitution derives from People). Indeed, the overall structure of his oral argument precisely paral-
lels the three-step structure of my argument in this section.
255. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 164-66, 170-71 (1803).
256. See supra notes 201-36 and accompanying text. Absent such a clear statement from the
People themselves in the Constitution, we should strain against reading the document as containing
partially hollow promises. Yet even without a principle of interpretive generosity directing us to read
the Constitution as "the best it can be," see R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986), the document and
its background structure of late eighteenty-century American jurisprudence offer little support to mod-
ern-day Legal Realists who attempt to tailor rights to fit remedies rather than vice versa. See gener-
ally Coleman & Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 1335 (1986) (critiquing
legal realist understanding of rights and remedies).
1489
The Yale Law Journal
valid structural postulate of absolute government immunity from all suits.
The latter principle is simply not part of our Constitution's structure. Its
sole basis is the British idea that the sovereign government, as the source
of all law, cannot itself be bound by any law absent its consent.257 As we
have seen, literally every article of the Federalist Constitution and every
amendment in the Bill of Rights rests on the repudiation of the British
view.258 Thus, to accept the plenary sovereign immunity of governments
as a structural principle is necessarily to reject the first postulate of popu-
lar sovereignty.25 Put another way, to try to straddle the inconsistent
principles of effective remedy and sovereign immunity is to fall into the
logical contradiction at the center of the Court's Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence.60
It must be emphasized that the structural argument outlined here does
not eliminate all "sovereign immunity." It does not make governments
suable for anything and everything, as the Court's free-wheeling approach
in Chisholm threatened to do. A defining feature of a government is that it
operates under legal rules that substantially differ from those applicable to
private citizens. What would be obviously tortious for a private citizen is
often standard operating procedure for a government-taxation, for exam-
ple. Thus so long as governments act within the scope of their delegated
authority, they may choose to exercise their sovereign power by immuniz-
ing themselves from rules that apply to private citizens. On this count,
Chisholm was wrongly decided and rightly repudiated. When govern-
ments act ultra vires and transgress the boundaries of their charter, how-
ever, their sovereign power to immunize themselves is strictly limited by
the remedial imperative.261' A government may immunize itself, even for
257. It might also be argued that because government entities have no authority to violate consti-
tutional norms, responsibility for violations cannot be attributed to these entities, but rests solely with
individual government officials. Under this fiction, government can by definition "do no wrong"; thus,
if a wrong has occurred, "government" did not do it-even if government policy allowed or even
prescribed the individual wrongdoing. This fiction has properly been rejected by the Court at the
rights-violation stage, see Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913), and
therefore has no legitimate place in constricting remedies. The fiction has also been rejected in private
corporation law: A corporation may be liable for the torts of its agents even if their actions were ultra
vires-a point that the Supreme Court has noted in the sovereign immunity context while utterly
misunderstanding its implication for government corporate liability. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 693-95 (1949); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89, 113 n.24 (1984) (citing 10 W. FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPO-
RATIONS § 4877, at 350 (rev. ed. 1978)).
258. See supra text accompanying notes 56-170.
259. See supra text accompanying note 240.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 216-25.
261. Thus, the Chisholm Court erred in concluding that because state governments were not fully
sovereign in every respect, they could never immunize themselves from liability. Today's Court com-
mits an equal and opposite error in concluding that because state governments are "sovereign" in
some limited and derivative respects, they can always immunize themselves from liability. The proper
analysis is more discriminating. Where governments are acting within the bounds of their delegated
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ultra vires acts, but only if other remedies-for example, strict liability
suits against non-judgment-proof individual officers-can guarantee vic-
tims full redress.
262
If we seek textual confirmation of this structural analysis, we need look
no further than the Tenth Amendment. This should not be surprising, for
once we have stripped away the Court-fashioned encrustations obscuring
the true meaning of the Eleventh Amendment, the Tenth becomes a far
more logical place to search for the theory of sovereignty embodied in the
Constitution. Indeed, no other provision of the Constitution focuses so
clearly on the triangular interrelations among the national government,
the state governments, and the People themselves: "The powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
As we have already seen, the final clauses of this Amendment confirm
the ultimate sovereignty of a unitary American People." 3 Consistent with
that sovereignty, the Amendment betrays an obvious concern with keeping
all governmental power strictly within the limits of the People's delega-
tions. The national government is not to exercise "powers not delegated to
[it] by the Constitution;" and states are not to exercise any powers "pro-
hibited" by the Constitution, "delegated" to national agents, or "reserved
"sovereign" power, they may partake of sovereign immunity; where not, not. See Dellinger, supra
note 13, at 1557.
262. See Hart, The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise
in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. R v. 1362, 1366-70 (1953) (noting congressional power to choose among
full and adequate remedies); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (simi-
lar). A slightly different way to conceptualize the matter is to see the government as a nondelegable
surety for the misdeeds of its officials. Like other sureties, or corporations liable under respondeat
superior, a government may have an independent claim against individual wrongdoers when their
wrongdoing results in entity/surety liability. See Dellinger, supra note 13, at 1553-59.
It might be asked why the Constitution should be read to require full remedies for constitutional
violations-after all, remedies for violations of legal rights are often qualified in various ways, e.g.,
through statutes of limitation. This question, however, ignores the fundamental difference between
constitutional wrongs and other legal violations. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). Unlike
other legal rights created and subject to qualification, modification, and limitation by government,
constitutional rights derive from a higher source than government itself. Their very purpose is to keep
government honest. Thus, absent a clear statement by the People in the Constitution itself, the docu-
ment should not be read to create gaps between right and remedy manipulable by government. This
argument harmonizes with the general rule for constitutional rights disfavoring denials of relief absent
a knowing and intelligent waiver of these rights. See, e.g., Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
Similarly, any argument that governments simply cannot afford to offer full remedies for constitu-
tional violations rings hollow given that governments spend so much to pay other expenses-including
liability judgments in nonconstitutional tort cases pursuant to statutory waivers of sovereign immu-
nity-not mandated by constitutional norms. If government's resources are finite, these discretionary
expenditures surely must take a back seat to payments mandated by constitutional principles; any
other system smacks of impermissible discrimination against constitutional rights. To argue that gov-
ernments "cannot afford" to guarantee full remedies is to argue that the regime of rights that the
framers embedded in the Constitution is simply unworkable. This is an argument that should be
required to bear a very heavy burden of proof.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 131-33.
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. . . to the people" through state constitutions.2"4 Strictly speaking, the
Tenth Amendment affirms the sovereignty of the People, not the sover-
eignty of state governments: It resoundingly affirms the structural conclu-
sion that governments have no sovereignty to violate the Constitution and
get away with it.
In fact, the Amendment can be seen as containing a tantalizing sugges-
tion that the very division of delegated sovereign powers between two dif-
ferent sets of agents can promote the ultimate sovereignty of the People.
In particular, the Amendment hints that the reservation of limited law-
making "powers . . to the States respectively" is somehow connected to
preventing the federal government from exercising "powers not delegated
to" it. Limited state governments can help maintain limits on the national
government. It is now time to explore that hint in greater detail.
III. A NEO-FEDERALIST VIEW OF FEDERALISM
Analysis of the power of each government, state and national, to
"check" unconstitutional conduct by the other follows naturally from
analysis of government liability for constitutional wrongs: Both concepts
stem from the framers' more general principles of popular sovereignty and
limited government. Just as the sovereign immunity issue turns on a
proper understanding of the revolutionary debate, so the issue of inter-
governmental relations is framed by the Civil War debate. Whereas the
Court's sovereign immunity doctrine misapplies the lesson of the Revolu-
tion, contemporary constitutional scholarship tends to misunderstand cer-
tain federalism issues because it misreads the message of the Civil War.
By interpreting the War as establishing the supremacy of the national
government, instead of the national People, contemporary scholarship has
overlooked the myriad ways in which states may usefully and permissibly
check federal lawlessness. Fittingly, each set of structural and historical
misunderstandings has a textual complement: The Court overreads the
Eleventh Amendment as enshrining state sovereign immunity, and con-
temporary scholars tend to overread the supremacy clause as embodying
the supremacy of the federal government instead of the supremacy of "We
the People" through the Constitution.
The basic proposition here is simple: Constitutional federalism is a two-
edged sword for constitutional justice. Under this view of federalism, each
constitutionally limited government can deploy its powers to police the
constitutional limits on the other's powers and remedy the other's consti-
264. See 3 J. STORY, supra note 21, § 1900 (state constitutions mark Tenth Amendment hound-
ary between those nonnational powers "reserved to the States respectively" and those powers reserved
"to the people").
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tutional violations. In contrast to the Court's doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity, we need to see how the limited sovereignty of state and federal gov-
ernments promotes and vindicates the ultimate sovereignty of the People.
A. The Riddle of The Federalist
Let us begin by considering again Madison's The Federalist No. 51, in
which he suggests that federalism and separation of powers work in simi-
lar ways:
[T]hose who administer each department [must have] the necessary
constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of
the others.
[ .. T]he constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices
in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other-that the
private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public
rights ....
...In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered
by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and
then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and sepa-
rate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the
people. The different governments will control each other, at the
same time that each will be controlled by itself.2" 5
Madison's point here is crisper than the clich6 that diffusion of political
power will generally prevent tyranny. He implies that the Constitution's
structure of government will help assure compliance with the specific le-
gal rights established by that instrument. He speaks of "the rights of the
people" and the structural incentives that "control" against governmental
"encroachments. '266
Madison's analogy between separation of powers and federalism invites
careful attention. For separation of powers plainly has a legal as well as a
political dimension; it establishes structures and institutions-like judicial
review-whose very purpose is to assure government compliance with the
specific legal rights embodied in the Constitution. The question thus be-
265. THu FEDERAI.ISr No. 51, at 321-23 (U. Madison).
266. His language in The Federalist No. 48 is to similar effect:
[Plower is of an encroaching nature and . . . ought to be effectually restrained from passing
the limits assigned to it. After discriminating, therefore, in theory, the several classes of power,
: I * the next and most difficult task is to provide some practical security for each, against the
invasion of the others. . . . [It is not] sufficient to mark, with precision, the boundaries of
these departments in the constitution of the government, and to trust to these parchment barri-
ers against the encroaching spirit of power. . . . [Tihe powers of government should be so
divided and balanced among several bodies of magistracy as that no one could transcend their
legal limits without being effectually checked and restrained by the others.
THE FEDERI.,r" No. 48, at 308-11 (J. Madison) (emphasis added).
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comes, what similar structural features vindicating constitutional rights
animate federalism?
The key words of The Federalist that can help us unlock this riddle
appear in a seldom-quoted passage of Hamilton's No. 28:
[I]n a confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to
be entirely the masters of their own fate. Power being almost always
the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand
ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these
will have the same disposition towards the general government. The
people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make
it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they can make
use of the other as the instrument of redress.2"7
Hamilton's point here, like Madison's in The Federalist No. 51, is not
simply that a federal system is a good thing because it diffuses power, but
the more precise and intriguing claim that federalism will serve to
"check" "usurpations" and "redress" invasions of "the people's" legal
"rights." We should note the symmetry of Hamilton's language here; like
Madison, he speaks of each government checking the lawlessness of the
other. We should also note the richness of Hamilton's imagery. He
weaves together language of checks and balances (the word "check" is
followed by a balancing image of the people "throwing themselves into
either scale");26. of military might (each government "will at all times
stand ready" to thwart the others' attempts to "invade[]" the rights of
citizens); of political competition/agency incentive analysis (governments
are "rivals" with competing "dispositions"; the People are their "mas-
ters");26 9 and technical legal doctrine ("rights" and "redress" are paired).
To understand fully the Federalists' vision of federalism, we must under-
stand how all these images were interrelated. In particular, we must see
how federalism was designed to check and balance at least three types of
interpenetrating power: military, political, and legal. The Federalists were
quite clear-eyed in recognizing that a system that distributed these three
267. THE- FI"Dn"RAI.ss' No. 28, at 180-81 (A. Hamilton) (emphasis added). Earlier Hamilton
defined "confederacy" to include any system-even one predicated on the sovereignty of one Peo-
ple-retaining both local and central government entities. Id. No. 9, at 75-76. As Professor Diamond
has shown, such a linguistic coup deviated from earlier definitions of confederacy. See Diamond, The
Federalists' View of Federalism, supra note 83, at 23-33; see also supra notes 9, 134 (discussing
other Federalist linguistic coups).
268. For further images of checks and balances, see THE FFDE.RALISr No. 9, at 72 (A.
Hamilton).
269. Although Hamilton's precise language is that the People are "masters of their own fate" and
not "masters of their competing agents," a double entendre seems intended. Cf id. No. 46, at 294 (J.
Madison) (federal and state governments are "different agents and trustees of the people," "mutual
rivals" controlled by a "common superior").
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types of power in radically divergent ways would be unstable in the long
run.27 0 It is thus no coincidence that Hamilton's final three words in this
passage, describing each government as a potential "instrument of re-
dress," are words that work well on all three levels-military, political,
and legal. Nor is it purely coincidental that on each of these levels, there
are powerful analogies between separation of powers and federalism, the
two great structural principles of the Constitution. For in separating and
dividing power, whether horizontally or vertically, the Federalists pursued
the same strategy: Vest power in different sets of agents who will have
personal incentives to monitor and enforce limitations on each other's
powers.2
B. Military Checks and Balances
The Constitution dramatically expanded the central government's mili-
tary powers. Under the Articles, Congress could raise troops only by
"requisitioning" each state for its proportionate "quota" of men (deter-
mined by white population). Each state legislature retained the power to
"raise,... cloath, arm and equip" its troops, and to appoint all regimen-
tal officers "of or under the rank of colonel. 27 2 To raise the funds to pay
for these men and materiel, Congress once again had to rely on state gov-
ernmental compliance with a quota system (this time based on wealth).
The unworkability of this requisition system-no mechanism short of war
existed to enforce states' obligations, so they quite predictably flouted
them2 7 -led the Federalists to empower the new national government to
directly raise its own army, to directly tax individuals to pay for that
army, and to appoint all its officers. In addition, the new Constitution
broke with the Articles by authorizing the new central government to na-
tionalize state militias "to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insur-
rections and repel Invasions.
'27 4
The very awesomeness of these military powers induced the Federalists
to balance power more carefully within the national government. In En-
gland, the King theoretically had the power both to declare war and to
command troops.2 7 5 Under the Articles, both of these powers resided, at
least on paper, in a single unicameral assembly, Congress. By contrast,
the Constitution split these powers between legislature and executive. The
270. See, e.g., id. Nos. 8, 23-29, (A. Hamilton); id. Nos. 41, 43, 48, 51 U. Madison).
271. See, e.g., id. Nos. 17, 26, 28, 66, 72, 84 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 51 U. Madison).
272. Articles of Confederation, 1781, art. IX, para. 5; id. art. VII.
273. For accounts of the free riding and race to the bottom created by congressional impotence, see
THE FrmERAI.rr No. 22 (A. Hamilton); J. MADISON, supra note 59.
274. U.S. Cos'r. art. I, § 8, paras. 12-15.
275. See THE FEDERAixsr No. 69, at 417-18 (A. Hamilton).
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former could declare war, but the latter would serve as commander-in-
chief. Similarly, Congress could lay down "rules for the government and
regulation" of military forces, but the President would execute these rules;
Congress could authorize military appropriations (for up to two years),
but the President would superintend actual military disbursements; Con-
gress could provide rules for nationalizing state militias, but the President
would command them whenever they were called into service.2
The Federalists struck a similar, though today less noted, vertical bal-
ance of military power. For despite the vastly increased practical power of
the central government-including the power to quell local insurrec-
tions-states still retained one vital check. Although they were forbidden
to keep any professional "Troops . . .in time of Peace without Congres-
sional consent," they were expressly charged with the "Appointment of
the officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the
discipline prescribed by Congress. ' 277 These militias were ultimately sub-
ject to nationalization in times of emergency, but their loyalties were
likely to be local. State governments would train these men, equip them,
and appoint their officers. If the national government had ultimate "title"
to these men and arms, state governments had "possession"-and the
Revolutionary War experience had shown that possession was no small
thing. In the event that the central authorities tried to use a national
standing army to suspend the Constitution and forcibly subjugate the Peo-
ple-a spectre made vivid by contemporary historical accounts of Stuart
tyranny in England, and the birth of despotism in other countries27 -the
various state militias could serve as organized and independent pockets of
military resistance.
In a single [nonfederal] State, if the persons entrusted with supreme
power become usurpers, the different parcels, subdivisions, or dis-
tricts of which it consists, having no distinct government in each, can
take no regular measures for defense. The citizens must rush tumul-
276. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 644 (1952) (Jackson, J., con-
curring) ("[The President] has no monopoly of 'war powers,' whatever they are. While Congress
cannot deprive the President of the command of the army and navy, only Congress can provide him
an army or navy to command.").
277. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 10, para. 3; id. § 8, para. 15; see 1 M. Farrand, supra note 40, at 172
(remarks of Elbridge Gerry).
278. See B. BAI.YN, supra note 20, at 55-159. One additional point must be kept in mind: In
1787, it was taken for granted that George Washington-a general-would be selected as the first
President under the Constitution (assuming Virginia's ratification). Although the general was largely
above suspicion himself, his fellow officers-including Hamilton and the Order of the Cincin-
nati-were widely seen (perhaps with some justice) as lacking his fabled commitment to civilian
supremacy. See generally M. JENSEN, TH. N.W NATION 67-84, 261-65 (1950) (discussing Order,
and Hamilton's personal involvement in military machinations of notorious Newburgh affair of 1783).
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tuously to arms, without concert, without system, without resource
279
In the United States, by contrast, should tyrannous national leaders at-
tempt a coup,
the State governments with the people on their side would be able to
repel the danger. . . . [The standing army] would be opposed [by] a
militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in
their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves, fight-
ing for their common liberties and united and conducted by govern-
ments possessing their affections and confidence. . . . [L]ocal gov-
ernments . . . . could collect the national will and direct the
national force .... 280
The very existence of small but expandable popular "shadow" armies or-
ganized by state governments could deter abuse of a much larger profes-
sional standing army organized by the national government-much as a
would-be monopolist must take into account not only actual competitors
but "shadow" competitors organized to enter the market if prices rise too
high.28' In the words of The Federalist: "[T]he existence of subordinate
governments, to which the people are attached and by which the militia
officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition,
more insurmountable than any which a simple [as distinguished from a
"compound" or dual-agency] government of any form can admit of."2 2
By balancing military power between two jealous governments, the People
would retain greater control over both. The national government could
forcefully put down any purely local coup or insurrection threatening the
republican government of a single state, but could be thwarted in any
genuine scheme of national tyranny by an alliance of local militias led by
state governments. "[A]s [the People] will hold the scales in their own
hands, it is to be hoped [they] will always take care to preserve the consti-
tutional equilibrium between the general and the State governments. 283
The Federalist's discussion of the military check of federalism may
strike modern readers as dangerous and embarrassing: 8 4 Dangerous be-
279. THE. FEDERAltmr No. 28, at 180 (A. Hamilton).
280. Id. No. 46, at 299-300 (J. Madison).
281. See, e.g., United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984) (Winter,
J.).
282. THE F-DERAmIST No. 46, at 299 (J. Madison).
283. Id. No. 31, at 197 (A. Hamilton); see also id. No. 11, at 87 (A. Hamilton) (using language
identical to that of The Federalist No. 28 to describe how American People could benefit from bal-
ance of military power among European governments: America's navy "would at least be of respecta-
ble weight if thrown into the scale of either of two contending parties" (emphasis added)).
284. It may also strike some as antiquated. Whether guerrilla resistance orchestrated by state
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cause it seems to invite-indeed, to celebrate-widespread state resistance
to national authority; embarrassing because it seems to vindicate the posi-
tion later taken by extreme states' rights theorists on behalf of nullifica-
tion and, ultimately, secession. As we ponder the full meaning of Appo-
mattox and Little Rock, we may wonder, can The Federalist be serious
about this? And so the above-quoted passages tend to be dismissed
("Hamilton will say anything to win Anti-Federalist votes") or repressed
("a few isolated passages about the peculiarly eighteenth century issue of
standing armies have little to teach us today in the aftermath of two
Reconstructions").
Both of these reactions are unjustified. The political insincerity of The
Federalist has been widely exaggerated. Too often, the fact that The Fed-
eralist worked brilliantly on a political level becomes a blanket excuse for
the cynic to abdicate responsibility to take the text seriously on any other
level.285 True, the Papers are a shrewd political tract, but they are also a
great work-perhaps this country's greatest work-of applied political
philosophy. And Publius (the pen name of the joint authors of The Feder-
alist) will not say just anything to win Anti-Federalist votes. In other
passages, for example, he is emphatic that the ultimate judicial resolution
of constitutional issues concerning the boundary between state and na-
tional powers must rest with national courts.2"' What's more, Publius
plainly considers the military argument an important one. It is featured
prominently in two different papers-one by Hamilton, one by
Madison-and alluded to in several others. And of course, the subsequent
militias is a plausible scenario in the event of an attempted coup in an age of supersophisticated
federal weaponry is a question I leave to those with stronger credentials in military technology. But
see infra text accompanying note 292.
285. I consider The Federalist to be the best single extra-textual source in explicating the Consti-
tution. First, the Papers were consciously quoted and used more than any other source during the
ratification period. When the Constitution was presented to the People themselves for their approval,
The Federalist was the gloss that supporters of the Constitution regularly used to explain and defend
the text to others. Second, the Papers brilliantly and elegantly package Federalist ideology by collect-
ing in one place the myriad and interconnected Federalist arguments in the air in 1787-1788. Finally,
and perhaps in recognition of both of these features of the Papers, the Supreme Court, its oral advo-
cates, and political pamphleteers, see, e.g., Marshall, supra note 49, at 193-94; Roane, supra note
103, at 113, generally accorded the work a special status very early on. Indeed, a catalogue of pre-
1825 Supreme Court cases in which the Papers are invoked as special authority by bench or bar reads
like a list of landmarks: Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); Gib-
bons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821);
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820); Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1
(1820); Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); Fletcher
v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386 (1798); Penhallow v.
Doane's Administrators, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 54 (1795).
286. See THE. FEDEnRAISTr No. 22, at 150 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 39, at 245 (J. Madison); id.
No. 82 (A. Hamilton); cf. supra note 162.
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adoption of the Second Amendment only underscores the "necess[ity]" of a
"well regulated Militia" to "the security of a free State. ' 287
Properly understood, Publius' argument for the military check of feder-
alism is extremely limited, yet equally important-and is in no way
mooted by the Civil War or the civil rights crusade. Publius is not arguing
for a general right of state militias, or anyone else, to engage in armed
resistance whenever they believe that national authorities are acting un-
constitutionally. Under ordinary circumstances, the People's remedies are
political and legal, not military. And Publius makes clear that these politi-
cal and legal questions are to be resolved, under ordinary circumstances,
in national fora-Congress, the executive branch, and federal courts. The
key qualification, of course, is the phrase "under ordinary circumstances."
And by hypothesis, the scenario painted by Publius as the occasion for
militia opposition is the extraordinary worst case of an attempted national
coup. No political or legal remedies exist in this situation. Presumably
national courts have been shut down, or, at best, their judgments are un-
enforceable. The only applicable law is martial law, enforced by gun and
sword. In such a scenario, the only remedy left to the People would be
military. As Hamilton carefully notes, recourse to arms in such an event
would be justified by the traditional Lockean right to revolt whenever the
government openly breaches its contract with the People: "If the repre-
sentatives of the people betray their constituents, there is then no resource
left but in the exertion of that original right of self-defense which is para-
mount to all positive forms of government .... "'88
This theory, it must be stressed, was not the one invoked by secession-
ists in 1861, nor could it have been. The national political channels re-
mained open-Lincoln had won the Presidency, but the race was fair; the
national courts remained open-if anything, the Taney Court stood as a
shameless apologist for Southern interests;289 and the national military
had taken no steps to threaten civilians-on the contrary, Southern citi-
zens launched the attack on Fort Sumter.29 The "moderate" Confederate
theory of secession rested on the right of each state convention to decide
for itself whether the federal compact had been materially breached, re-
gardless of what the federal courts or the Peoples of other states be-
lieved.29 An even more extreme version of Confederate ideology rested
287. U.S. CoNsr. amend. II.
288. Tmi. FEIwtDFAI.1iSI" No. 28, at 180 (A. Hamilton).
289. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
290. See A. LINCOI.N, supra note 110, at 421-26; A. LINCOLN, First Inaugural Address, in 4
THE. Com.rEci) WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 264-71 (R. Basler ed. 1953) [hereinafter First
Inaugural Address.
291. Southern complaints about the failure of several Northern states to enforce vigorously the
federal Fugitive Slave Law seem largely makeweight. In any event, secession would only exacerbate
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secession not on claims of federal usurpation, but rather on the sovereign
right of the People of each state to alter or abolish their government at
any time for any reason-even in violation of a pre-existing treaty. As we
have seen, both these Confederate theories were premised on a view of
sovereignty plainly inconsistent with the Federalist Constitution.
When we move from the Civil War era to our own, the military check
of federalism might appear largely unnecessary given the seeming improb-
ability of an attempted national coup in late twentieth century America.
Yet this happy state of current affairs is perhaps partly due to the military
check itself. The sturdy contemporary ethos of civilian supremacy that
makes an attempted military takeover unlikely today draws much of its
strength from an unblemished history of due subordination of the national
military. That history, in turn, may well have been influenced by the mil-
itary check. Of course we can never know what might have happened had
the Federalists eliminated state militias; but perhaps the strongest evi-
dence of the effectiveness of the framers' system of military checks is two
centuries of civilian supremacy that have made a military coup almost
unthinkable.292
C. Political Checks and Balances
The ability of state governments to help implement the People's right to
revolt in extraordinary times is paralleled by their ability to help enforce
the People's constitutional rights under more ordinary circumstances.
29 3
Once again, the independent and pre-existing organizational structures of
state governments were seen as incipient pockets of resistance-here, po-
litical resistance-to unconstitutional federal conduct. The People could
the issue of fugitive slaves, and many other tensions between North and South. See First Inaugural
Address, supra note 290, at 264-71.
292. Cf supra note 278; 4 D. MACONE, JEFFERSON AND His TIME 7-11 (1970) (Republican
leaders ready to use state militias to resist should lame duck Congress attempt to violate clear dictates
of Article II by designating someone other than Aaron Burr or Thomas Jefferson as President in
1801; same Republican leaders willing to acquiesce peacefully should Congress lawfully opt for Burr
over Jefferson, notwithstanding latter's superior moral and political claim to office).
293. Between the poles of military revolution and ordinary protection of existing constitutional
rights is the case of constitutional amendment. Once again, the Federalist Constitution gave state
governments a central role, by allowing two-thirds of the state legislatures to force Congress to call a
constitutional convention. U.S. CONSr. art. V. The Federalists knew that constitutional amendment
might be necessary to check abuses by the national legislature, and they therefore carefully provided
for modes of amendment that would not require congressional concurrence. See 1 M. Farrand, supra
note 40, at 22 (Madison's 13th Virginia Resolution). Hamilton's words concerning amendments have
a familiar ring: "We may safely rely on the disposition of the State legislatures to erect barriers
against the encroachments of the national authority." THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 526.
Once again, however, constitutional federalism is symmetric: Because the Federalists knew that
constitutional amendment might be necessary to check abuses of state governments, they also carefully
provided for modes of ratification that would enable Congress to side-step state legislatures and di-
rectly appeal to the People in convention assembled. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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confidently confer broad powers upon national agents precisely because
they had also created a second set of specialized agents to monitor the first
set and orchestrate resistance to its abuses. State legislatures would bring
together persons with a special interest in and aptitude for political affairs
whose daily duties would necessarily require them to attend closely to na-
tional politics.2"4 At the first sign of a national abuse of power, they could
sound a general alarm, communicating information and advice to their
constituents and thereby winning their favor. The performance of colonial
governments in monitoring Parliament and mobilizing opposition to vari-
ous schemes of imperial oppression between 1763 and 1776 furnished an
obvious historical precedent,295 conjuring up an image of the state legisla-
ture that in some ways resembles the self-image of the institutional press
today. In the words of The Federalist:
Independent of parties in the national legislature itself, . . . the
State legislatures, who will always be not only vigilant but suspi-
cious and jealous guardians of the rights of the citizens against en-
croachments from the federal government, will constantly have their
attention awake to the conduct of the national rulers, and will be
ready enough, if anything improper appears, to sound the alarm to
the people, and not only to be the VOICE, but, if necessary, the
ARM of their discontent.29
It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system that the
State governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete
security against invasions of the public liberty by the national au-
thority. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretences so
likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of men, as of the
people at large. The legislatures will have better means of informa-
tion. They can discover the danger at a distance; and possessing all
the organs of civil power and the confidence of the people, they can
at once adopt a regular plan of opposition, in which they can com-
bine all the resources of the community.
297
Every government would espouse the common cause. A correspon-
dence would be opened. Plans of resistance would be concerted. One
spirit would animate and conduct the whole. . . . A few representa-
tives of the people would be opposed to the people themselves; or
rather one set of representatives would be contending against thir-
294. Here and elsewhere, the Federalists recognized the efficiency of specialization of labor. See
G. Win.ts, supra note 22, at 108-11.
295. Cf McLaughlin, supra note 78 (noting overlap between "states rights" and "individual
rights" rhetoric in colonial arguments against Parliament).
296. TM. FtI-RAi.tsr No. 26, at 172 (A. Hamilton). Note how the reference to "the ARM of
. . . discontent" anticipates the military check argument.
297. Id. No. 28, at 181 (A. Hamilton); accord id. No. 84, at 516-17 (A. Hamilton).
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teen sets of representatives, with the whole body of their common
constituents on the side of the latter.298
The nation's first major constitutional crisis after ratification was re-
solved in a fashion strikingly consistent with The Federalist's vision of
state legislatures as political watchdogs. In 1798, congressional supporters
of President John Adams enacted several bills of dubious constitutionality
designed in large part to stifle critics of the administration. The ability of
the opposition press to attack the Alien and Sedition Acts was chilled by
the prospect of prosecution under the Acts themselves. But if the Constitu-
tion's general protections for freedom of speech and the press under the
First Amendment were somewhat unclear in 1798, the special constitu-
tional protections for opposition speech in state legislatures were unde-
niable. These bodies thus took the lead in politically challenging Adams
and the Acts. The legislatures of Virginia and Kentucky adopted resolu-
tions declaring the Acts dangerous and unconstitutional, and inviting sister
legislatures to do the same.299 Despite some grand and ambiguous claims
in the resolutions themselves, these enactments had no legal force.300
Nonetheless, they served as useful political "instruments of redress" in
alerting the People to the threat to their liberties and mobilizing political
opposition to the Adams men. Although political agitation at the state
level was unsuccessful in securing immediate repeal of the offensive legis-
lation, it effectively transformed the national election of 1800 into a popu-
lar referendum on these bills. And with the accession of Thomas Jefferson
to the Presidency and the electoral triumphs of the anti-Adams party in
congressional races, enforcement of the Acts stopped, and they were qui-
etly allowed to expire under their own terms in 1801.3 °0 The constitu-
tional crisis was thus ultimately resolved by political decisions within the
298. Id. No. 46, at 298 (J. Madison). Madison's second sentence here seems to be a rather direct
allusion to the intercolonial committees of correspondence that had emerged in the 1770's to coordi-
nate opposition to parliamentary abuses.
299. Eight years earlier, the Virginia legislature had adopted resolutions denouncing as unconsti-
tutional the federal government's assumption of state war debts. Virginia Resolutions on the Assump-
tion of State Debts, in Do(:uM.N'rS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 76, at 155-56 (describing
state legislators as "guardians . . . of the rights and interests of their constituents" and "sentinels
placed by them over the ministers of the federal government, to shield it from their encroachments, or
at least to sound an alarm when it is threatened with invasion"). This 1790 declaration is an impor-
tant link in the historical chain connecting the anti-parliamentary activity of colonial legislatures
before 1776 with the resolutions of 1798. Note especially the use of the revealing word "ministers" to
describe federal officers.
300. Madison, one of the chief architects of the resolutions, later conceded as much. See J.
MADISON, The Virginia Report of 1800, in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POUTI-
CAl. THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 299, 346 (M. Meyers ed. 1973) [hereinafter The Virginia Re-
port of 1800]; J. MADISON, Letter to the North American Review, in id. 531, 541-44.
301. See Powell, Original Intent, supra note 106, at 924-27.
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national government itself, but under political conditions powerfully af-
fected by the "alarm" that state legislatures had sounded.3"2
Unsurprisingly, the structure of horizontal separation of powers creates
analogous incentives for signalling and political organizing. Even (or per-
haps especially) if his veto is overridden, a President's veto message can
serve as an important warning to the People that national legislators are
attempting to breach the constitutional walls on their powers. So too with
a judicial opinion, even (or perhaps especially) one that the political
branches refuse to enforce. Indeed, Professor Ackerman's accounts of the
elections of 1866 and 1936 as constitutional referenda of sorts neatly par-
allel mine here of the election of 1800, with the interesting difference that
these later referenda were signalled by and organized around horizontal
constitutional disputes between different branches of the national
government.
30 3
In fact, the analogy between separation of powers and federalism is
even more precise, for both operate on a legal as well as a political level.
A presidential veto on constitutional grounds has legal force. So does a
federal court declaratory judgment that an act of Congress is unconstitu-
tional. Likewise, state governments are more than mere political bodies.
Unlike the press, a state legislature can do more than simply sound a
political alarm. 304 Unlike the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions, not all
actions by state legislatures need be viewed as naked declarations devoid of
legal force. The Tenth Amendment reminds us that state governments
have residuary powers to enact law. As we shall see, this fact has dra-
matic implications for the vindication of constitutional rights.
302. The very magnitude of federal operations in the 20th century, combined with the rise of
professional lobbyists, political parties, and the national media, may have reduced state legislatures'
comparative institutional competence as watchdogs. Even today, however, state governments retain a
comparative institutional advantage over nongovernmental watchdogs in one key respect. States fur-
nish opponents of national policy with an opportunity to secure actual hands-on experience running
government, thereby strengthening their credibility as qualified candidates in the next set of national
elections. In a nonfederal system, any who would challenge an abusive national leadership must do so
from either a minority "shadow government" position within the national government, or a leadership
position outside civil government-e.g., the military or private corporations. Twentieth century
America has had its share of national leaders coming from outside government-consider, for exam-
ple, Herbert Hoover, Dwight Eisenhower, and (perhaps) Lee Iacocca-but it has also regularly
tapped leaders of state government, such as Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. Publius would not
have been surprised by this state of affairs. See THE FDIERA.ISTr Nos. 45, 56 (J. Madison).
303. See Ackerman, supra note 69, at 1051-70.
304. Professor Rapaczynski has offered an important analysis of how constitutional protections of
state governments can be justified on organizational theory grounds similar to those used to support
constitutional protections of press and association. See Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The
Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 Sup. Cr. Riiv. 341. But as Professor Rapaczynski
himself recognizes, one vital difference between state governments and other specially-protected orga-
nizations is that states wield limited "sovereign" powers to enact laws, id. at 389-91-a recognition in
some tension with his general inclination to reject the usefulness of sovereignty theory.
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D. Legal Checks and Balances
The general structure of separation of powers enables each national
branch to thwart a national law it deems unconstitutional-Congress by
declining to pass it; the President by vetoing it (or, if it is a criminal
statute, by declining prosecution or pardoning those convicted); and the
federal courts by engaging in judicial review. Of course, there are limits
and exceptions to this general feature of one-branch veto. The President's
veto may be overridden; conversely, a simple congressional majority, once
having passed a law, cannot repeal it, even if it later deems the law un-
constitutional, without the concurrence of the President. Nevertheless,
built into the general structure of the Constitution is a libertarian bias
based on checks against constitutionally suspect laws and in favor of the
broadest of the various constructions of the constitutional right given by
the three branches.
3 0 5
The structure of separation of powers thus protects constitutional values
by providing three separate, overlapping, and mutually reinforcing reme-
dies-legislative, executive, and judicial-against unconstitutional federal
conduct. A similar mechanism of overlapping legal remedies for constitu-
tional wrongs is at work in the structure of federalism. A state govern-
ment may violate the Constitution, yet fail to provide victims with a suffi-
cient range of causes of action to ensure a full remedy for the wrong.
Suppose complete redress in a particular situation requires joint and sev-
eral strict liability of all state officials who participate in unconstitutional
conduct, or entity liability of the state government itself, yet state law pro-
vides for neither. The beauty of constitutional federalism is that the fed-
eral government can furnish aggrieved individuals a supplemental rem-
edy. Section 1983 is one example of such a federal remedy."0 6
There are structural reasons to believe that the federal supplemental
remedy may systematically tend to be more generous than state-furnished
remedies. To begin with, federal officials were not the perpetrators of the
wrong, and thus will suffer no political embarrassment from any judicial
proceedings that might publicize that wrongdoing. On the contrary, legis-
lators in Congress can score political points among their constituents by
casting themselves in the role of heroes rescuing victimized citizens from
villainous state officials. Best of all, the rescue operation costs the federal
government little: State officials, after all, will have to foot the liability
bill. In any event, the citizen victims will typically enjoy the best of both
305. See THE FEIDFRAtISr No. 73, at 443-44 (A. Hamilton); Amar, supra note 9, at 222-24, 258
n.1 7 0 , 263 n.1 9 1.
306. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
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worlds, since they can invoke both state and federal remedies for the state
wrong.1
0 7
Conversely, where the national government has violated constitutional
rights, it may fail to provide adequate federal causes of action to fully
remedy its own wrongs. It is not just coincidence that for over a century
Congress has provided section 1983, a general cause of action against per-
sons who violate constitutional rights "under color of state law," but no
analogous cause of action against unconstitutional actions of federal offi-
cials 308-a discrepancy narrowed, but not eliminated, by Congress only
under pressure from the Supreme Court's holding in Bivens v. Six Un-
known Federal Agents.3 09 Once again, the beauty of federalism is that
another government can provide citizens with additional causes of action.
For reasons symmetrical to those canvassed above, state remedies should
systematically tend to be more generous than those offered by Congress.310
Once again, federalism's political incentives will help to enforce legal
rights and vindicate the maxim, ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thus, far from justifying a gap between constitutional right and rem-
edy, as the Court at times implies, federalism abhors a remedial vacuum.
Citizens can rely on the federal government to provide supplemental rem-
edies for constitutional wrongs committed by states, and vice versa. 1 Seen
307. All of this of course presupposes that significant sections of the polity continue to cherish
constitutional values, and that governmental officials can thus improve their standing with constituents
by affirming constitutional symbols. As Professor Charles Black has made clear, the Constitution
cannot in the long run survive without ongoing popular affirmation. C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND
THE COURT (1960). The only thing that the document itself can do-but it is a big "only thing"-is
to structure institutions and symbols in ways that guard against temporary lapses and ever nudge us
to affirm our better selves.
308. See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963) ("Over the years Congress has consid-
ered the problem of state civil and criminal actions against federal officials many times. But no gen-
eral statute making federal officers liable for acts committed 'under color,' but in violation, of their
federal authority has been passed." (citation omitted)).
309. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
310. Indeed, there are stronger reasons to expect generous state law remedies for federal wrongs
than vice versa. Every federal remedy is ultimately paid for by Americans-Congress' constitu-
ency-even though the expenditure is "off budget." By contrast, a state law remedy may politically
externalize cost altogether by imposing at least part of the ultimate financial burden on out-of-staters.
See infra text accompanying notes 352-55; cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 296 (J. Madison) ("A
local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members of Congress than a national spirit will
prevail in the legislatures of the particular states.").
311. It might be said that the development of national parties reduces the willingness of officials
in one government to embarrass officials of their own party in another government. But to say this is
to say that political parties have blurred the Federalists' vertical separation of powers by fostering
collusion among entities that were designed to compete against each other for popular sympathy. See
THE FEnRAi.xy'r No. 27 (A. Hamilton); id. Nos. 45-46 (J. Madison). For similar reasons, the party
system may have distorted horizontal competition within the national government. Perhaps this is one
of the reasons that Madison in 1787 was so hostile to the notion of national parties. In any event, the
point about national parties seems less applicable to a general congressional remedy that applies in all
states, Democratic and Republican. Interestingly, the Republican framers of section 1983 designed it
to apply to the then-Republican states of the North as well as the then-Democratic states of the South.
See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
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in this light, the Tenth Amendment appears as the symmetrical counter-
part of the enforcement clauses of the Civil War Amendments.
1. Historical Examples
The ability of the federal government to remedy state lawlessness may
seem virtually self-evident given the central place of section 1983 in con-
temporary legal discourse.312 Yet history provides equally dramatic exam-
ples of state remedies against federal abuses, which contemporary scholar-
ship has tended to ignore.
a. Fourth Amendment
Consider first an example from the Fourth Amendment. Before the Su-
preme Court decided Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents in 1971, the
only damage remedy generally afforded to individuals whose homes had
been unconstitutionally searched by federal agents was provided by the
state common law of trespass. Without this state law cause of action, a
citizen simply had no standing to get into court to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the search and be compensated for the wrong done. Thus, for
nearly the first two centuries of our constitutional history, only state
law-created by dint of the reserved lawmaking power of
states-furnished any redress for a species of concededly unconstitutional
conduct by federal officials.
The structure of these pre-Bivens cases was quite simple: The ultimate
issue before the court concerned the federal Constitution, but standing was
conferred by the vertically-pendent state law cause of action."1 ' Plaintiff
would sue defendant federal officer in trespass; defendant would claim
federal empowerment that trumped the state law of trespass under the
principles of the supremacy clause; and plaintiff, by way of reply, would
play an even higher supremacy clause trump: Any federal empowerment
was ultra vires and void because of Fourth Amendment limitations on
312. For some interesting variations on the theme of federal protection of individual rights, see
Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035
(1977); Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WNL.
& MARY L. REv. 639 (1981).
313. See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963) ("When it comes to suits for damages
for abuse of power, federal officials are usually governed by local law. Federal law, however, supplies
the defense, if the conduct complained of was done pursuant to a federally imposed duty, or immunity
from suit." (citations omitted)); id. at 656 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing cases); Dellinger, supra
note 13, at 1538-39 ("[T]he contemplated method [of Fourth Amendment] enforcement, the Govern-
ment asserted [in Bivens], must have been a state common law action for damages in which the
amendment would have operated to prevent defenses such as justification by reason of a general war-
rant." (citing Brief for Respondents at 11)); Gibbons, supra note 179, at 1943 n.296, 1948 n.320
(state law causes of action against federal officers "commonplace" during nineteenth century); see also
Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 CoLUM. L. REv. 1109, 1124, 1128-29 (1969) (citing cases).
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federal power itself. If, but only if, plaintiff could in fact prove that the
Fourth Amendment had been violated, defendant's shield of federal power
would dissolve, and he would stand as a naked tortfeasor.
The structure of these cases is illustrative of the myriad ways in which
constitutional "public law" protections are intricately bound up
with-indeed, presuppose-a general backdrop of "private law" protec-
tions defining primary rights of personal property and bodily liberty.
14
Alexis de Tocqueville explicated this subtle interplay in Democracy in
America: "The Americans hold that it is nearly impossible that a new
[unconstitutional] law should not injure some private interest by its provi-
sions. . . . [it is to these interests that the protection of the Supreme
Court is extended." '315 And as Publius noted, in the same passage in
which he spoke of states as "counterpoises" to federal power, states would
typically define and protect these primary rights, thereby enlisting the af-
fections of their citizens:
There is one transcendent advantage belonging to the province of the
State governments . . . [They will be] the immediate and visible
guardian of life and property, . . regulating all those personal in-
terests and familiar concerns to which the sensibility of individuals is
more immediately awake, . . . impressing upon the minds of the
people affection, esteem, and reverence towards the government.
3 6
The Court's decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents37 does
not moot the importance of federal-state remedial competition. In the best
tradition of the remedial principles set forth in Marbury v. Madison,318
the Bivens Court inferred a damage action directly under the Fourth
Amendment. Yet the promise of this move was only partially fulfilled.
Although we have seen that full remedies for constitutional violations will
often require governmental liability,319 lingering notions of sovereign im-
munity induced the Bivens Court to recognize only a cause of action
against individual (and possibly judgment-proof) federal officers. Individ-
ual liability makes a good deal of analytic sense where standing is con-
ferred by a cause of action that in no way depends upon state action. A
314. See generally Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
489 (1954).
315. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVI.i.E, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 154-55 (Bradley ed. 1945).
316. THE FIERAmIsT No. 17, at 120 (A. Hamilton); accord id. No. 45, at 292-93 (J. Madison)
("The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course
of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people. . . . "); Cf. U.S. CONsr. amend. V
(imposing obligation on federal government to accord "due process" to legal interests in "life, liberty,
or property" protected, inter alia, by state law).
317. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
318. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
319. See supra text accompanying notes 244-60.
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trespass cause of action applies to all individuals, whether or not the tres-
passer wears a uniform. By contrast, the Bivens cause of action is itself
predicated upon a governmental wrong, and thus seems naturally to call
for governmental liability.3 20 That the Court did not restructure the case
as Bivens v. United States is yet another unfortunate residue of the Young
fiction.32'
Moreover, even the cause of action that the Bivens Court did approve
was subsequently qualified by a set of individual immunities that threaten
to widen further the gap between right and remedy. Consider, for exam-
ple, the case in which a federal magistrate wrongly issues a search war-
rant without probable cause. Assuming the warrant is issued ex parte and
immediately executed, it is hard to imagine how the citizen victim could
prevent the unconstitutional search from taking place. And after her home
has been searched, she may still lack a federal remedy. The magistrate is
absolutely immune; the federal agents are likely to enjoy good faith immu-
nity-they did, after all, have a warrant; and the Federal Torts Claims
Act may not apply. In this situation, state remedies such as trespass may
continue to help plug the remedial gap. 22
Apart from misguided doctrinal concerns about sovereign immunity, the
Court's hesitation in Bivens and its progeny probably stems from a linger-
ing doubt about whether remedy-fashioning is a more legislative than ju-
dicial function, and from an awareness of the special political vulnerabil-
ity of federal judges in suits involving coercive relief against agents in
coordinate branches of government.323 On both of these counts, remedial
competition between the political branches of state and national govern-
320. See Wolcher, supra note 225, at 285-86.
321. Ironically, Young was also the source of the Bivens Court's willingness to entertain suit
directly under the Constitution even if no private tort suit lay. See supra note 218. It was this use of
the Constitution as a self-executing cause of action, that was Young's analytic breakthrough-and not
the notion that a government official acting unconstitutionally was "stripped" of immunity, a notion
of much earlier vintage. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738,
837-39 (1824). Bivens merely extended the injunctive principles of Young to suits for damages at law.
322. Although some of the language of the Bivens majority suggests the desirability of remedial
uniformity, see, e.g., 403 U.S. at 395; id. at 409 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment), the Court's
true concern was with a constitutional remedial floor, and not with uniformity of Fourth Amendment
remedies per se. Plainly, Bivens' holding in no way automatically ousts supplemental state law reme-
dies that might be more generous in certain respects (e.g., on the individual immunity issue) than the
Court-fashioned cause of action. Dellinger, supra note 13, at 1540. The continued permissibility of at
least some broader state law causes of action suggests that the Bivens remedy itself does not exhaust
the full range of the Fourth Amendment right, but may have been limited by institutional concerns.
See infra text accompanying notes 323-25. If this were not so, any additional state law remedy would
seem to be pro tanto an illegitimate tax on federal instrumentalities. See infra text accompanying
notes 351-55.
323. Consider for example Marbury v. Madison. The most politically delicate part of Chief Jus-
tice Marshall's opinion was not his assertion of the power of federal courts to decline to apply acts of
Congress they deemed unconstitutional, but his earlier claim that the judicial department could, in
appropriate cases, order coercive relief directly against a defendant officer of the executive branch. Cf
1 A. ntD Tc:quEvnt.E, supra note 315, at 106-07.
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ment can strengthen judicial resolve. In confronting lawless conduct by
one government, the federal courts need not stand alone if they can draw
upon the remedial law and political support of a competing government.
Thus, state governments can help federal courts implement truly full rem-
edies that these courts-for purely institutional reasons-might hesitate to
order on their own. 24 Separation of powers and federalism can reinforce
each other here, creating possibilities for useful alliances between state
governments and federal courts to keep the rest of the federal government
honest.3 25
b. Habeas Corpus
States need not confine their remedies to damages, nor have they histor-
ically. The ability of states to vindicate constitutional values through in-
junctive relief was perhaps nowhere more dramatic than in early state
habeas corpus cases: State habeas offered a way for those imprisoned by
federal officers in violation of their federal constitutional rights to win
their freedom. In the mid-nineteenth century, however, the Supreme
Court called into question this tradition of libertarian federalism. In
Ableman v. Booth 2" and Tarble's Case,a27 the Court held that principles
of national supremacy forbade state courts to inquire into the lawfulness
of federal detention. Yet the Court's analysis in these cases was shaky, and
its language quite sloppy. For example, scholarship by William Duker
has established that the very purpose of the habeas non-suspension clause
of Article I, section 9, was to protect the remedy of state habeas from
being abrogated by the federal government;32 the language of non-
suspension obviously presupposes a pre-existing (state) common law
habeas remedy. The non-suspension clause is powerful textual evidence
confirming the general structural postulate that state remedies were in-
tended to play a vital role in checking federal misconduct.3 29 The clause
also illustrates yet again the interplay of common law and constitutional
324. On underenforcement of legal norms created by institutional limitations of federal courts, see
Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1212 (1978); Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 585 (1975); Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFr. 107,
175-77 (1976); Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q.
659; Note, A Norm-Based Remedial Model for Underinclusive Statutes, 95 YALE L.J. 1185 (1986).
325. Cf Biveus, 403 U.S. at 428 (Black, J., dissenting) ("[The fatal weakness in the Court's
judgment is that neither Congress nor the State of New York has enacted legislation creating such a
right of action. For us to do so [alone] is, in my judgment, an exercise of power that the Constitution
does not give us." (emphasis added)).
326. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
327. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872).
328. W. DUEiR, A CONKrlTUTIONAI. HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 126-80 (1980).
329. Especially because the non-suspension clause is the original Constitution's most explicit ref-
erence to remedies. See Hill, supra note 313, at 1118 n.42.
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protections of liberty. The common law would furnish the cause of action
that assured judicial review; the Constitution would furnish the test on the
legal merits of confinement.
The principle of national supremacy that the Court invoked in
Ableman and Tarble's Case seems irrelevant on the facts of those cases.
The Constitution, and not the national government, is supreme in our
legal system. Indeed, the Constitution's supremacy clause specifically
charges state courts with the obligation to abide by it as the supreme law
of the land.330 That was precisely what the state courts in Ableman and
Tarble's Case were doing when they sought to inquire into the legality of
federal detention.
The Supreme Court's habeas doctrine reflects apparent concern that
state courts might rule improperly on the merits-that is, on the question
of the constitutionality of detention. But resolution of the merits by a state
court would present a federal question that would trigger Supreme Court
appellate review under the relevant jurisdictional statutes. Congress could
go even further by providing for removal from state to federal court when-
ever it appeared that the lawfulness of detention would turn on the resolu-
tion of a federal question. Of course, in this removed proceeding, federal
courts would be obliged to enforce the vertically-pendent state law habeas
remedy-but this is precisely the point: Congress should not automatically
be able to oust any state remedy it deems "inconvenient." Full compliance
with constitutional norms is often "inconvenient" from the government's
point of view. Ableman and Tarble's Case can be justified only if they are
understood simply as attributing to Congress a desire for exclusive federal
court jurisdiction in habeas proceedings against federal officers.3 3' So un-
derstood, these cases should not be read to allow a federal court vested
with exclusive jurisdiction to disregard-to suspend-the state-law habeas
remedy. Jurisdiction must be distinguished from the rule of decision, as
the Tenth Amendment, the Rules of Decision Act, and the Eleventh
Amendment's repudiation of Chisholm all make clear.
c. State Legislative Power and Federal Judicial Supremacy: A Neo-
Federalist Synthesis
The role of the states suggested by this neo-Federalist vision is at once
similar to and different from state court "interposition." According to
330. U.S. CoNs'r. art. VI, para. 2 ("This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby.").
331. This is, I believe, the prevailing understanding of Ableman and Tarble's Case among federal
jurisdiction scholars. See, e.g., Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword: Constitutional
Limitations on Congress' Authority To Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HAst,. L.
REv. 17, 80-84 (1981).
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nineteenth century states' rights theorists, state courts had to be given un-
reviewable power to hold federal conduct unconstitutional; only through
this "interposition" of state court judges, it was argued, could federal en-
croachments against the Constitution be prevented." 2 In a more re-
strained version of this argument, Professor Henry Hart and other twenti-
eth-century scholars have argued that Congress may choose to give state
courts final jurisdiction over federal statutory and constitutional ques-
tions.3 33 Yet the text and structure of Article III clearly seem to mandate
that the last word on all federal question cases be vested in the federal
judiciary, either at trial (via removal or exclusive federal jurisdiction 3 4) or
on appeal from state courts.33 5 The neo-Federalist view offered here is
fully consistent with the constitutional supremacy of federal over state
courts . 3  The constitutionality of the federal conduct challenged in any
given case would always pose a federal question whose ultimate resolu-
tion, along with all other federal questions raised, would always lie with
federal courts. The role of the states is solely to provide victims of consti-
tutional wrongs with the chance to have their federal rights defined and
fully protected in federal court.337 Thus, interposition theorists were right
in believing that states had a vital part to play in vindicating individual
constitutional rights against federal encroachments; 338 they were wrong in
claiming that the Constitution's script gave state courts the last word on
federal questions.
3 39
332. See supra text accompanying notes 117-19.
333. See generally Amar, supra note 9, at 215-16, 220-29 (canvassing Hart school scholarship).
334. Congressional power to provide for exclusive federal jurisdiction in federal question
cases-indeed in any category of Article III cases or controversies-is well established. See The Moses
Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 428-31 (1867).
335. See Amar, supra note 9.
336. Even in constitutional disputes involving conflicting federal and state claims, federal courts
can be seen as impartial umpires, since federal judges enjoy significant constitutional independence
from the political branches of the federal government. Though this independence is not total, federal
judges typically enjoy far more independence from their legislature than do state judges from theirs.
See id. at 226-29, 233-38; cf Marshall, supra note 49, at 208-12 (noting Senate's role in confirma-
tion of federal judges).
337. Many have noted that Congress can typically confer Article III standing by creating a statu-
tory right whose violation may be prosecuted in federal court. See, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973); Berger, Standing To Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Require-
ment?, 78 YAi.F L.J. 816 (1969). It is less noted, but equally true, that state legislatures can likewise
confer standing. This way of thinking about standing might require re-examination of the holdings of
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), and Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
338. One of the main arguments for state interposition in Madison's Virginia Report of 1800
stressed that many constitutional encroachments by federal officers might not be challengeable in Arti-
cle III courts. See The Virginia Report of 1800, supra note 300, at 305-06. However, if state govern-
ments can confer standing and force an Article III test of a wide range of dubious federal activity,
there is little need to swallow the bitter pill of interposition in order to counteract federal judicial
impotence.
339. Whereas the Hart school emphasizes the role of some state officials as judicial agents (im-
pliedly independent of politics), the neo-Federalist view emphasizes the role of all state officials as
state agents (impliedly independent of the national government). Neo-Federalist remedies may be
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The 1882 Supreme Court case of United States v. Lee""0 elegantly dra-
matizes this neo-Federalist synthesis. If the case did not exist, one would
be tempted to invent it. George Lee, son of General Robert E. Lee,
brought suit in ejectment to recover possession of the family estate in Ar-
lington, Virginia, the site of today's Arlington Cemetery. Federal military
officers were occupying the lands under claim of federal title, the validity
of which Lee disputed. During the Civil War, Congress had imposed on
the land a nominal property tax that, under the terms of the statute, had
to be paid in person by the land's owner. General Lee, otherwise engaged
at the time, graciously declined Congress's invitation to walk unarmed
into the enemy camp. Payment was tendered by others on Lee's behalf,
but the government refused to accept. The government then foreclosed on
the estate, and bought the land itself (at a bargain price) at the auction.
Over the defendants' vigorous assertions of sovereign immunity, the Su-
preme Court held for Lee because the federal government's actions had
violated the Fifth Amendment's due process and takings clauses.
Yet it was a state law cause of action that had enabled Lee to get into
an Article III court in the first place. The case stands as a poetic reminder
of the ways in which, short of interposition, nullification, secession, and
Civil War (a war that perhaps could also have been captioned United
States v. Lee)34 states may serve as the "instrument of redress" for un-
constitutional federal conduct.
3 42
2. A Neo-Federalist Future: Converse-1983
A neo-Federalist view of constitutional remedies helps us to see more
clearly what we have been doing all along: Perhaps without always realiz-
furnished by either state judges fashioning common law or state legislators enacting statutes. The
allocation of authority between these branches, and their internal organizational structure, are basi-
cally issues of state constitutional law. Since the Federalist Constitution nowhere prescribes the mech-
anism of appointment, tenure of office, salary guarantees, mode of removal, or substantive jurisdiction
of state judges, the document evidently presumes that these officers may at times be "judges" in name
only, little different from state legislators. The Hart school notwithstanding, it is unlikely that the
Federalists placed their "ultimate" reliance on state judges qua judges. See Amar, supra note 9,
235-38.
340. 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
341. See supra note 19. It is perhaps worthy of note that final military judgment was entered at
the Appomattox Courthouse.
342. Both Tarble's Case, decided in 1872, and Lee, handed down a decade later, obliged the
Justices to begin to define the Civil War's implications for federalism. The holding of Tarble's Case
correctly affirmed the supremacy of the federal judiciary over state judicial systems, see Amar, supra
note 9, at 235-38, but the language seemed to go further. At times, the Tarble Court seemed to
trivialize the legitimate role of states in protecting constitutional supremacy from federal encroach-
ments. Lee's holding backed away from this extreme view, yet the Court's language was less than
resounding in affirming the permissibility and value of state law checks against federal unconstitution-
ality. But cf Hill, supra note 313, at 1124-25 (reading Lee to derive cause of action directly from
Constitution rather than state law).
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ing it, states have furnished, and are continuing to furnish, remedial aid
and comfort to citizens victimized by federal unconstitutionality. Yet neo-
Federalism is more than an historical connect-the-dots exercise through
which we can see a larger pattern emerging from seemingly unrelated
cases such as Bivens, Tarble's Case, and United States v. Lee. To recon-
ceptualize past events is to imagine future possibilities. A brief exploration
of one possible remedial scheme that states might try to adopt in the fu-
ture will help to illuminate the scope and the limits of state power. 43
Once the symmetry of the legal check of federalism is understood, a
state government might be inclined to adopt a simple state statute in-
verting the language of 42 U.S.C. section 1983 in something like the fol-
lowing manner:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of [the United States], subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of [this state] or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immu-
nities secured by the Constitution, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
Would such a converse-1983 statute be permissible? At first blush, it
might seem vulnerable to the following criticism: Unlike the other state
law causes of action canvassed above, which applied generally against
both private actors and government officials, a converse-1983 statute ex-
plicitly singles out the federal government as its target. It thus offends the
basic principles of McCulloch v. Maryland44; it is an impermissibly dis-
criminatory tax on federal instrumentalities. And the legitimacy of section
1983 itself does not necessarily prove the constitutionality of a converse-
1983 statute, for as Chief Justice Marshall noted in McCulloch, very dif-
ferent principles are involved when the nation taxes a state. The part is
represented in, and therefore may legitimately be bound by, the whole,
but the reverse is not true.
3 4 5
This line of criticism, while forceful, must be qualified. There is all the
difference in the world between a state's attempt to thwart a legitimate,
"necessary and proper" course of conduct adopted by the national govern-
ment-the issue in McCulloch-and an otherwise analogous attempt to
thwart illegitimate, ultra vires conduct that lacks constitutional sanc-
343. Although attempting to address in at least cursory fashion the major constitutional issues
posed by the generic converse-1983 statute, I shall not try to canvass the complex set of subsidiary
questions that would be presented in the actual drafting of any particular statute.
344. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
345. Id. at 435-36.
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tion.346 A converse-1983 action does single out federal officials, but they
deserve to be singled out. They wield extraordinary powers, capable of
extraordinary abuse.3417 The framers expected and desired-indeed, relied
on-states to keep a special eye on the federal government.
3 48
A close reading of McCulloch itself confirms these principles. Chief
Justice Marshall structures his opinion as a response to two questions.
First, he considers whether the federal government can constitutionally
create a national bank. Only after answering this question in favor of the
federal government does he consider the second question of whether
Maryland may nevertheless tax that bank. The clear implication of this
way of structuring the analysis (and of several artfully drafted passages in
the Court's discussion of the second question" 9) is that if the Bank had
been unconstitutionally chartered, then Maryland could have taxed it.
350
It would have been an improperly authorized entity that could in no way
partake of federal tax immunity.
McCulloch may nonetheless help to define the limits of permissible
state remedies. For example, if a state were to provide for a minimum of
one million dollars of presumed damages to any citizen whose home was
unconstitutionally searched by the federal government, the remedy should
346. The converse-1983 statute proposed in the text is narrowly tailored: It penalizes only uncon-
stitutional federal conduct. As Dean Ely has pointed out, a good fit with a legitimate purpose goes a
long way towards relieving suspicions of unconstitutional motivation. J. ELY, supra note 234, at
145-48.
Nevertheless, the very existence of a converse-1983 cause of action might be thought to threaten
legitimate federal operations by subjecting federal officers to possibly frivolous lawsuits. This danger,
however, is not unique to converse-1983 suits-it applies equally to trespass suits, to Bivens suits, to
habeas suits, and indeed, to virtually all litigation under the "American rule." Should Congress want
to protect legitimate operations from bad-faith harrassment, it should not be allowed to oust all con-
verse-1983 actions: Such a reaction would itself be a peorly tailored proposal that would equally
immunize illegitimate federal conduct and destroy legitimate legal claims of victims. See infra text
accompanying notes 361-67. Congress could, however, provide for fee-shifting, which would tend to
discourage frivolous claims against federal officers while fully preserving the rights of citizens who can
prevail on the merits. Moreover, under the principles of the Tenth Amendment and Erie, the "argua-
bly procedural" nature of a federal fee-shifting proposal would clearly justify its application in federal
courts entertaining converse-1983 cases. See Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV.
693 (1974).
347. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 391-95 (1971).
348. Of course, a state could eliminate all concern about discrimination by extending its converse-
1983 statute to its own officers. While sufficient to save the statute's constitutionality, such an exten-
sion of the statute should not be necessary. The point is obviously an important one, for many of the
political incentives that would generate a converse-1983 statute flow precisely from its asymmetric
quality. If federal judges forced state governments to police themselves as vigorously as they police the
federal government, many would police neither well. At least in the area of constitutional misdeeds, a
certain amount of competition (and even discrimination) is positively desirable-"ambition must be
made to counteract ambition" to protect "the rights of the people."
349. See 17 U.S. at 425-30 (speaking of "constitutional laws of the Union," "laws made in
pursuance of the constitution," "legitimate operations of a supreme government," and of federal
"right. . . to preserve" the bank (emphasis added)); see also id. at 427 ("The power of Congress to
create, and of course to continue, the bank, was the subject of the preceding part of this opinion; and
is no longer to be considered as questionable.").
350. Or at least, very different ground rules about state taxation would have applied.
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fail as an impermissible "tax" on federal operations. In a very limited
sense, some violations of the Constitution by the federal government are
inevitably necessary-if not, strictly speaking, proper-exercises of federal
power. Thus, the creation of a state remedy that goes far beyond what is
required to make the victim whole-a tax masquerading as a rem-
edy-would violate McCulloch principles.
A slightly different formulation could perhaps be derived from a com-
ment in McCulloch's closing paragraph: "This opinion . . . does not ex-
tend to a tax paid by the real property of the bank, in common with the
other real property within the State . . . ." This passage might sup-
port the following test for federal courts: A converse-1983 statute should
be upheld so long as the burden of proof and damage provisions are
roughly analogous to those under comparable causes of action that apply
against private citizens. Because potential defendants under these other
statutes are represented in the legislature, these statutes are unlikely to
contain excessively punitive liability rules; thus this "nondiscrimination"
test and the "nontax" test outlined above are unlikely to yield sharply
divergent results.
Even under current Court doctrine, no sovereign immunity bar would
stand in the way of a converse-1983 statute. As a doctrinal matter, sover-
eign immunity is inapplicable to damage suits against government officials
in their individual capacities, where defendants have to pay out of their
own pockets. As a practical matter, a converse-1983 statute-especially if
it provided for strict liability, as it could consistently with McCul-
loch 352-might well force the federal government to indemnify its officers.
Without a promise of indemnification for negligent or good faith (but
nonetheless unconstitutional) conduct, who would agree to work for the
government?
3 53
Direct indemnification (or higher salaries to compensate employees for
their additional liability risk) would require payment from general funds.
The benefits of a converse-1983 statute would be local, but the costs
would be dispersed. In such a situation, every state legislature would have
incentives to follow the lead of the first state whose converse-1983 statute
was upheld by federal courts. The structure of payoffs may seem to create
351. 17 U.S. at 436.
352. 1 am assuming that the various individual immunities that currently limit Bivens actions, see
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), derive not from the limited nature of the federal constitu-
tional right itself, but from institutional limitations on federal courts creating a margin of under-
enforcement. See supra text accompanying notes 323-25; cf. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)
(construing section 1983 as providing for various immunities of state officers in absence of clear con-
gressional statement to contrary).
353. See Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REv.
209, 227-28 (1963). For a careful examination of the differences between individual liability cum
indemnification and direct entity liability, see P. SCHUCK, supra note 249, at 82-121.
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the potential for a classic "race to the bottom," yet I believe we should
more properly view the political incentives as inducing a race to the top, a
race to the banner of ubi jus, ibi remedium, a healthy race refereed by
federal judges 54 ready to keep the contestants within the bounds of Mc-
Culloch and Bivens.
3 55
Indeed, federal courts should allow states to go one step beyond individ-
ual strict liability in fashioning converse-1983 remedies. As we have seen,
full remedies for constitutional wrongs will often call for direct govern-
ment liability.38" Yet the federal government may hesitate to create a
cause of action against itself, so the question arises whether state govern-
ments can create such a cause of action. As a practical matter, the ques-
tion is almost identical to that raised by a strict liability converse-1983
statute, since, as noted above, such a statute would likely oblige the federal
government to absorb the ultimate cost. As a doctrinal matter, of course,
the cases are different because current Court doctrine would immunize the
federal sovereign from suit. Yet we have seen that current doctrine rests
on a fatally flawed understanding of sovereignty and should be dis-
354. Every converse-1983 case would raise at least two federal questions. First, did the defendant
violate the federal Constitution? Second, did the state remedy go beyond simply making plaintiff
whole? The last word on these federal questions must in every case lie with an Article III court, and
not a state court. See supra text accompanying notes 332-42. As a constitutional matter, Article III
appellate review of state court decisions would suffice. If, however, Congress were concerned about
state trial court overexuberance, it could of course always provide for removal or exclusive federal
jurisdiction. Id. Thus, any concern about "abuse" of converse-1983 must ultimately be framed as a
concern about federal courts, and not state governments. Indeed, state lawmakers might do well to
borrow a page from certain long-arm jurisdiction statutes by simply authorizing damages "up to the
limits" of the state's constitutional authority. Such open-ended language would once again leave fed-
eral courts with the task of defining and enforcing those limits.
355. Recent Supreme Court cases have dramatically restricted the use of the exclusionary rule to
remedy Fourth Amendment violations. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Some
state legislatures might try to respond by providing for a state exclusionary remedy applicable not just
against state police officers, as Justice Brennan's scholarship invites, see Brennan, State Constitutions
and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977) (state constitutions may
provide individuals with rights against state government that go beyond federal constitutional min-
ima), but against federal agents as well. Such an effort, however, faces problems on two fronts.
First, a plausible argument can be made that the exclusionary rule overcompensates its beneficiaries
by excluding unlawfully seized evidence that probably would have been seized anyway had the police
followed the proper procedures ex ante. Put another way, the exclusionary rule may be applied in
situations where, more likely than not, the illegality of a search-due to, say, a technical defect of the
warrant-was not a but-for cause of the seizure of evidence. (In this respect, the exclusionary rule's
overcompensation of victims is analogous to the hypothetical involving one million dollars of presumed
damages, supra text accompanying note 351.)
Second, a state exclusionary rule would raise knotty Tenth Amendment and Erie issues insofar as it
attempted to bind federal judges. The rule undeniably excludes material and probative evidence from
trials whose primary focus is the criminal defendant's guilt or innocence. A federal rule that rejected
exclusion in favor of promoting the truth-seeking function of that trial is more than "arguably proce-
dural." See Ely, supra note 346. Unlike the other substantive causes of action considered above, the
procedural nature of the exclusionary rule could perhaps limit the extent to which it necessarily binds
federal courts as a residuary rule of decision.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 244-60.
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carded."' 7 A state law combining converse-1983 principles with rules of
entity liability and respondeat superior should be upheld, so long as the
liability provisions aimed at U.S.A., Inc. roughly track rules for private
corporations under analogous state laws.
The complete absence of converse-1983 laws from state statute books
today may seem to undercut the descriptive force of the neo-Federalist
view that state legislatures have incentives to "race" to protect citizens
against federal abuse.3"' However, there may be a quite simple explana-
tion: State legislatures have not passed these statutes because they have
been unaware of their constitutional authority to do so, and more gener-
ally, unaware of their special role and responsibility in protecting their
constituents from federal lawlessness. This is perhaps a reflection of the
inadequacy of contemporary legal discourse about federalism: In discard-
ing the extremism of nullification and interposition, we have also thrown
away a rich antebellum tradition emphasizing state protection of constitu-
tional norms against the federal government.3 59 Today's nationalists
wrongly interpret the Civil War and the civil rights movement as estab-
lishing the supremacy of the national government, instead of the
supremacy of the Constitution. They overread McCulloch and are overly
hostile to states. By contrast, the Justices seem bent on invoking state sov-
ereignty only as a paradoxical check against legitimate congressional and
constitutional rights.360 They overlook McCulloch and are overly hostile to
remedies. Neither side has pursued a line of analysis that would welcome
converse-1983 statutes. And so the legal imaginations of our state
lawmakers have been unduly limited.
357. Id.
358. Of course, state common law causes of action have always helped to keep the federal govern-
ment in check. See supra text accompanying notes 312-42. But after the Civil War, state remedies
against federal misconduct did not keep pace with expanded congressional remedies against state law-
lessness: Congress adopted section 1983, but states failed to extend their antebellum common law
tradition to the more self-conscious device of converse-1983 statutes.
359. Compare Amphictyon, supra note 107, at 58-59 (speaking of right and duty of states as
"sentinels of the public liberty" to "remonstrate against the encroachments of power" and "resist the
advances of usurpation, tyranny and oppression" and citing The Federalist No. 28) and 1 J. STORY,
supra note 21, §§ 289-291 ("Perhaps, from the very nature and organization of our government...
there will . . . be a strong line of division between those, who adhere to the state governments, and
those, who adhere to the national government. . . . [Tihis very division of empire may . . . be the
means of perpetuating our rights and liberties, by keeping alive in every State at once a sincere love of
its own government, and a love of the Union, and by cherishing in different minds a jealousy of each,
which shall check, as well as enlighten, public opinion.") with Choper, The Scope of Judicial Power
Vis-h-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YAt.E L.J. 1552, 1611 (1977) ("the
assertion that federalism was meant to protect, or does in fact protect, individual constitutional free-
doms has no solid historical or logical basis").
360. See supra note 211.
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3. The Remedial Dialogue
One final set of complications should be noted. The variety of remedies
adopted by different states might create a crazy quilt of legal intricacies
threatening to confound efficient and uniform execution of national opera-
tions, and perhaps tending to erode the sense of national identity that the
Constitution was meant to symbolize. In such a situation, Congress might
seek to preempt these various state remedies with a uniform regime of
exclusive federal remedies. Yet we must not bow too quickly to this asser-
tion of federal power; the remedial imperative must be harmonized with,
rather than sacrificed to, the desiderata of government efficiency and na-
tional unity.
The Tenth Amendment can aid analysis here. The reserved law-
making power of the states means that state-created remedies are auto-
matically in force, unless displaced by a federal law falling within the
finite (though broad) powers of the national government. Congress enjoys
no explicit power to preempt state remedies for unconstitutional federal
conduct. Moreover, whereas .congressional power to create federal reme-
dies for federal constitutional wrongs seems obviously "necessary and
proper," the power of Congress to destroy state remedies is not so obvi-
ously implicit in our constitutional structure. Furthermore, where the
state is performing a vital and (to borrow from the lexicon of recent Tenth
Amendment case law) "traditional" state function361 of policing against
federal constitutional wrongs, countervailing federal power should not be
lightly assumed262 To give Congress plenary power to nullify any state
remedy it disliked would disturb the careful constitutional balance of fed-
eralism, and would ultimately imperil individual constitutional liberty by
weakening an important check against federal abuse. 63
Congress must not be allowed to use national uniformity as a pretext to
361. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 683 (1982) (quoting National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976)).
362. See generally Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities in
Perspective, 1981 Sup. C'r. REv. 81. Although Professor Nagel's analytic framework to my mind fails
to justify the Court's holding in National League of Cities, the framework would, it seems, justify
strict judicial review of any congressional attempt to preempt state law remedies against unconstitu-
tional federal conduct.
363. The government's brief in Bivens buttressed its argument that federal courts should not infer
a damage remedy directly under the Constitution by pointing to the role of states in restraining abuses
of federal power. On the issue before the Bivens Court, this argument borders on non sequitur: Fed-
eralism and separation of powers are not mutually exclusive, but mutually reinforcing and comple-
mentary structures for fully vindicating constitutional rights. See supra text accompanying notes
323-25. The government's argument, however, does suggest why congressional attempts to destroy
state remedies should receive special scrutiny. Indeed, it is noteworthy that in response to myriad and
at times obstructionist lawsuits against federal officials based on state law causes of action in the
nineteenth century, Congress responded not by attempting to destroy the causes of action themselves,
but simply by providing for removal jurisdiction. See Gibbons, supra note 179, at 1948 n.319.
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deny full remedies for federal unconstitutional conduct. Uniformity is just
as well served by uniformly full, as by uniformly inadequate remedies.
Thus, to demonstrate a bona fide purpose-such as the avoidance of an
obstacle course of diverse state law remedies-Congress should be obliged
to provide an exclusive federal remedy that is as effective as the fullest
state remedy 84 it seeks to displace. 65 Unless Congress furnishes such a
remedy, federal courts should invalidate any effort to preempt state reme-
dies." 8' Hence, even where states are denied the last word on remedies for
federal constitutional wrongs, they have the power to compel a dialogic
response from Congress that is more generous to aggrieved citizens than
the congressional status quo ante.87
IV. CONCLUSION
The neo-Federalist view sketched here recognizes the vital role of fed-
eral courts, but also emphasizes the important part that other institu-
tions-such as Congress, state courts, and state legislatures-can play in
shaping and promoting constitutional values. The argument here is not
merely historical, but hortatory: Even if states have not always taken seri-
ously their role in protecting individual constitutional rights against the
federal government, they should do so. All those who wield the power of
government-Court and Congress, state judge and state legislator-should
take seriously the obligation to use that power to promote the ultimate
sovereignty of the People as embodied in the Constitution. 68
364. This assumes, of course, that the state remedy itself is not overcompensatory, and therefore
voidable by federal courts even without congressional intervention. See supra text accompanying notes
351-55.
365. Even if this rule were rejected, federal courts could at least deploy a clear statement doctrine
allowing them to follow state remedial law absent express congressional preemption.
366. Any state law remedy-whether judge-made or statutory-for a violation of a congression-
ally created right is subject to a strict preemption analysis. The question is always one of congres-
sional intent: Did Congress, as the source of the right, intend to allow the particular supplemental
state remedy? See Note, State Incorporation of Federal Law: A Response to the Demise of Implied
Federal Rights of Action, 94 YALE L.J. 1144, 1157-62 (1985). Here, by contrast, we deal with rights
not of congressional creation, rights against the federal government. In this area, the remedial role of
state governments is one of constitutional entitlement, not congressional suffrance.
367. Once again, the analogy between separation of powers and federalism is instructive. The
remedial dialogue between the states and Congress contemplated here closely parallels the Court-
Congress remedial dialogue contemplated by the Supreme Court's creation of "constitutional common
law" in Bivens. In Bivens, the Court fashioned a damage remedy in the first instance for federal
violations of the Fourth Amendment, but indicated that this remedy could be displaced if Congress
chose to create an alternative, "equally effective" remedy. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Agents, 403
U.S. 388, 397 (1971). In fact, Congress later took up the Court's invitation to participate in a reme-
dial dialogue when it amended the Federal Torts Claims Act in the wake of Bivens. See Pub. L. No.
93-253, § 2; 88 Stat. 50 (1974) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982)).
368. At the outset of this essay, I posed the question whether our Constitution was "divided
against itself." See supra text accompanying note 9. We are now in a position to see the answer to
that question. Unlike the Confederations of the 1780's and 1860's, the Federalist Constitution securely
rests on the sovereignty of a unitary People. Although the Constitution does divide power among
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Today's Court seems to have lost sight of the People-and so it has
transmogrified doctrines of federalism and sovereignty into their very an-
titheses. Sovereign immunity allows "sentinels" hired to uphold the law to
become gunmen who are a law unto themselves. And "Our Federalism"
perverts a structure designed to assure full remedies for constitutional
wrongs into a system that regularly frustrates the remedial imperative.
Whenever the rhetoric of "states' rights" is deployed to defend states'
wrongs, our servants have become our masters; our rescuers, our
captors.1
6 9
The Constitution is two hundred years old this year. Perhaps the best
way we could celebrate this enduring document would be to ask whether
current legal doctrines do full justice to it, to its makers, and to ourselves.
competing agents, it does so precisely to protect that unitary People: The Constitution's compound
structure is in harmony with its substantive themes of popular sovereignty and limited government.
369.
The perverted use of genus and species in logic and of impressions and ideas in metaphysics,
have never done mischief so extensive or so practically pernicious, as has been done by States
and sovereigns, in politics and jurisprudence; in the politics and jurisprudence even of those,
who wished and meant to be free. ...
[ .. S]tates and governments were made for man . . . [yet] his creatures and servants have
first deceived, next vilified, and at last oppressed their master and maker. ...
• . . Let a state be considered as subordinate to The People.
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 454-55 (1793) (opinion of Wilson, J.) (emphasis altered).
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